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ABSTRACT 
i 
THE LEGALIZATION OF INTIMACY IN MEXICO 
by Manuel Castillo 
 
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor iuris (Dr. iur.) at the Faculty of Law, of the Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin in Germany. The main scope of the research is the legalization of intimacy, using 
Mexican law as a case study. Considering that the right to intimacy arises from the right 
to privacy, this research discusses the fundamental human rights that constitute a 
framework for the legalization of intimacy. The research provides an approach to the 
analysis of this subject that includes what has been introduced as the Spheres of 
Intimacy and the Structures of Intimacy. The issue of gender is discussed in its 
relationship with the law and intimacy. From a queer perspective, this dissertation 
questions the equality of marriage and same-sex marriage, arguing that a new form of 
legalization of intimacy for all is needed. Furthermore, this study provides a 
comparative review of Mexican legislations within the framework of international law. 
At the end, this dissertation offers a proposal for the legalization of intimacy in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
Keywords: 
 
Intimacy, privacy, marriage, family, sexuality, civil union, partnership, matrimony, 
cohabitation, concubinage, Mexico, human rights, LGBTQI, partners, spouses, love, 
law, relationship, gay, queer, feminist, masculine, feminine. 
_____ 
 
DIE LEGALISIERUNG DER INTIMITÄT IN MEXIKO 
von Manuel Castillo 
 
Diese Dissertation wurde zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor iuris (Dr. 
iur.) an der Juristischen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in Deutschland 
vorgelegt. Das Hauptthema der Forschung ist die Legalisierung der Intimität, am 
Fallbeispiel des mexikanischen Rechts. Mit der Prämisse, dass das Recht auf Intimität 
sich aus dem Recht auf Privatsphäre ergibt, bespricht diese Forschungsarbeit die 
grundlegenden Menschenrechte, die einen Rahmen für die Legalisierung der Intimität 
ermöglichen. Die Einführung, der Sphären und Strukturen der Intimität, liefert eine 
Vorgehensweise zur Analyse dieses Themas. Es erfolgt eine Betrachtung der Frage der 
Geschlechter in ihrer Beziehung mit dem Recht und der Intimität. Aus einer „queer“ 
Perspektive hinterfragt diese Dissertation die Gleichstellung von Ehe und 
gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehe, mit dem Argument, ob eine neue Form der Legalisierung 
der Intimität für alle notwendig ist. Darüber hinaus, liefert diese Arbeit eine 
vergleichende Bewertung der mexikanischen Rechtsvorschriften im Rahmen des 
Völkerrechts. Am Ende der Dissertation, wird ein Vorschlag zur Legalisierung der 
Intimität im einundzwanzigsten Jahrhundert dargeboten. 
 
Schlagwörter: 
 
Intimität, Privatsphäre, Ehe, Familie, Sex, Sexualität, Lebenspartnerschaft, 
Partnerschaft, Ehe, Lebensgemeinschaft, Konkubinat, Mexiko, Menschenrechte,  
LGBTQI, Partner, Ehepartner, Liebe, Recht, Beziehung, schwul, feministisch, 
männlich, weiblich. 
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For many centuries, societies and individuals have valued and pursued intimacy. 
Primarily, in a local (regional and/or cultural) form of marriage, individuals have 
formed new units of cohabitation, developed new relationships and family ties. 
Nowadays, the 21st century is quite demanding, and factors like globalization and the 
growth of the world population after the baby boom generation have created new 
opportunities for different forms of intimate interaction between individuals. The 
development of societies and the availability of information, which includes facts as 
well as vision, passive data as well as interactive spheres, via new technologies, have 
enabled individuals to question their own desires and to separate them from socially 
imposed volitions. Marriage is now an option both for women and for men, but not 
the only one. There are additional forms of intimacy that allow individuals to be 
together, sometimes but not necessarily with legal recognition, and they are not 
necessarily matrimony. The transformation and evolution of societies and peoples 
includes new trends in their sexual life, and also in their lifestyle. This encompasses 
new forms of intimacy, and different combinations of the individuals who engage in 
intimacy. That is to say, man and woman is not the only combination; but also, man 
and man, woman and woman, and woman and man (men not being the priority).  
 
Many events took place in the twentieth century, including feminism and gay 
liberation movements, and opened the doors for related rights and obligations for 
individuals. What is known as the sexual revolution that took place between the 1960s 
and the 1980s can be seen as just the preamble for what is now occurring, which 
includes an evolution in the legalization of intimacy. In previous decades, social 
movements that claimed more sexual liberties focused on the acceptance of different 
sexualities. Now, they seem to be more interested in the recognition of their intimacy 
with other individuals; and in this domain, sexuality is just a component.  
 
What is important – though – is not just acknowledgement and tolerance, but 
rather a legal recognition of intimacy that includes the enforcement of its rights and 
obligations. This is already the case for heterosexual couples in most of the world. 
Nevertheless, other sexual minorities are disadvantaged or simply unable to get 
I. INTRODUCTION 
2 
appropriate recognition of their intimate partners. Some countries have already 
approved legislations that enable the legal recognition of intimacy for same-sex 
couples. Unfortunately, these countries are outnumbered by a big majority of 
territories where this issue is not even debated yet. Mexico is currently one of the 
countries where the debate around gay marriage and LGBTI rights has lasted for years, 
and there is still a lot to be done in order to have a fair protection of human rights for 
these minorities. For those who seek recognition, the future seems to be promising 
and the forecast is positive, because some states have already embraced these sexual 
minorities by granting them some sort of rights for their intimacy. Nonetheless, these 
rights are not equally recognized at the federal level.  
 
In any case, the social demand for same-sex marriage in Mexico has a 
heteronormative footprint that is not discussing the overarching and gender-neutral 
issue of intimacy. Considering this fact, this dissertation will provide a new and 
distinct approach to the legal discussion of gay marriage; one where the core issue is 
intimacy, i.e. not just marriage or merely being gay. 
 
 This dissertation introduces an innovative analysis of intimacy that explores 
the way it is legalized, with the case study of Mexico. Intimacy is a human and thus 
universal topic; consequently, and insofar this is true, the ideas presented in this 
research may also be applied in different countries. In this research, the issue of 
intimacy is observed and handled differently than in many other debates, and it could 
serve as an example to examine intimacy and its legalization in other jurisdictions 
with this same method. This thorough study on the legalization of intimacy in Mexico 
is divided in six chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and provides background 
information. Chapter II will provide the conceptual framework around the question of 
intimacy in general. This framework includes the identification of what this research 
calls the Spheres of Intimacy and the Structures of Intimacy. Chapter III describes 
how the legalization of intimacy in Mexico has evolved, detailing the current forms 
that are legally recognized, some court cases and a review of the applicable 
international law. Chapter IV deals with the fundamental rights of intimacy, which 
encompass constitutional law, human rights and comparative law. This section finds 
the legal ground for the right to intimacy as a derivate of the right to privacy 
embraced by the Mexican constitution. The following, Chapter V, reconsiders the 
 3 
 
relationship between law and gender and its relevance for the study of intimacy. At 
this point, the research will introduce a more critical legal reasoning for the debate on 
gay marriage, taking into account queer, feminist, and conservative positions.  The 
concluding Chapter VI at the end of this dissertation offers a new proposal for the 
legalization of intimacy in the 21st century. This proposal was drafted after the 
analysis of the current legalization of intimacy in Mexico and with a more profound 
understanding of intimacy in general, regardless of the sex and sexuality of 
individuals. One of the arguments of this research is that individuals should be 
empowered to determine the way they want to manage their intimacy and the state 
should solely set up the legal platform for this management. Same-sex couples should 
have that right as well, and this is justified with the review of the connection between 
human rights and intimacy. After reading this research, it will be clear how intimacy 
is legalized in Mexico and how it could be legalized in a different way, both in 
Mexico and abroad.  
 
I.1. An insight into Mexico  
 
According to the most recent federal census, Mexico has a population of at least 
112,336,538 citizens.1 Some of them are married, some of them are divorced and 
some of them are planning on getting married sometime in the future. At some point, 
they have been or will be interested in intimacy and the legal aspects of it. The 
registries have recorded a little bit over half a million new matrimonies per year in the 
last decade.2 The behavior for marriage appears to be quite steady, approximately the 
same number of people get married every year; and more than half of those who do 
get married, accomplish their goal between the age of 20 and 29.3 However, the 
numbers for divorce are more surprising because of their upward trend. The divorce 
rate has almost tripled since 1995; in the last recorded year, the rate of people getting 
divorced came close to 16% of those who got married that year.4 The main grounds 
for divorce that were reported were, for the most part (88%), de facto separation and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). Anuario estadístico de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos 2012. Mexico: INEGI, 2013.  Chart 2.1. 
2 Ibidem, Chart 2.10, the figure registered for 2011 was 570,954.!
3 Ibidem!
4 Ibidem, Chart 2.11. 
4 
no-fault (by mutual agreement).5 Currently available statistics from the government 
only show the data for matrimony. Unfortunately, by the time the most recent census 
was completed, there were no additional structures of intimacy that could be surveyed. 
For instance, it would have been quite interesting to read information regarding the 
number of households with same-sex partners, married or not. Hopefully, this 
information will be included in the next census, considering that the social reality has 
changed a lot in the past decade. 
  
 With these figures, it becomes evident that the legalization of intimacy is a 
phenomenon that directly affects at least half a million Mexican citizens and 
foreigners who reside in Mexico every year. Additionally, there are more individuals 
affected indirectly, like children and other third parties. Therefore, it is important to 
understand this phenomenon more clearly.  
 
Furthermore, the divorce rates also suggest that there might be some areas for 
improvement that could help individuals to define the rules for their intimacy 
differently, and to improve their relationships in general; of course, with the 
protection of the legal system. Not only is it important to improve one’s relationships 
with others, but also to secure them legally with official recognition of that 
relationship by the state. That is why this dissertation approaches the issue of 
intimacy from a legal perspective, because individuals should be informed of the 
impact of the legalization of their intimacy, or the lack thereof.  
 
Just as many other developing countries, Mexico is trying to promote the 
protection of human rights. The constitutional amendments of June 9, 2011 are the 
most transcendental reforms in human rights matters in Mexico since the 1980’s.6 
Chapter IV will discuss these reforms and their connection with intimacy. That 
section will explain why the right to privacy and intimacy should be construed as 
human rights that fall within the protection of the constitution. Yet the reader might 
wonder: Given the atrocious murders in Ciudad Juarez (Mexico) and similar human 
rights violations taking place every day in the country, why is it important to learn 
about marriage, gay marriage and intimacy? It may not be necessarily obvious, but the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ibidem, Chart 2.12.!
6 OJF. June 10, 2011. First Section, pp. 2-5. 
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essence of the problem is the same: there is no gender equality in Mexico. And this is 
precisely one of the core topics that this dissertation tackles.  
 
Since 1993, Ciudad Juarez became famous for being – infamously – one of the 
most dangerous cities for women in the world. Neither the Mexican government nor 
the justice system has been able to solve this problem. This is why this research must 
embrace the issue of gender. The women-specific crimes that keep occurring are an 
indicator of the gender inequality in Mexico. Misogyny is represented in different 
forms; in Ciudad Juarez, these murders show the most extreme consequence of 
women-specific hatred. These deaths are just the symptoms of a more profound 
problem, gender inequality. The sentence of November 16, 2009 from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the case of Gonzalez et al (“Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico7 is a reminder of this sad reality, because Mexico, as a state, was found guilty. 
One of the findings during this procedure was that “the issue of gender is the common 
denominator of the violence in Ciudad Juarez, which ‘occurs as a culmination of a 
situation characterized by the reiterated and systematic violation of human rights.’ 
They alleged that “cruel acts of violence are perpetrated against girls and women 
merely because of their gender and, only in some cases, are they murdered as a 
culmination of this public and private violence.”8 Although the court in this case did 
not classify these particular murders as femicide, it is sadly a common practice in 
Mexico that has killed hundreds in Ciudad Juarez and thousands in Mexico as a 
whole.9 So, going back to the connection between human rights and intimacy, it is 
necessary to review the issue of gender in order to understand why the constitution 
must protect individuals equally. And this includes fair access to the legalization of 
their intimacy. Chapter V will particularly review the issue of gender and its 
relevance for the comprehension of intimacy and this legal research in general. 
 
I.2. Democracy, Constitutionalism and Legal Pluralism  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Gonzalez et al (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. C-Series No. 205.!
8 Ibidem, Section 128, p. 37.  
9 For further information about this topic, see: Bowden, Charles. Murder City: Ciudad Juárez and the 
Global Economy’s New Killing Fields. New York: Nation Books, 2010. 
6 
Mexico is still a developing country, and certainly full of contradictions. According to 
Forbes magazine, Carlos Slim (a Mexican citizen) has kept the record as the richest 
man in the world for four consecutive years,10 while a few million Mexicans still live 
in extreme poverty. Inequalities are everywhere in this developing democracy, and 
regarding the right to intimacy, this is not an exception. Heterosexuals in Mexico have 
the right to get married and are entitled to benefits out of marriage in the whole 
country; whereas same-sex couples can only get married in Mexico City and Quintana 
Roo, and may get some sort of benefits with a Civil Pact of Solidarity in Coahuila or a 
Civil Union in Colima. This restriction represents a discrimination based on sexual 
preferences and creates first-class and second-class citizens. In a democratic state, 
such differences should be eliminated. If the goal is to have an actual rule of law 
according to the constitutional provisions, then human rights should be respected at 
all times. There is a clear prohibition for discrimination within Article 1 in the 
Mexican Constitution; however, there are still many issues that must be challenged in 
order to reach a state of equality. Granting equal rights for the legalization of intimacy 
to same-sex couples is one of these challenges. 
 
In Mexico, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) has played a more 
important role since 2000, standing a solid institution regardless of the ruling party in 
the executive branch. As part of the democratization process, the SCJN has become 
more autonomous and more proactive. A culture of constitutionalism is since then 
shaping up; and crucial debates, like “The Valls Project”, empower the autonomy of 
the Court because the Court is now acting proactively with an investigatory approach 
to justice. Supreme Court Justice Sergio Valls was very proactive in the defense form 
marriage equality in Mexico City. As Chapter IV will report in detail, his project 
during the Motion of Unconstitutionality that attempted to invalidate the Mexico 
City’s marriage laws proved that the judicial power was independent from the 
executive branch. 
  
Before year 2000, the same political party in Mexico ruled by a factual 
absolute majority for more than seventy years. This political party acted as a quasi-
dictatorship that controlled all branches of government. After more than a decade of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Kroll, Luisa. Forbes.  Inside The 2013 Billionaires List: Facts and Figures. March 25, 2013.  
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political transition, the changes in the political structure of the country cannot only be 
seen in the congress and government, but they can be seen at the Supreme Court as 
well. Now, the decisions made there are not necessarily compatible with or dictated 
by the federal government. These changes are slow, but little by little, the judicial 
system is becoming stronger.  
 
The twentieth century was marked by a system of authoritarian 
presidentialism, where the Mexican presidents and their political party (the PRI) were 
the most powerful entities that controlled all institutions. Nowadays, there is more 
political and legal pluralism, different parties control different branches of 
government at different levels; federal, state, and local. Consequently, the SCJN is 
more independent and sovereign, less politics-oriented and more justice-centered. In 
acknowledgment of these positive developments, on December 10, 2013, the United 
Nations awarded the Mexican Supreme Court as one of the winners of the United 
Nations Prize in the Field of Human Rights for year 2013. This recognition added in 
the press release that: “The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice provides legal 
protections for constitutional rights of Mexican citizens and residents.  The national 
Supreme Court has accomplished very considerable progress in promoting human 
rights through its interpretations and enforcement of Mexico’s Constitution and its 
obligations under international law.  Additionally, the national Supreme Court has set 
important human rights standards for Mexico and the Latin American region.”11 The 
separation of powers envisioned by the constitution is now more real and the effects 
of constitutionalism are noticeable.  
 
Since its creation, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 has maintained a spirit of 
equality and social justice. This spirit, however, does not actually match the current 
reality. For instance, Mexico is still struggling to integrate the indigenous 
communities, and this challenge is not an easy task. Although the constitution, 
explicitly in Article 2, acknowledges these indigenous groups, the legal system and 
the access to justice in Mexico work in Spanish. As a result, these communities are 
disadvantaged and unable to social entitlements and justice in their native languages. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 United Nations. Press Release HR/5164. “Selection Committee Announces 2013 Winners Of United 
Nations Human Rights Prize.” URL=<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/hr5164.doc.htm> 
8 
The internal colonialism based upon the mainstream Spanish-speaking Mexican 
identity is reducing the indigenous communities, their languages and identities. 
Almost seven out of every 100 Mexicans speak an indigenous language; and out of 
this population, eighty percent are poor, half of them living in extreme poverty.12 
Women in indigenous groups are particularly affected, because they have fewer 
opportunities to succeed within their local groups and even fewer within the 
overarching Mexican establishment. Official statistics prove that indigenous women 
are a special concern that requires institutional priority; indicators show the 
inequalities in terms of health, education, access to services, law-enforcement and 
violence.13  
 
  Nevertheless, mainstream Mexico can also learn from some indigenous groups 
about gender equality. The Zapotec Indians, for instance, are an example of pre-
Colombian gender diversity. The city of Juchitán, in the Mexican state of Oaxaca, is 
one of the most tolerant cities in Mexico. For centuries, the Zapotec communities 
have embraced a third gender called “muxe”; the muxes are people born as men who 
dress as women or men indifferently, and perform some of the roles usually attributed 
to women. The muxes are embraced by the local population and are fully integrated. 
Anthropologist Lynn Stephen has observed that “while an active/passive system of 
sexual relations suggests inequality and hierarchy, the role of the muxe is defined not 
in terms of power or its absence in sexual interactions but in terms of the gendered 
social relations of work, food, dress, speech, and ritual.”14 The clash between the 
Hispanic tradition and the pre-Hispanic cultures, like the Zapotec, still coexists in 
some areas in Mexico; Oaxaca is just an example. This is part of the paradox of 
colonialism (previously Spanish, now mainstream Mexican), while the central 
Mexican culture is trying to educate the indigenous communities about gender 
equality; the dichotomization of gender is being reinforced. However, some of these 
tolerant pre-Hispanic 15  traditions should survive. Stephen points out that: “the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 OJF. February 27, 2013. Fourth Section, p. 2.!
13 Ibidem. For further information and statistics about indigenous communities in Mexico, see also: 
INEGI. The indigenous population in Mexico. Mexico: INEGI, 2004.!
14 Stephen, Lynn.  “Sexualities and Genders in Zapotec Oaxaca.”  Latin American Perspectives. Issue 
123, Vol. 29, No.2 (March 2002): 41-59. p. 55. 
15 For further information regarding the history of sexuality in Mexico, including the status quo at the 
time the Spanish colonization process began and pre-Hispanic homosexuality, see: Trueba Lara, Jose 
Luis. Historia de la Sexualidad en México. Mexico: Random House Mondadori, 2008. 
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simultaneous presence and absence of sexual labeling, and the centrality of gender as 
an organizing principle in sexual behavior suggest that sexuality and sexual identity 
have not been evenly deployed in concepts of social identity and selfhood…we see 
multiple historical strands of identity that have commingled for more than 500 years 
and continue to be in constant motion. The simultaneous influence in Zapotec 
communities of indigenous, Spanish colonial, and contemporary urban and 
transnational systems of gender and ideas about sex and sexuality suggests a rich and 
interesting future.”16 Amaranta Gomez Regalado (born as Jorge Gomez Regalado) 
was the first transsexual congressional candidate in Mexico in year 2003.17 Her 
nomination by Mexico Posible, a defunct political party, triggered a national debate 
about transsexuals and their rights in Mexico. Transsexual and Zapotec, she had the 
courage to run for a seat in congress; and even though she did not succeed, she is now 
a political activist. In July 2013, the first openly gay candidate for a municipality, 
Benjamin Medrano, was elected as mayor of Fresnillo, Zacatecas.18 These candidacies 
serve as examples of the legal pluralism that the Mexican democracy is currently 
experiencing. 
 
I.3. Gay rights and the critique of marriage  
 
Social activism in Mexico has grown exponentially since 1978, especially in bigger 
cities like Mexico City.19 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual (LGBT) groups are 
now more proactive when influencing political parties to include the gay rights 
agenda in the political debate. Nonetheless, the discussion around intersexuality is 
almost inexistent; and, as pointed out by Christian Rea, it does not have a political 
identity yet.20 Therefore, the term LGBTI, (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and 
Intersex) is seldom used in Mexico. Some of the objectives of these LGBT activists 
are: to get the authorities to prosecute hate crimes, to fight discrimination, to fight !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Stephen, p. 56.!
17 Medina, Antonio. La Jornada. “La nueva visibilidad lésbico-gay”. Mexico: UNAM, June 5, 2003.!
18 Stevenson, Mark. The Huffington Post. “Benjamin Medrano, Mexico's First Openly Gay Mayor, 
Elected In Rough North.” July 18, 2013. 
19  See! Diez, Jordi. La trayectoria política del movimiento Lésbico-Gay en México. Estudios 
Sociológicos. El Colegio de México. Vol. 29, No. 86 (May%Aug., 2011), pp. 687-712.  The author 
marks this date as the birth of the gay and lesbian movement in Mexico due to a demonstration that 
took place on July 26, 1978 in Mexico City. 
20 Rea, Christian. Intersexuales: La notable excepción de la regla. La Jornada.  May 7, 2009. 
10 
HIV/AIDS and to have marriage equality in the whole country.21 The goal of some 
gay activists is to have equal access to matrimony, and they are pushing their agendas 
through the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) at the National Commission 
for Sexual Diversity.22 However, the goal to have equal access to matrimony in the 
whole country is not changing the terms of marriage, but rather just making that 
available for same-sex couples. In other words, LGBT rights activists represented by 
this political party are implicitly agreeing with the current provisions for marriage, 
except the gender restriction for access. Nonetheless, they are not criticizing the 
actual obligations (fair or not) that one commits to in marriage. 
 
Considering the position of LGBT activists for marriage equality detailed 
above, it is also important to review the feminist perspective of marriage. Women are 
already able to marry men. However, not all women see marriage as an ideal form of 
legal union. Susan Moller Okin in Justice, Gender and the Family analyses 
thoroughly the vulnerability of women before, during and after marriage, she suggests 
that “Marriage continues the cycle of inequality set in motion by the anticipation of 
marriage and the related sex segregation of the workplace. Partly because of society’s 
assumption about gender, but also because women, on entering marriage, tend already 
to be disadvantages members of the work force, married women are likely to start out 
with less leverage in the relationship than their husbands.”23 This difference in access 
to income creates inequalities in the distribution of justice within the family, because 
it also grants the male figure more authority. Nicola Barker in Not The Marrying 
Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage also provides and extensive feminist 
critique of marriage that includes the legal consequences of marriage. Mexican 
Feminist Psychologist, Marina Castañeda, has studied the phenomenon of Mexican 
machismo for many years in her practice. In her book, The invisible machismo 
returns,24 she points out some of the imbalances in marriage, and in particular the 
assumed gender roles in Mexican homes. Castañeda argues that: “Matrimony, in its 
traditional form does not allow a periodical renegotiation of its own rules. But other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 For instance, see the Civil Association “Agenda LGBT, A.C.”, and its mission. 
URL=<http://www.agendalgbt.org.mx/> 
22 Comisión Nacional de la Diversidad Sexual. URL=<http://diversidad.prd.org.mx/> 
23 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender and the Family. USA: Basic Books Inc., 1989.  p.146. 
24 Castañeda, Marina. El Machismo Invisible Regresa. Mexico: Santillana Ediciones Generales, 2007. !
 11 
 
forms of relationships that we can observe today, for example homosexual couples, 
allow us to envisage different ways of maintaining egalitarian relationships in the 
long term.”25 She points out legal obstacles in Mexico that foster such inequalities. 
For instance, the monopoly of maternity attributed to women in marriage; which is 
promoted by regulations that allow women to take a maternity leave, but does not 
apply to men who might be willing to take a paternity leave.   
 
Elizabeth Brake also suggests that: “While many feminists have focused on 
the reform of marriage, others have argued for its abolition. It is sometimes claimed 
that marriage is inherently structured, socially, by sexist norms, precluding the 
possibility of true feminist reform. On such views, abolishing marriage is necessary to 
reshape social expectations and change patterns of choice accompanying it. For 
example, legal marriage may encourage women's economic dependence by enabling 
and providing incentives for it. Thus, the legal structure of marriage, in combination 
with social norms, is taken to encourage choices which disempower women relative 
to men.”26 After the Cohabitation Partnership Law was enacted in Mexico City, many 
opposite-sex couples decided to opt for a cohabitation partnership instead of 
matrimony. Even though they had the option to choose matrimony, they opted for a 
limited-liability version of the legalization of their intimacy. Even heterosexual 
couples were able to see more equality in a cohabitation partnership than in 
matrimony. Such imbalances in marriage will be discussed in Chapter III, and it will 
be clear why matrimony, as is it now, is not a perfect structure for the legalization of 
intimacy in Mexico. In marriage, women have a strong pressure to procreate. And 
with procreation, women become more susceptible to financial dependence from their 
husbands. Therefore, the impulse or social pressure for reproduction is one of the 
greatest challenges that women face during marriage. Men do not lose their power or 
independence after their children are born, because the duties of education and the 
household in general are usually delegated to women. Many women stop working 
after marriage or childbirth, this creates a dependent relationship with their husbands 
that will constrain their decisions based on this dependency. Abortion is only legal in 
Mexico City and only within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. In the rest of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Ibidem, pp. 237-238. 
26 Brake, Elizabeth. "Marriage and Domestic Partnership", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Section 5.1. 
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country, it is only possible under certain conditions, like rape and incest. These 
restrictions limit the capacity of women to make rational choices and do not foster 
their autonomy. 
 
 Considering this, it is difficult to fight for and advocate for gay marriage, 
because marriage is not perfect to begin with. To ban same-sex couples from 
matrimony is obviously a form of discrimination, but matrimony is not the answer 
either, the goal is to legalize intimacy efficiently. Hence, the approach of this 
dissertation to marriage is a more critical one, which has been influenced by queer 
studies.27 Cressida Heyes explains that “Queer politics, then, works to trouble the 
categories “gay” and “lesbian,” as well as “heterosexual” (or indeed other categories 
of social thought in general), and eschews a genetic quest for the origins of 
homosexuality. In addition to historicizing and contextualizing sexuality, including 
the very idea of sexual identity, the shift to queer is also characterized by 
deconstructive methods. Rather than understanding sexual identities as a set of 
discrete and independent social types, queer theorists adduce evidence and read to 
emphasize their mutual implication…Queer theorists point out that the homo/hetero 
dichotomy, like many others in western intellectual history that it arguably draws on 
and reinforces, is not only mutually implicated, but also hierarchical (heterosexuality 
is superior, normal, and originary, while homosexuality is inferior, deviant, and 
derivative) and masquerades as natural or descriptive.”28 
 
Thus, it is along this line of thought that this dissertation will tackle the issue 
of the legalization of intimacy in Mexico. In order to understand whether marriage is 
the most appropriate form of legalization of intimacy or not, the essence and legal 
elements of marriage must be deconstructed. It is necessary to understand the social 
and legal construct of marriage, and to analyze it separately from a given (hetero-) 
sexuality. The queer critique of marriage, that this dissertation will further develop in 
Chapter V, is that marriage is heteronormative. In other words, that it takes 
compulsory heterosexual principles as the ideal norm. This can be better understood 
with the following eloquent argument from Judith Butler: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 For more particular references on Queer Theory, see: Stychin, Carl F. Law’s Desire: Sexuality and 
the Limits of Justice. New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 140-156.!
28 Heyes, Cressida, "Identity Politics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Section 5. 
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“To say that one is for or against gay marriage is not always easy to do, since it may be that 
one wants to secure the right for those who wish to make use of it even as one does not want it 
for oneself, or it may be that one wants to counter the homophobic discourses that have been 
marshaled against gay marriage, but one does not want to be, therefore, in favor of it. Or it 
may be that one believes strongly that marriage is the best way for lesbian and gay people to 
go and would like to install it as a new norm, a norm for the future. Or it may be that one not 
only opposes it for oneself but for everybody, and that the task at end is to rework and revise 
the social organization of friendship, sexual contacts, and community to produce non-state-
centered forms of support and alliance, because marriage, given its historical weight, becomes 
an ‘option’ only by extending itself as a norm (and thus foreclosing options), one that also 
extends property relations and renders the social forms for sexuality more conservative.”29  
 
The issue at stake here is how to regulate and to legalize intimacy in such a way that it 
does not replicate the heterosexual formula for reproduction and intimate behavior; 
and at the same time, to respect equality for access to this intimate association and 
equality within it. As Butler underscores: “For a progressive social movement, even 
one that may want to produce gay marriage as an option for nonheterosexuals, the 
proposition that marriage should become the only way to sanction or legitimate 
sexuality is unacceptably conservative.”30 This research proposes a new way to 
legalize intimacy that would enable both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to 
engage in a different legal structure that will empower them to regulate their own 
intimacy, with more liberty, self-determination and equality. 
 
I.4. Research Question, Materials and Methodology  
 
This dissertation poses a specific research question, focuses on a distinct set of 
material and sources to answer it, and applies a scientific methodology throughout the 
research. It will be seen later how this research answers the research questions with 
primary and secondary sources, using scientific methods and also applying the 
approaches proposed by this same dissertation; in other words, making use of the 
ideas presented here. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Butler, Judith. Undoing Gender. USA: Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2004, p. 109.!
30 Ibidem!
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I.4.1. The Research Question 
 
During the initial sketch of this dissertation, the idea was to write about gay marriage 
in Mexico; how to fight for it and how to legalize it. However, as the analysis of this 
topic began to shape up, it became more and more evident that the issue at its core 
was not gay marriage, but rather a more comprehensive understanding of intimacy. 
The first phase of the research lead to the conclusion that marriage and same-sex 
marriage, for that matter, are just the visible surface of the more transcendental issue: 
Intimacy. As a result, the lead research question was rephrased as follows: 
 
How is intimacy legalized in Mexico? 
 
This lead question begs for additional answers to subsidiary questions, such as:  What 
is intimacy? What are the legal elements of intimacy? Is there a right to intimacy? 
Why should intimacy be legalized at all? The first hypothesis is that intimacy is a 
close reciprocal relationship of future-oriented companionship with attachment in 
different private domains. The second one is that the legal elements of intimacy are 
found in what will be described as the Spheres of Intimacy. These elements are then 
identified in different forms or Structures of Intimacy provided by the Civil Code and 
other separate legislations in Mexico. The third hypothesis is that the Mexican 
Constitution provides a set of fundamental human rights that enable a right to privacy 
out of which the right to intimacy arises. Consequently, individuals should have the 
right to intimacy, regardless of their sex, gender or any other characteristic; because 
the protection of human rights must be applicable to all without discrimination. A 
further hypothesis is that intimacy should be legalized, but with a different approach, 
a regulation for self-regulation that is provided as the conclusion in this research. 
 
 This research shows how intimacy is legalized in Mexico from a critical 
perspective. Moreover, in the quest to answer this lead question, different forms of 
legalization of intimacy in general are examined; for example, matrimony, civil 
unions, cohabitation partnerships and concubinage. Having answered the lead 
question and subsidiary questions at the end of this dissertation, a new proposal for 
the legalization of intimacy in the 21st century is suggested. This proposal includes the 
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elements observed throughout the development of this thesis, as a fundamental part of 
the discovery process. 
 
I.4.2. Materials and Sources 
 
For the preparation and creation of this research, it was necessary to make use of a 
large amount of materials and diverse sources. This dissertation relies intensely on 
primary sources of research, such as the Mexican Constitution, federal and local Civil 
Codes, as well as separate legislation and, in particular and extensively, jurisprudence. 
Just as an example, in order to understand the meaning and interpretation of the word 
Intimacy in the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, it was inevitable to read and 
analyze ninety-six verdicts, just to grasp and identify the accurate definitions. 
Additionally, commentaries and reviews have been fundamental to appreciate the 
different perspectives around the issue of intimacy. Secondary sources that were used 
include, commentaries, judicial opinions, articles and essays by scholars, as well as 
rich encyclopedias like the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The discovery 
phase of this research also required the use of some tertiary sources like databases and 
statistical sources. However, such sources and empirical research were used mostly to 
corroborate some information and to inform the researcher, but not as a tool to 
provide or create empirical evidence. Most of the resources were found either in 
English or in Spanish; in any case, a translation into English is provided for sources 
that have been originally published in other languages. 
 
One of the challenges finding materials for this research project was that the 
issue of marriage and gay marriage in Mexico is mostly discussed within a gay rights 
discourse; and taking into account that the approach to marriage provided here comes 
from an understanding of intimacy and privacy, the Mexican literature was rather 
scarce. Many articles advocating for gay rights have been published in Mexico 
recently, but they do not handle the issue of gay marriage in an academic fashion; 
only a couple of exceptions stand out, such as the works of Adame Goddard31 and De 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Adame Goddard, Jorge. “Análisis y juicio de la Ley de Sociedades de Convivencia para el Distrito 
Federal”. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, XL, No. 120. Mexico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM, Sep.- Dec. 2007.  pp. 931-939. 
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La Mata et al.32 Even though this research disagrees with most of their ideas, it must 
be acknowledged that they created a possibility to contrast the point of view of this 
dissertation with their perspectives. Fortunately, North American and European 
scholars have been doing research in this field for decades, and their ideas also 
nurtured the discussion around intimacy and privacy presented in this research. A 
complete list of all the sources, authors, articles, journals, books, reports, 
encyclopedias, and commentaries used here is provided in detail at the end of this 
dissertation.  
 
I.4.3. Research Methodology 
 
The structures and spheres of intimacy introduced in the second chapter of this 
dissertation provide both a theoretical framework and a method to analyze intimacy. 
The question of intimacy is analyzed first, and with the working definition of 
intimacy, the five spheres of intimacy will be introduced. These spheres are crucial to 
understand and to dismantle the concept of intimacy, but also, to read the legislations 
around intimacy with a different lens. Simultaneously, these spheres prove to be 
content and factors of intimacy. They are content, because they lie within the realm of 
intimacy; and factors, because they can be used to assess intimacy in different 
structures.  
 
Chapter II also provides a theoretical analysis, discussing the concepts and 
definitions necessary to understand the content of this dissertation. This includes 
discourse analysis; in the sense that Foucault33 would make use of this word, not as 
speech, but rather as a more embracing and lasting phenomenon that occurs in 
different domains because of the relationships of power in society. The language and 
terms introduced in this part of the research is fundamental for the interpretation of 
the rest of the dissertation. It is essential to construe the terminology the way it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 De La Mata Pizaña, Felipe and Roberto Garzón Jiménez. Sociedades de Convivencia. Mexico: 
Editorial Porrúa-Universidad Panamericana, 2007. 
33 For further details on the Foucault’s Discourse Analysis Methodology see: Jäger, Siegfried and 
Florentine Maier.!“Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian critical discourse analysis 
and dispositve analysis.” In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. Ed. by Ruth Wodak and Michael 
Meyer. London: SAGE Publications, 2009, pp. 34-61; and Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of 
Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1972.  !
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presented in the second chapter, for it will be used in that particular connotation 
throughout the research.  
 
 Chapter III begins with a historical research approach to the subject matter 
since the introduction of the first Law on Civil Matrimony in 1859 in Mexico. It is 
important to see how intimacy was legislated in the past, so as to understand how it is 
legalized now. But most importantly, in order to foresee a new way to legalize it in 
the future. In the analysis of the different types of structures of intimacy, the historical 
approach is present, comparing the past with the present civil code provisions. The 
chapter also provides a comparative analysis of the structures of intimacy. It was 
important to compare and contrast the different types of legalization of intimacy in 
order to identify the advantages, the disadvantages and the missing elements in every 
structure. At the end of chapter III, the chart depicting all the distinctions among them 
proves how important it was for this research to use the comparative analysis 
methodology. Furthermore, the dissertation also compares the situation of the 
legalization of intimacy in Mexico with the current situation around this issue in other 
countries in the world. This has helped to understand the stage of development of the 
Mexican legal system, and also, to compare different forms of legalization of 
intimacy. 
 
The fourth chapter is particularly permeated by pure legal research. This 
section discusses the fundamental rights of intimacy; consequently, the method used 
here is the legal analysis of primary sources of law such as the constitution. The 
research here reviews even the literal wording of constitutional law, international 
human rights and jurisprudence. It was important at this stage of the dissertation to 
analyze the doctrines of the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice. So, during the 
examination of jurisprudence, a more doctrinal research method was applied, 
especially in the examination of the synergy between privacy and intimacy in 
constitutional law and human rights. 
 
Chapter V is more focused on gender and its relationship with intimacy. The 
method used for this chapter was rather a critical and social analysis of literature 
around the issue of gender. The approach here is to embrace different perspectives 
18 
and points of view regarding intimacy and its legislation. This includes, among others, 
queer theory, feminism and conservatism. The goal was to describe all these 
perspectives as part of the broader debate around the legalization of intimacy, 
maintaining a critical perspective.  
 
In addition to the research methods detailed above, this dissertation carries on 
a critical legal research approach. During the discovery and review phases of the 
research, the literature and sources are always analyzed from a critical legal research 
perspective. This includes the identification of material and immaterial elements and 
phenomena; and also, a more sensitive analysis of the narrative of social and political 
issues. The study of the legalization of intimacy is an inter-disciplinary ambition. One 
cannot focus entirely on the law and ignore the related aspects like sociological and 
psychological issues. Hence, the research methods applied in this dissertation include 
the historical research, comparative analysis, descriptive/narrative methods, 
conceptual research, theoretical analysis, doctrinal legal research, and a projective 
model for the conclusion.  
 
I.4.4. State of Research 
 
Up until now, there is plenty of basic literature around the issue of marriage and gay 
marriage in Mexico. There are comprehensive scientific works like those of Jorge 
Adame Goddard,34 that analyze all of the legal aspects of matrimony and other forms 
of legalized intimacy, like the Cohabitation Partnership Law in Mexico, also studied 
by De La Mata Pizaña et al.35 And also comparative studies like that of Julio Bustillo, 
with a more international approach.36 However, the debate goes around the idea of 
whether it should be approved or not, whether it is right or wrong, whether it is legal 
or illegal. Currently available research in Mexico (including the works mentioned 
above) focuses on the issue of marriage or other forms of legalization, but not on the 
intrinsic meaning of intimacy and/or how to legalize it differently. This dissertation 
deals with the core of the issue, the fundamental essence of marriage: Intimacy.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 See for instance: Adame Godard (2007), op. cit.;!and Adame Godard, Jorge. El Matrimonio Civil En 
México (1859-2000). UNAM: Mexico, 2004.!!
35 De la Mata Pizaña et al (2007), op. cit.!
36 Bustillo, Julio. Human Rights and Constitutional Protection. A brief study on same-sex marriage in 
Mexico and in comparative perspective. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado (UNAM-IIJ), XLIV, 
num. 132, Sep.-Dec. 2011, pp. 1017-1045.!
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As it will be shown in the fourth Chapter, the concepts of intimacy and 
privacy are very often used as synonyms in the literature, in the jurisprudence and by 
commentators. Significant literature, like the works of Julie Inness37 and Karen 
Prager38 will be used in this dissertation; as well as definitions in the jurisprudence 
that help distinguish the difference between intimacy and privacy, such as the one 
provided by Mexican Supreme Court Justice Olga Sánchez Cordero de García 
Villegas.39 The arguments presented here will discuss the difference that is not 
handled in the literature in Mexico, that important distinction between intimacy and 
privacy. Only after that distinction is made, can the right to privacy and the right to 
intimacy be understood clearly. One of the assets of this research project is that it 
proposes a new way to analyze intimacy, furthering the debate around same-sex 
marriage. The hypotheses presented here have the capacity to reignite the debate at a 
different level and to foster more academic research in this particular contemporary 
field.  
 
I.5. Objectives and Purpose 
 
Certainly, one of the goals of this dissertation is to inform the reader of the current 
situation regarding the legalization of intimacy in Mexico. It is important to 
understand the real legal obligations and the limits of an individual’s liability before 
engaging in intimacy; however, to have a merely informative purpose would not be an 
ambitious objective. The arguments that will be introduced throughout this research 
are a reflection on the issues of intimacy, privacy, gender, sexuality, and human rights 
(among others); and they will enable any reader to develop a more critical reasoning 
for the analysis of these matters. Hopefully, a more informed opinion will prepare the 
ground for a more proactive attitude towards the legalization of intimacy. Because 
only a proactive reaction from individuals can catalyze change, and undoubtedly, 
many changes are necessary to fight the current discriminatory legislations that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See in particular Chapter 6: Inness, Julie C. Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, pp. 74-94.   
38 Especially regarding the concept of intimacy. Prager, Karen J. The psychology of intimacy. New 
York: Guilford Press, 1995. 
39 Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Mexico).!Constitutional Injunction 402/2007. May 23, 2007. 
Case registration number: 171883.!
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prevent many same-sex couples from engaging in intimacy; and those that create 
injustices within intimacy, even for opposite-sex couples. One of the most important 
intentions of this research is that when the reader comes to the end of this work, the 
concept of intimacy and the way it is regulated will have been understood. This 
applies to the specific case study of Mexico presented here, but it is also applicable in 
the broader international context. After this comprehension in depth, readers will be 
able to ask themselves; how they want to legalize their intimacy, whether they are 
doing it appropriately, or whether they want to engage in intimacy at all. In any case, 
it will be clear that individuals have the capacity and the right to determine and to 
define the rules for their own intimacy.  
 
 There must be a shift of paradigm in the legalization of intimacy. And 
changing these paradigms requires engaging all stakeholders, including legislators, 
judges, and the citizenry in general. As Cohen has pointed out: “Rather, from the 
perspective of the reflexive legal paradigm, determining the appropriate forms of 
regulating self-regulating of intimate association, and for which purpose, can become 
a topic of discussion. What must replace the moral (and medical) assessment of sex 
acts and object choice is an egalitarian morality of intimate relationships…Freedom 
of intimate association should go together with regulations fostering equality fairness 
and responsibility.”40 In other words, when it comes to legalizing intimacy, the 
current paradigm in contemporary societies is to regulate a formula or a prescription 
for intimacy that imposes a specific morality, based on generalized or “normalized” 
ideas of acceptable sexuality, sexual practices, admissible family ties, idealized 
parenthood, and religious fundamentalism. Yet, one can only wonder, have these 
formulas really worked? They might have for some people, but they do not work for 
everybody. Individuals should be able to decide what they want for themselves and 
their intimate lives. This is the idea behind the paradigm shift in the legalization of 
intimacy; the legislations must be enacted in such a way that they include provisions 
that allow people to self-regulate their intimate behavior and rules. Only this way can 
individuals truly enjoy their privacy, equality and self-determination. This dissertation 
is also promoting this paradigm shift; as mentioned before, the conclusion in Chapter 
VI summarizes the ideas of this research and puts the methodology and theory into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Cohen, Jean L. Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm.  USA: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
pp. 114-115. 
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practice, suggesting a new proposal for the legalization of intimacy in the 21st Century. 
The goal is to deliver this message at all levels, not only at the academic level, but 
also at the political and personal ones; because intimacy is not only an abstract and 
ethereal construct debated by academics, it has an impact in real life, and in 
individuals of all social classes, genders, cultures, ages, and backgrounds. The 
chapters to follow will show every aspect in the realm of intimacy, and particularly in 
its legalization, hoping that the hypothesis presented here will have a powerful and 
effective impact on the legalization of intimacy in present and future generations. 
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II.1. Introduction 
 
Before the actual analysis of the legalization of intimacy in Mexico, it is crucial to 
discuss the question of intimacy. The four sections in this chapter will provide an 
insight into intimacy. First, the definition of intimacy will be dismantled in order to 
answer the following question: What is intimacy? Such a broad concept demands a 
deep analysis. Using a specific classification of connotations, the concept will be 
assessed at different levels. The contrast of fourteen different definitions of intimacy, 
including the one developed by this research, will clarify the interpretation of this 
word throughout the rest of the text. Second, a study of the discourse on sexuality and 
intimacy is necessary to be aware of the evolution of societies. The idea of the 
discourse of intimacy will be developed from the discourse of sex, predominantly 
using the discourse of sexuality observed by Michel Foucault, and the transformation 
of intimacy, as it is perceived by Anthony Giddens. This discourse analysis will 
situate the current debate on the legalization of intimacy within the contemporary 
epoch. Third, this chapter also includes the introduction of what shall be called the 
Spheres of Intimacy. The complexity of intimacy has been broken down into five 
different domains. These spheres of intimacy and their interaction will be analyzed 
individually. The emotional, moral, sexual, economic and constructive spheres will 
show how the legalization of intimacy affects more than one particular area of an 
individual’s personal and private environment. Fourth, it will be explained how 
intimacy and its spheres function within a specific structure, and such structures are 
called Structures of Intimacy. The description of the structures of intimacy will entail 
the definition of traditional marriage, same-sex or gay marriage, common-law 
marriage, putative marriage, civil unions, domestic or registered partnerships, and a 
biblical analysis of marriage. At the end of this chapter, it will be easier to grasp the 
essence of intimacy and to identify it in the subsequent sections of this thesis, because 
the legalization of intimacy cannot be understood if the concept of intimacy is not 
intelligible. In particular, the abstraction of the spheres of intimacy and the structures 
of intimacy is necessary to comprehend the issues that will be developed later on. 
Both the spheres and the structures of intimacy will be used as tools of analysis for 
 II. THE QUESTION OF INTIMACY 
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the legalization of intimacy. Therefore, beyond their theoretical or hypothetical 
inception, they will have a practical use in the following discussions. 
 
II.2. The Definition of Intimacy 
 
First of all, it is necessary to begin with the definition of the word Intimacy. The main 
problem with intimacy is that it is not clearly defined. And before discussing the 
legalization of intimacy, it is necessary to understand what is it that needs to be 
legalized. This concept, as many others, has multiple connotations. It is a widely used 
concept in everyday language, and it is quite difficult to define with precision, 
because everybody uses the term with a different meaning. Beyond the scholarly 
interpretations of intimacy, people have daily experiences of intimacy that shape their 
perception or redefine their personal abstraction of the concept. Intimacy is love, 
intimacy is trust, intimacy is closeness, intimacy is self-disclosure, intimacy is 
bonding, intimacy is attachment, intimacy is sexuality, intimacy is support, intimacy 
is commitment, intimacy is nothing, intimacy is everything.  
 
The first known use of the word intimacy in the English language dates back 
to 1641.1 But today, scholars and experts debate the actual meaning of the word, the 
spectrum it encompasses and its relevance. In this regard, every discipline approaches 
the issue differently. In the area of psychology, Karen J. Prager has developed a 
classification system with categorical principles that help understand the different 
interpretations of the word intimacy. Her research, The Psychology of Intimacy, is a 
comprehensive and informative study of intimacy in the field of psychology. 2  
However, for this research on the legalization of intimacy, it is important to analyze 
intimacy from a legal point of view. In this area, Julie C. Inness and Jean L. Cohen 
bring the issue of intimacy into the legal focus. Inness, in a philosophical/legal 
fashion, discusses the significance of intimacy in Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation.3 
She sees intimacy as the core of privacy, and she links the behavioral side of intimacy, 
the acts and activities, to their love, liking or care. Inness argues that,  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “Intimacy”. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2013. 
2!Prager, Karen J. The psychology of intimacy. New York: Guilford Press, 1995.!
3 Inness, Julie C. Privacy, Incimacy and Isolation.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
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“An examination of a range of paradigmatic examples of intimate matters produced an 
account of intimate acts and activities: to claim that an act or activity is intimate, is to claim 
that it draws is meaning and value from the agent’s love, liking or care. Intimate decisions 
concern such matters. Hence, they involve a choice on the agent’s part about how to (or not 
to) embody her love, liking, or care.”4  
 
Cohen nurtures the debate with a political and legal interpretation of intimacy. She 
analyzes the constitutional side of privacy and intimacy with a feminist critique. In 
her work, Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm,5 she reviews the rights to 
privacy and intimacy questioning the current regulations and providing a new 
paradigm for the legislation on intimacy. She point outs that, 
 
“…despite the demise of the old public/private dichotomy, we still need a normatively 
compelling and analytically cogent conception of privacy and of privacy rights. Otherwise, the 
issues involved in the regulation of intimate relationships cannot be addressed fruitfully 
because privacy is an enabling condition of intimacy. ”6 
 
From a legal point of view, the debate on intimacy requires a discussion on privacy, 
because both concepts are closely related. The works mentioned above are key 
sources and provide a holistic insight into the debate of intimacy and its legalization. 
The following references are additional definitions of intimacy by other academics:  
 
Definitions of Intimacy emphasizing Intimate Interactions [Intimate Behavior] 
“An interaction that…is self-revealing and/or relationship-focused in its content…one 
partner does or says something [that]…is readily discriminated…by the partner, who 
responds in a positive, understanding and/or self-revealing way her- or himself.”7 
(Fruzzetti & Jacobson) 
“Clearly formulated adjustments of one’s behavior to the expressed needs of the other 
person.”8 (Sullivan) 
“A product of eye contact, distance, smiling and other behaviors.”9 (Patterson) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Ibidem, p. 90. 
5 Cohen, Jean L. Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm.  USA: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
6 Ibidem, pp. 2-3. 
7  Fruzzetti, A.E. & N.S. Jacobson. “Toward a behavioral conceptualization of adult intimacy: 
Implications for marital therapy.” In E.A. Blechman (Ed.), Emotions and Family (117-136) Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum, 1990. pp. 126-127. 
8 Sullivan, H.S. The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: Norton, 1953. p. 246.!
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“An interpersonal process that involves communication of personal feelings and 
information to another person who responds warmly and sympathetically. This 
response validates the first person’s experience.”10 (Reis & Shaver) 
 
Definitions of Intimacy emphasizing Intimate Interactions [Intimate Experience] 
“A subjective appraisal, based upon interactive behaviors, that leads to certain 
relational expectations.”11 (Chelune, Robinson & Krommor) 
“Closeness, love, caring, affection.”12 (Sexton & Sexton) 
“The sharing of hurt and of fears of being hurt.”13 (L’Abate & L’Abate) 
 
Definitions of Intimacy emphasizing Intimate Relationships 
“(a) A desire to promote the welfare of the loved one, (b) experienced happiness with 
loved one, (c) high regard for the loved one (d) high regard for the loved one (e) 
mutual understanding with the loved one (f) sharing of one’s self and one’s 
possessions with the loved one (g) receipt of emotional support from the loved one (h) 
giving of emotional support to the loved one (i) intimate communication with the 
loved one, and (j) valuing the loved one in one’s life.”14 (Sternberg) 
 “A deep form of acceptance of the other as well as a commitment to the 
relationship.”15 (Gilbert) 
“A composite of …affection …expressiveness …compatibility …cohesion 
…sexuality …conflict resolution …autonomy …and identity.”16 (Waring) 
“The degree of mutual need-satisfaction within the relationship.”17  
(Clinebell & Clinebell) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Patterson, M.L. “An arousal model of nonverbal exchange.” Psychological Review, 83, 235-245. p. 
235.!
10 Reis, H.T. and P. Shaver. “Intimacy as interpersonal process.” In S. Duck (Ed.), Handbook of 
Personal Relationships: Theory, Relationships, and Interventions (pg. 367-389). Chichester, UK: 
Wiley, 1988. p. 375.!
11 Chelune, G.J., Robison, J.T. and M.J. Krommor. “A cognitive interactional model of intimate 
relationships.” In V.J. Derlega (Ed.) Communication, Intimacy, and Close Relationships (pg. 11-40). 
Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1984. p.13.!
12 Sexton, R.E. & V.S. Sexton. “Intimacy: A historical perspective.” In M. Fisher & G.Stricker (Eds.), 
Intimacy (pg. 1-20). New York: Plenum, 1982. p. 2.!
13 L’Abate, L. & B.L. L’Abate. “The paradoxes of intimacy.” Family Therapy, 3, 175-184. 1979. p.178.!
14 Sternberg, R.J. “A triangular theory of love.” Psychological review, 93, 119-135. 1986, pp. 120-121.!
15 Gilbert, S. J.  “Self-disclosure, intimacy and communication in families.” The Family!Coordinator, 
25, 221-231, 1976, p. 221.!
16 Waring, E.M. “Facilitating marital intimacy through self-disclosure.” The American Journal of 
Family Therapy, 9, 33-42, 1981. p. 34. 
17 Clinebell, H.J. & C.H. Clinebell. The Intimate Marriage. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. p. 1. 
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“The closeness and interdependence of partners, the extent of self-disclosure, and the 
warmth or affection experienced [within the relationship].”18 (Perlman & Fehr) 
 “Reflects feelings of closeness and emotional bonding including intensity of liking, 
moral support and ability to tolerate flaws in the significant other.”19  
(Tolstedt & Stokes) 
 
The definitions listed above show the diversity across the literature in the field 
of intimacy, they have been grouped according to their common denominator. This 
classification helps better understand the diverse conceptions of intimacy that 
different scholars have, they have been sorted out according to Prager’s taxonomy.20 
She acknowledges two different elements within the concept of intimacy:  
 
A. Intimate Interactions, and 
B. Intimate Relationships. 
 
She defines intimate interactions as dyadic communicative exchanges. These intimate 
interactions are time-specific and location-specific. Moreover, they include two 
additional sub-elements: (a) Intimate Behavior, and (b) Intimate Experiences. Intimate 
behavior happens when people share what is private and personal. Intimate 
experiences are individual experiences of intimacy, closeness, bonding, etc. While 
these interactions and behavior have a more temporary character, intimate 
relationships have a history of intimate interactions with anticipation of future 
intimate contact over time. Intimacy in a relationship has a more complex time and 
space framework. She supports the idea that intimate relationships include sustained 
affection (or love for that matter), mutual trust and partner cohesiveness.21 Thus, she 
explains the concept of intimacy in a multi-tiered arrangement of elements, as shown 
in the figure below:22 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Perlman, D. & B. Fehr. “The development of intimate relationships.” In D. Perlman & S. Duck 
(Eds.), Intimate Relationships: Development, Dynamics, and Deterioration (pp. 13-42). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage, 1987. p. 16. 
19 Tolstedt, B.E. & J.P.Stokes.”Relation of verbal, affective, and physical intimacy to marital 
satisfaction.” Journal of Counseling Psychology, 30, 573-580. 1983.p. 574. 
20 Prager, p. 3. 
21 Ibidem, p. 24. 
22 Ibidem. Figure 1.2., p. 20.!
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Taking into consideration all the nuances and ambiguities regarding the 
concept of intimacy, how shall it be construed in the context of the legalization of 
intimacy? For the purposes of this research, the concept of intimacy shall be defined 
and interpreted as:  
 
A close reciprocal relationship of future-oriented companionship with 
attachment in different private domains.  
 
This working definition could be located above, in the categorical classification of 
intimate relationships within the superordinate concept of intimacy. This dissertation 
understands intimacy this way because it encompasses the social, political, cultural 
and economic dimensions of the relationships that individuals build. Their intimacy, 
their association, is also a dynamic unit inside the wider scope of society. The first 
part of this definition implies an interpretation of intimacy as a frequent relationship, 
and not as an isolated one-time event. It is reciprocal because it is bilateral and due to 
its longer-term assumption, it creates the space for commitments (rights and 
obligations) for and from both parties. These commitments generate attachment in 
different private domains that link the individuals who form that intimacy. In this 
research, considering the different aspects of an intimacy, such private domains shall 
be called Spheres of Intimacy.  
Subordinate  
Level 
Basic Level 
Superordinate Level Intimacy 
Intimate 
Interaction 
Intimate 
Experience: 
 
Perceptions of 
understanding. 
Positive feelings 
(e.g. warmth, 
attraction). 
Intimate 
Behavior: 
 
Verbal (e.g. 
self-disclosure). 
Non-verbal  
(e.g. affection, 
touch). 
Intimate 
Relationship 
Romantic 
partners, 
friends, 
parents, and 
children; 
other kinds of 
intimate 
relationships. 
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II.3. The Spheres of Intimacy 
 
After the evaluation of many factors that affect or shape intimacy, this research has 
identified five groups of elements that share these common domains. Each one of 
these groups shall be denominated Sphere. Consequently, the analysis of intimacy is 
ultimately a study of these five Spheres of Intimacy. Some components in the spheres 
are isolated while some of them are co-dependent because they overlap in different 
areas. The interaction among them can be best understood within the logical depiction 
of a Venn diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intimacy is the combination of all of the above. Therefore, the concept of intimacy 
should be analyzed as a construct, whose conceptual elements are each one of these 
spheres. Since intimacy is a reciprocal relationship, these spheres do not represent an 
individual’s intimacy. They depict, rather, the intimacy of individuals (in plural). 
Intimacy is, thus, the sum of the Emotional Sphere, the Moral Sphere, the Sexual 
Sphere, the Economic Sphere and the Constructive Sphere. In the legalization of 
intimacy, the elements within these spheres are materialized and their implications are 
more tangible. The legal components of intimacy might be spread across different 
legislations, not in a condensed set of regulations. The materialization of intimacy 
through its legalization will be explained in the individual discussion of each sphere.  
 
Emotional 
Sphere 
Sexual 
Sphere 
Moral 
Sphere 
 
Constructive 
Sphere 
Economic 
Sphere 
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II.3.1. The five spheres in depth 
 
A. The Emotional Sphere of Intimacy  
 
Romance can be clearly identified in the narrative of novels and films of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. However, that emotional side of intimacy was a 
feminine romance where women provided the emotional side and men were in charge 
of the sexual wisdom and romantic passion. Giddens uses the term pure relationship 
when referring to the close and continuing emotional tie to one another. He argues 
that while love used to be tied to sexuality, the pure relationship is part of a 
restructuring of intimacy and it emerges nowadays in other contexts of sexuality 
besides heterosexual marriage.23 Giddens adds that the transmutation of love is as 
much a phenomenon of modernity as is the emergence of sexuality.24 This emotional 
sphere has now changed in intimacy. Men and women are equally allowed to express 
and to involve their emotions into intimacy. As western societies move farther away 
from twentieth century masculinities, the emotional sphere and the gender-balance 
within becomes more relevant. Feelings like love, confidence, friendship, 
companionship, liberty, self-esteem, pride and trust are inherent to contemporary 
intimacies in all the combinations of relationships: man-man, woman-man, and 
woman-woman. These sensations validate the individual’s perception of the self as a 
member of the relationship with the other. Individuals are the human capital in 
intimacy, and they feel proud of that companionship in the different legal forms it can 
be found or structured. 
 
 How are all these emotions consolidated in the legalization of intimacy? 
Although feelings are difficult to explain and to show as something solid, they do 
materialize in different forms by law. First of all, the solemnity of a civil or religious 
ceremony and the signatures on the marriage license guarantees the commitment of 
individuals as it is made public. The emotional symbolism of intimacy is displayed in 
ceremonious events.25 Some religions, like Catholicism, have specific protocols for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Giddens, Anthony. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern 
Societies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992. p. 9.!
24 Ibidem, p. 34.!
25 See the “Symbolic Recognition” in Barker, Nicola. Not The Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of 
Same-Sex Marriage. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. pp.103-109. 
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marriage ceremonies. Civil codes also detail specific wordings for civil matrimonies. 
For the most part, this is because the emotional impact of intimacy is acknowledged. 
Furthermore, partners may demonstrate their trust and confidence through legal 
instruments such as the figure of “legal guardianship.” In many jurisdictions, spouses 
are legal guardians by default. This means, your life may depend on your spouse’s 
decisions if you are deprived of your legal capacity. Therefore, the trust and faith you 
may have in your intimacy will be demonstrated in legal guardianship. This is 
narrowly connected with the legal figure of emancipation. Parents usually have the 
legal guardianship of their children, but they lose or waive this right when their 
children get married or reach adulthood. The trust conferred by the state upon parents 
is then transferred onto spouses. This legal emancipation that an intimacy may 
provide represents the emotions of liberty and independence. Moreover, intimacy is a 
milestone for adulthood. Not only legally, but also psychologically and sociologically. 
As children leave their parents’ intimacy in order to constitute their own, they become 
adults. 
 
Intimacy – and the lack thereof – has developed a taxonomy of civil (or 
marital) status. Hence, an individual is married (in intimacy); divorced (former 
member of an intimacy), separated (distant from an intimacy), widow (the sole living 
member of an intimacy) or single (in absence of intimacy). Individuals have different 
feelings and pride about the status the law grants them. But also – and most 
importantly – these different statuses may give individuals specific rights and 
obligations. The rights can be as simple as collecting a partner’s mail and signing 
documents on behalf of them (access to privacy), or they can also be as crucial as 
allowing individuals to visit their partners at a hospital or prison. 26 In sum, the 
emotional elements of an intimacy can be materialized at least through the civil status, 
the solemnity of the ceremony, emancipation and legal guardianship. !
B. The Moral Sphere of Intimacy  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 It is worth considering the legal implications of an individual’s civil status. See the publications by 
the International Commission on Civil Status (ICCC). For example: “Bogus Marriages” (09/2010) and 
“Fraud with respect to civil status” (1996/2000), available at URL=<http://www.ciec1.org>.!
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Values, principles and standards are found in intimacy as well. On one hand, intimacy 
is a moral subject because each of the individuals that form that intimacy comes with 
a morality that permeates their intimacy. On the other, it is a moral object whose 
righteousness will be scrutinized by society. The moral assessment will include the 
value assigned to the individual because of their intimacy, and also, to the 
interpretation of the individual’s own perception of their intimacy. It is in the moral 
sphere – unquestionably – where religion plays its most important role, because the 
ethical barometer will be strongly influenced by a particular religion and its exegesis 
of right and wrong. Morality promotes or hinders the socialization and integration of 
an intimacy in communities. This will affect employment protection or discrimination, 
the distribution and application of justice, social inclusion or exclusion and the 
involvement of that intimacy or any of its members in the public sphere.   
 
It cannot be forgotten, that the State has the moral monopoly of intimacy. The 
state through its legislation will then allocate its own morality on intimacy. Moral 
clauses that are materialized legally are, for instance, provisions regarding gender-
bias access. Thus, the difference between the legalization of exclusive opposite-sex 
marriage and including same-sex marriage is that the former is influenced by the 
principle of morality, whereas the latter is guided by a principle of justice.27 Also, in 
religious states like Israel and most Islamic countries, morality is directly solidified 
because religion is the law. Therefore, any religious (i.e. moral) standards are 
immediately applied to the legalization of intimacy.  
 
An intimacy is supposed to persist through a longer period of time. Married 
individuals are supposed to be married forever; this is exemplified in the well-known 
phrase “Till death do us part.” Morality decides on the beginning, duration, and also 
on the termination of intimacy. The impediments or prerequisites to begin an intimacy 
with someone show the moral outlines. Incest is a clear indicator; individuals are not 
allowed to marry a close relative. This is most of the times not only an impediment to 
start intimacy, but also a crime.  Whether an intimacy can be terminated or annulled, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 For reference regarding the morality of the legal debate around gay marriage read: Baird, Robert M., 
and Stuart E. Rosenbaum. Same-sex marriage: The moral and legal debate. New York: Pyr Books, 
2004. 
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it will depend on the grounds for divorce or annulment. These grounds or 
justifications are allocated according to moral doctrines. 
 
Social values also contribute to the dichotomization of male and female roles 
in society. This will dictate the duties and positions of individuals within their 
intimacy, or at least the collective expectations. The equilibrium within intimacy is 
affected by the gender differentiation. This separation of masculinity and femininity is 
based on social bigotry. Equality in intimacy can only be reached without this 
bisection. For this reason, a heavier moral sphere in intimacy will produce more 
internal disproportionality. 
 
C. The Sexual Sphere of Intimacy 
 
As discussed before, intimacy is much more than plain sex. Yet, the sexual feature of 
intimacy is still very important. The sexual sphere can be explored in three different 
contexts: sexual practice, sexual preference, and sexual identity.28  
 
First of all, sexual practice relates to the sexual activity of partners in intimacy. 
The physical appetite, desire and eroticism around intimacy are key ingredients. 
While sexual contact was prominent in the discourse of sex, it now plays a less 
important part in intimacy. Giddens points out: “In an interesting –and significant- 
reversal of the trends remarked upon by Foucault, the proponents of Sex Addicts 
Anonymous…have sought to medicalize sex addiction.”29 The clinical treatment of 
sex addiction shows, if nothing else, that the element of sexual practice requires 
boundaries, and these very limits are now determined by intimacy. It is also true that 
the mutual sexual desire of individuals is usually a given precondition. However, the 
contemporary typification of spousal rape as a crime proves that sexual activity must 
be voluntary as well, and that there is no such thing as sexual obligation in intimacy.  
 
Secondly, sexual preferences become relevant from two perspectives. On one 
hand, the sexual preference of individuals will “label” their intimacy. It will make it a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 It is important to consider in the sexual sphere of intimacy, the criminalization of any forbidden act 
like sodomy, which indirectly targets and discriminates specific sexualities. 
29 Giddens, p. 65. 
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homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, asexual, mono-sexual or pansexual intimacy; 
according to the sexual partners they choose. On the other hand, individuals may 
choose the type of sexual exclusivity they want to have in the course of their intimacy. 
For example, adultery is the sexual preference beyond the spousal bed. Partners may 
choose what kind of sexual commitment they prefer. They may opt for sexual 
exclusivity (monogamous sexual activity), but they may also choose sexual liberty; 
allowing their partners to engage in sexual intercourse with someone else as it 
happens in what is now denominated “open relationships” (polygamous sexual 
activity). Either type of sexual commitment must be observed only as a single 
component of intimacy in its superordinate level. 
 
And last, but most certainly not least, the consideration of sexual identity 
cannot be ignored. Individuals experience a validation of self as they join in intimacy. 
The cognitive factor of intimacy is crucial for individuals, because they affirm their 
sexuality and reinforce their identity as they begin their own intimacy. 30  The 
embracement of their sexual identity is fundamental for the establishment of their 
self-identity in its broader meaning. Therefore, being able to choose one’s same-sex 
or opposite-sex partner in a legal intimacy endorses and legalizes the individual’s 
sexuality and lifestyle. 
 
D. The Economic Sphere of Intimacy 
 
In a world where the capital is necessary to survive, the economic sphere of 
intimacy is vital. Arranged marriages are the epitome of the economic and class 
relevance of intimacy. The practice of arranged marriages, where usually parents or 
other family members decide upon an individual’s (especially women) intimacy 
partner, has declined in the west. Nonetheless, it is still frequent in Asia, Africa and in 
the Middle East. Individuals “own” property separately until they engage in intimacy. 
At that point, the concept of ownership must change because companionship also 
means sharing time and property. In the legalization of intimacy, the management of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30!See! Herdt,! Gilbert and Robert Kertzner.!“I do, but i can’t: The impact of marriage denial on the 
mental health and sexual citizenship of lesbians and gay men in the United States”. Sexuality Research 
and Social Policy Journal.!National Sexuality Resource Center (USA). March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 1, 
pp. 33-49. The authors have done specific research on the mental health and well-being linked to the 
ability of gay men and women to get married in the U.S.!
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assets can be determined. For example, marriage in many jurisdictions provides a 
community property or separate property modality. These legal mechanisms allow 
individuals to keep their property or assets secured for one of them, or they may also 
choose to own their goods and chattels jointly. Individuals in intimacy may also be 
liable for their partners. When dealing with third parties, being in intimacy could 
change the types of financial responsibilities a person has, not only for themself, but 
for their partners as well. 
 
Moreover, there is a welfare dimension regarding intimacy. Contemporary 
welfare states in the west grant some sort of benefits to their citizens. These benefits 
may include social security in the form of medical assistance and pensions. An 
individual’s intimacy or their status of intimacy could determine whether they are 
entitled to specific welfare benefits or not. For instance, widows and spouses have 
access to specific compensations arising from a spouse’s death or disability. The 
prerogatives can include a different taxation scheme for individuals depending on 
their intimacy status.31 Donations of property between spouses may also have some 
tax-exempt or tax-reduction advantages. 
 
The legal responsibilities that an intimacy can generate also include alimony. 
During or after an intimacy, individuals usually have the responsibility to look after 
each other and, if applicable, their descendants. As a consequence, they will have the 
financial obligation to support their intimacy partners or to claim that obligation from 
them. In other words, intimacy can guarantee that nourishment and care will be 
provided, in some cases, even after the termination of that intimacy. 
 
E. The Constructive Sphere of Intimacy 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Taxation is a very important issue for many couples. For example in the United States, in the 
Supreme Court landmark decision United States v. Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer, et al. No. 
12-307. 2013. Decided on June 26, 2013, 570 U.S. ___2013; the original motivation for the case was 
tax-related, due to a federal estate-tax exemption that was not being honored in a same-sex marriage 
estate. !
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The names of the previous four spheres where almost self-explanatory. The 
conception of the constructive sphere requires, undoubtedly, a certain degree of 
abstraction. In the first place, intimacy is the relationship of two individuals; these 
individuals are the founders and pillars of that intimacy. This research identifies two 
types of construction of intimacy: a horizontal and a vertical one. A horizontal 
intimacy is that type of intimacy whose constructive sphere includes only two 
individuals, the founders. A vertical intimacy is the one where the intimacy expands 
through a generation, in other words, when it includes descendants.32 Neither type of 
construction is better than the other; they are just morphologically different 
formations. Foucault talked about the deployment of sexuality, he distinguished two 
fundamental dimensions: the husband-wife axis and the parents-children axis. He 
noted: “The family, in its contemporary form, must not be understood as a social, 
economic, and political structure of alliance that excludes or at least restrains 
sexuality, that diminishes it as much as possible, preserving only its useful functions. 
On the contrary, its role is to anchor sexuality and to provide it with a permanent 
support.” 33  And, “to ensure its reproduction (…the regulated fabrication of 
children).”34 It is true that some intimacies in the twenty-first century include children, 
the vertical ones. However, in the contemporary discourse of intimacy, a horizontal 
intimacy is just as worthy. What he calls a structure of alliance, the family, also exists 
in a horizontal intimacy that has chosen not to include descendants. 
 
 It is important to implement the concept of agency in intimacy. When two 
individuals constitute their intimacy, they form a single unit; namely, a family unit. 
Even without children, individuals increase their capacity, their power, in other words 
their agency as they begin their intimacy. This intimacy agency they construct is a 
family. This agency will further or constrain their socialization; the limitations of their 
agency will be determined by the structure of intimacy they form, owing to the fact 
that they interact as a family unit and not as isolated individuals. The legal capacity to 
change last names in intimacy is a legal mechanism of the constructive sphere. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 For further reference on adoption and same-sex couples, read: Tobin, John and Ruth McNair. Public 
International Law and the Regulation of Public Spaces: Does the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
impose an obligation on states to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt? International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 23, (2009), Oxford University Press, pp. 110-131. 
33 Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An introduction. Volume 1. New York: Random House, 
Vintage Books Edition, 1990. p. 108. 
34 Ibidem, p. 14.!
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Feminists are against changing their last names when they get married. If it is only 
possible to take the husband’s last name, but not the wife’s, it is certainly unfair. 
Nonetheless, if the family unit can decide which last name to take, the issue is gender-
balanced. The decision to keep one last name for both intimacy partners can actually 
be interpreted as an asset, inasmuch as the new agency they constitute will be 
identified by a shared last name.  Individuals who keep their original last names 
denote that they still belong to their parents’ agency, as a product of their vertical 
intimacy. Whereas those who opt for the new last name demonstrate they have fully 
emancipated from their parents, even in their legal identity. Whether changing last 
names is possible or not, this resolution is also a very emotional one. Horizontal 
intimacies may become vertical as they include descendants. These descendants may 
come from different paths. Biological reproduction was certainly the rule in the 
discourse of sex. The current discourse of intimacy includes new alternatives such as 
adoption, surrogacy and assisted reproduction. The legalization of these options 
includes the legal framework around kinship ties and access to reproduction. The 
subject of inheritance is present in either type of construction of intimacy. However, it 
becomes more important as the construction expands because the web of connections 
is multilineal.   
 
It is in the State’s best interest to legislate on intimacy. The construction of 
intimacy, after all, builds citizenry and citizenship. Pluralism, diversity and other 
democratic values can come from the very establishment of intimacy. The values an 
individual learns within an intimacy, be it from a spouse in a horizontal intimacy or 
from parents in a vertical one, eventually influence the individual’s participation in 
the state as a citizen. This is a constructive element of intimacy. Because families, that 
is to say, intimacies structure societies. And the democratization of these societies 
depends on the very democratization of intimacy as well, not only on its internal 
distribution of justice, but also on the equal access of citizens to intimacy. 
Immigration is then strictly linked to this subject-matter, the benefits or limitations 
that an intimate relationship will bring about are very significant. While previous 
generations used to be more endogamous, contemporary intimacies are much more 
exogamous ever since the phenomenon of globalization. Immigration provisions are 
thus related to intimacy because they may affect an individual’s right to construct 
their intimacy. In the past, inter-racial stipulations used to play a bigger role; the 
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racial controls have now merged into the immigration rhetoric. A foreign citizen’s 
right or impediment to be physically present in a specific country may jeopardize or 
reduce their constructive capacity and cohesiveness in intimacy. Therefore, 
immigration regulations fall within the constructive sphere in the legalization of 
intimacy. 
 
II.3.2. The Interaction of Spheres 
 
These five domains of intimacy are depicted as spheres because they interact among 
themselves. They do not have a cause-effect relationship, but rather an interdependent 
correlation. It can be exemplified while deconstructing a specific issue, e.g. the 
decision to have children. This decision would fall within the constructive sphere, as 
the intimacy would change from a horizontal, to a vertical one. Furthermore, 
individuals could choose to adopt children, to use a surrogate or to have children via 
sexual intercourse. In this context, the sexual sphere may or may not be involved. The 
modality to bring descendants into that intimacy – or not – may be guided by moral 
decisions. So, abortion, biological reproduction or the use of in-vitro fertilization 
could bring in the moral sphere. The bigger the family, the more financial resources 
will be necessary. In other words, children also fall within an intimacy’s economic 
sphere. Probably in most cases, the determination to have children involves feelings 
i.e. is a part of the emotional sphere. Considering the legalization of these spheres, the 
decision to have children includes legal mechanisms in each sphere: the legal 
guardianship of these children (emotional); alimony, nourishment and financial 
support (economic); adoption and available types of assisted reproduction (moral); 
inheritance and kinship ties (constructive), [de-] criminalization of abortion and 
constraints regarding biological reproduction (sexual). This example shows the 
interconnection and dependence of all spheres in specific domains of intimacy. 
 
II.4. The Structures of Intimacy 
 
Up until now, intimacy has been defined as a close reciprocal relationship of future-
oriented companionship with attachment in different private domains. These private 
domains are the five spheres that have been detailed above. As discussed in the 
constructive sphere, the two agents of intimacy form an agency. Thus, they are also 
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that form through which the agency of intimacy will circulate. Consequently, the web 
of legal connections between the two agents in the five spheres of intimacy constitutes 
a Structure of Intimacy. These structures shape, bound and hold the five spheres of 
intimacy. The reciprocal association in intimacy requires a mutual understanding of 
rules and commitments. When intimacy is legalized, these rules become legally 
binding due to its contractual relationship. Intimacy, however, is much more than a 
simple commercial contract between two individuals. Hence, structures of intimacy 
are closely related to, and rely on the law in a broader scope that includes different 
areas of law. The legalization of the agents’ intimacy will have repercussions in a 
wide range of fields that will affect much more than their mere dyadic relationship. 
As their intimacy is legalized, the relationship of each individual with others will 
change, and so will the relationship of both of them – as an item – towards third 
parties. Therefore, the legal framework around that relationship constitutes and 
reinforces their legal structure of intimacy. The most important aspect to consider in 
the structures of intimacy is that they are and represent the body of law in an intimacy. 
In other words, the role of law, the legality and legally binding cohesion is what 
configures a given structure of intimacy, and such structures include all five spheres 
of intimacy as well.  
 
Typology of Structures 
 
Observing different types of legislations around the world in the domain of intimacy, 
one can identify that they share similarities in terms of their legally binding 
commitments. As mentioned before, intimacy is a phenomenon that affects people of 
all cultures, so these regulatory schemes of relationships in different countries or 
jurisdictions have elements in common. Therefore, the following types of structures 
group or cluster the most usual forms of legalization of intimacy that are called 
Structures of Intimacy in this research; namely, marriage (in its different forms), civil 
unions, and domestic or registered partnerships. 
 
II.4.1. Relationships 
 
Partnerships like the boyfriend-girlfriend, boyfriend-boyfriend, and girlfriend-
girlfriend bonds are more “informal” constructions of intimacy. They usually precede 
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a more formal structure and are seen as a precondition or an embryonic stage towards 
a deeper commitment. Nonetheless, many individuals spend a lifetime experiencing 
one solid relationship or a series of serious relationships without ever legalizing them. 
These sorts of relationships have their own rules and customs; indeed, the mutual 
understanding between partners exists. However, these relationships are amorphous 
constructions of intimacy whose boundaries are not clearly defined. And most 
importantly, they are not legally recognized. So, they shall not be considered 
structures of intimacy in the context that this concept is being used in this research. 
Giddens claims that "the idea of the 'relationship' emerges as strongly in gay sub-
cultures as among the more heterosexual population."35 Even though heterosexual 
men and women qualify for marriage, many of them now choose to remain single and 
exercise their intimacy in unofficial relationships. "Gay women and men have 
preceded most heterosexuals in developing relationships, in the sense that term has 
come to assume today when applied to personal life. For they have had to 'get along' 
without traditionally established frameworks of marriage, in conditions of relative 
equality between partners,"36 the author added.  Thus, in this context, relationships are 
forms of intimacy whose framework or structure is not recognized by law. As 
Giddens has underscored, they are unofficial. In other words, they are not legally 
binding types of intimacy and cannot be considered a structure of intimacy for the 
comparative purpose of this dissertation. 
 
II.4.2. Marriage 
 
Marriage is one of the oldest legal types of intimacy. Discussions on marriage can be 
found from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to our contemporaries.37 Time has changed 
the interpretations and legalization of marriage. Yet, it is still strongly influenced by 
religious thought. Christian philosophers and theologians like St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas have made an impact on the discourse of marriage. 38 
Notwithstanding, and particularly for the legalization of marriage, it is the Corpus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Giddens, p. 14. 
36 Ibidem, p. 15. 
37 Lacey, Walter K. The Family in Classical Greece. New York: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
38 See Augustine, Saint. Treatises on marriage and other subjects. Vol. 27. New York: Fathers of the 
Church, Inc.,1955; and Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Ed. Anton C. 
Pegis. USA: Random house, 1945. 
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Iuris Civilis that has contributed the most to the current laws on marriage in the west. 
The Justinian Codex is by far, the oldest comprehensive body of legalization of 
intimacy whose influence lasted for almost one thousand years in the Common Era. 
One of the definitions of marriage, provided in the digest by Modestine, states that: 
 
“Matrimonium est maris et femina, conjunction et consortium, monis vitae, divini et humani 
juris communication.”39 
 
In other words, marriage is the union between a man and a woman in company 
forever, in reciprocal communication of human and divine interests. This definition 
shows at least two things; (a) that marriage has been considered as a life-long 
commitment for centuries, and (b) that Roman law discerned the religious and 
mundane aspects of marriage. Although the piety and virtuousness of marriage 
increased over the medieval period, it was not until the 16th century that the Catholic 
Church took over the monopoly of matrimony in the Council of Trent.40 In the 
twenty-fourth session, matrimony became the seventh sacrament, and the Church 
reformed modern marriage by requiring the solemnity of the church, taking over the 
jurisdiction of marriage, confining sexual activity to matrimony, and banning 
concubinage and divorce.41 Over the years, as highlighted by Foucault, “…relations 
of sex gave rise, in every society, to a deployment of alliance: a system of marriage, 
of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of names and 
possessions.”42 What Foucault conceived as a system of marriage also has some 
elements of the structures of intimacy, because he was able to identify the agency of 
marriage as discourse, whose complexity affects the domains of the spheres of 
intimacy. This system of marriage has not precisely been a system of justice. The 
critique of marriage focuses on the gender role distribution. As pointed out by John 
Stuart Mill in The Subjection of Women, “It is not a sign of one’s thinking the boon 
one offers very attractive, when one allows only Hobson’s choice, ‘that or none.’ And 
here, I believe, is the clue to the feelings of those men, who have a real antipathy to 
the equal freedom of women”, he adds, “The conditions which the laws of this and all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Pacheco Pulido, Guillermo. “La olvidada enseñanza del derecho romano.” Revista Jurídica de la 
Escuela Libre de Derecho de Puebla. Year 1. Vol. 1. Number 1, March 1999. p. 60. 
40 Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent. (Translation by Theodore A. Buckley). London: 
George Routledge and Co., 1851.!
41 Ibidem, pp. 176-186. 
42 Foucault (1990), p. 106. 
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other countries annex to the marriage contract. Marriage being the destination 
appointed by society for women.”43 Feminists view marriage as an institution that 
fosters inequalities, and asymmetry between men and women. For example, Susan 
Moller Okin claims that the vulnerability of women by marriage begins even before 
marriage in the anticipation, it continues in the duration of marital life and it continues 
even after a divorce.44 Considering the gender-bias disadvantages of marriage, why is 
marriage as a structure of intimacy still alive? One of the answers is that many people 
choose marriage as a structure because they have deep religious convictions. In the 
case of a large majority of the western world, where Mexico is included, religious 
beliefs are a decisive factor. That is why it is now important to review the Christian 
doctrine within the bible. 
 
A. Biblical Analysis of Marriage 
 
The purpose of marriage according to the Bible is the interdependence of men and 
women, to provide companionship, commitment to an exclusive relationship, 
longtime partnerships, the context for raising children, a covenant, procreative sexual 
relationship, love and the submission of wives to their husbands. The Bible reads: 
“That is why a man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and they 
become one flesh.”45 This is the idea of cohesiveness and unity in marriage, the 
interdependence. Companionship is fundamental because “It is not good for the man 
to be alone. I will make a helper suitable for him.”46 Of course, women are that 
suitable help. The commitment to an exclusive and long-time relationship is 
formulated as: “Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.”47 Or, 
until one of the spouses dies, “For example, by law a married woman is bound to her 
husband as long as he is alive, but if her husband dies, she is released from the law 
that binds her to him.”48 Marriage is the incubator of children, “Has not the one God 
made you? You belong to him in body and spirit. And what does the one God seek? 
Godly offspring. So be on your guard, and do not be unfaithful to the wife of your !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Mill, John Stuart. The Subjection of Women.  London, UK: Savill, Edwards and Co. Printers, 1869. 
pp. 51-53. 
44 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender and the Family. USA: Basic Books Inc., 1989. pp. 134-169.!
45 Genesis 2:24.  
46 Genesis 2:18. See also Genesis 2:20-22; Genesis 3:12; Proverbs 31:10-12.!
47 Matthew 19:6. 
48 Romans 7:2 and 1 Corinthians 7:39. 
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youth.”49 “For the unbelieving husband has been sanctified through his wife, and the 
unbelieving wife has been sanctified through her believing husband. Otherwise your 
children would be unclean, but as it is, they are holy.”50 Marriage is perceived as a 
contract, “You ask, ‘Why?’ It is because the Lord is the witness between you and the 
wife of your youth. You have been unfaithful to her, though she is your partner, the 
wife of your marriage covenant.”51 The sexual experience belongs exclusively in 
marriage, “But if they cannot control themselves, they should marry, for it is better to 
marry than to burn with passion.”52 “If a man is found sleeping with another man’s 
wife, both the man who slept with her and the woman must die. You must purge the 
evil from Israel. If a man happens to meet in a town a virgin pledged to be married 
and he sleeps with her, you shall take both of them to the gate of that town and stone 
them to death—the young woman because she was in a town and did not scream for 
help, and the man because he violated another man’s wife. You must purge the evil 
from among you.”53 Sexual intercourse is then an obligation called spousal or marital 
debt; “The husband should fulfill his marital duty to his wife, and likewise the wife to 
her husband. The wife does not have authority over her own body but yields it to her 
husband. In the same way, the husband does not have authority over his own body but 
yields it to his wife. Do not deprive each other except perhaps by mutual consent and 
for a time, so that you may devote yourselves to prayer. Then come together again so 
that Satan will not tempt you because of your lack of self-control.”54 The emotional 
side of marriage is considered, being love a precondition for marriage, “So Jacob 
served seven years to get Rachel, but they seemed like only a few days to him because 
of his love for her.”55 “His heart was drawn to Dinah daughter of Jacob; he loved the 
young woman and spoke tenderly to her. And Shechem said to his father Hamor, ‘Get 
me this girl as my wife.’”56 “Now Saul’s daughter Michal was in love with David, and 
when they told Saul about it, he was pleased.”57 The submissive role of women 
becomes clear: “Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands as you do to the 
Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Malachi 2:15. 
50 1 Corinthians 7:14. 
51 Malachi 2:14, see also Ezekiel 16:8 and Proverbs 2:17. 
52 1 Corinthians 7:9, see also Genesis 29:21. 
53 Deuteronomy 22:22-24. 
54 1 Corinthians 7: 3-5. 
55 Genesis 29:20. 
56 Genesis 34: 3-4. 
57 1 Samuel 18:20.!
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body, of which he is the Savior. Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives 
should submit to their husbands in everything.”58 Women, allegedly without their own 
head, are also reproductive machines: “I will make your pains in childbearing very 
severe; with painful labor you will give birth to children. Your desire will be for your 
husband, and he will rule over you.”59 The termination of marriage through a divorce 
of widowhood was also foreseen, “They said, ‘Moses permitted a man to write a 
certificate of divorce and send her away.’”60 “If a man marries a woman who becomes 
displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her, and he writes her a 
certificate of divorce, gives it to her and sends her from his house.”61 
 
In the appalling Bible extracts above, what this research has called the spheres 
of intimacy can be appreciated. Marriage, even in the Bible, has an emotional sphere 
(love), a moral sphere (gender roles), a sexual sphere (sexual practice), an economic 
sphere (the wife being the property of the husband and her unpaid labor), and a 
constructive sphere (procreation). 
 
B. Traditional Marriage in Christianity 
 
Traditional marriage in Christianity is the legal union between a man and a woman. 
What is now called traditional marriage is based on the legal idea of matrimony. The 
word matrimony dates back to the fourteenth century and it arises from the Latin 
word matrimonium,62 used in Justinian’s Code and in Canonical Law. The set of laws 
around the structure of marriage may include provisions for adoption, reproduction, 
abortion, inheritance, legal guardianship, divorce, immigration, property ownership, 
taxation, social security, and gender-specific access among others. These traditional 
marriages can be performed via a civil or religious ceremony, depending on the 
jurisdiction. It is important, though, that the validity of that marriage be effective in 
the domains detailed above. Although most conservatives claim the origins and 
“sanctity” of marriage have biblical foundations, it must be taken into account that the 
Bible also describes other types of marriages and family formations. For example, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Ephesians 5:22-24. 
59 Genesis 3:16, see also 1 Peter 3:1-6, Titus 2:4-5, and Colossians 3:18. 
60 Mark 10:4. 
61 Deuteronomy 24:1. 
62 “Matrimony”.!The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2013.!
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levirate marriage, i.e. marrying a brother-in-law, as the story of Tamar and Onan and 
the marriage of Ruth and Boaz explain.63 Also, the mandatory marriage of a woman 
after she has been raped;64 or the forced marriage of female slaves,65 including slaves 
of someone’s wife, as the case of Abram and Sarai relates;66 and female prisoners of 
war67 or polygynous marriages like those of Lamech and Solomon.68 For better or 
worse, traditional marriage has not embraced these biblical forms of marriage. In the 
west, traditional marriage is still considered the highest level of intimacy between 
opposite-sex individuals, and one where sexual activity is expected to be 
monogamous. 
 
C. “Same-sex” or “Gay” Marriage 
 
The current trend to add the attributive adjective same-sex or gay to the word 
marriage implies that the concept is something different. Nevertheless, same-sex and 
gay marriage are nothing else but traditional marriage. The only difference is that this 
type of marriage has opened its access to spouses of the same sex. However, the 
structure of intimacy as a regulatory scheme of intimacy is the very same. The 
eighteen developed societies where this type of marriage is currently available 
countrywide are: The Netherlands69 (since January 11, 2001), Belgium70 (since June 1, 
2003), Spain71 (since July 2, 2005), Canada72 (since July 20, 2005), South Africa73 
(since November 30, 2006), Norway74 (since January 1, 2009), Sweden75 (since May 
1, 2009), Portugal76 (since June 5, 2010), Iceland77 (since June 27, 2010), and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Genesis 38:6-10 and Ruth 4. 
64 Deuteronomy 22:28-29. 
65 Exodus 21:4. 
66 Genesis 16. 
67 Deuteronomy 21:11-14. 
68 Genesis 4:19 and 1 Kings 11:3, Solomon had 700 wives of royal birth and 300 concubines. 
69 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 2001, Number 9 (11 January). Official Journal of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
70 Moniteur Belge (Official Gazette) on Feb 28, 2003 ed. 3, pp. 9880-9883. 
71 Law 13/2005 of July 1, published on the Official Journal of Spain, BOE Number 157 (July 2) pp. 
23632-23634. 
72 Bill C-38, the Civil Marriage Act. S.C. 2005, c. 33, §§ 2, 4. 
73 After the Constitutional Court Decision on Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and 
Another (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19; 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (December 1, 
2005).!
74 Norsk Lysningsblad. Norwegian Official Journal. The Marriage Act Number 47 of July 4, 1991. 
Amended by the Act Number 53 of June 27, 2008.  
75 Äktenskapsfrågor (Government Bill) 2008/09:80. December 11, 2008. 
76 Law 9/2010. Diário da República (Official Journal), 1.a série—N.o 105—May 31, 2010, p.1853. 
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Argentina78 (since July 22, 2010), Denmark79 (since June 12, 2012), Brazil80 (since 
May 15, 2013), France81 (since May 17, 2013), Uruguay82 (Since August 1, 2013),  
New Zealand83 (since August 19, 2013), and the United Kingdom84 (England and 
Wales), where the bill has Royal Assent already, but will not come into effect until 
mid-2014. Moreover, this type of marriage is locally available in some regional 
jurisdictions within Mexico (Mexico City and Quintana Roo), and within the United 
States (California, Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Maine, Minnesota  New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, 
Washington and Vermont). Mexico and the U.S. have limited jurisdictions to perform 
the legal act of marriage; however, these marriages are valid in the whole country. 
 
The countries listed above are jurisdictions that have basically opened the 
access to same-sex couples, with higher court decisions, amending the wording of 
legislations with gender-neutral language or changing the definition of marriage. 
Nonetheless, the structure of intimacy and the components of marriage are still the 
same as traditional marriage. In other words, same-sex marriage is a relabeled 
structure that has not been transformed in its essence. Furthermore, it must be 
considered that there is also a powerful trend to ban same-sex marriage. As pointed 
out by Ian Curry-Sumner:  
 
“At the same time, alongside the trend towards recognition, it is nonetheless important to be 
aware of an opposing trend towards prohibition. In 2011 constitutional bans to same-sex 
marriage have been proposed in four jurisdictions around the world (Chile, Hungary, Jamaica 
and Zambia) thus far. Currently at least 25 jurisdictions worldwide provide for the 
constitutional limitation of marriage to one man and one woman. Cuba (1976), Burkina Faso !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Lög um breytingar á hjúskaparlögum og fleiri lögum og um brottfall laga um staðfesta samvist (ein 
hjúskaparlög). Law on amendments to the marriage and other laws and repealed the Act on registered 
partnership (one marriage). Act 65/2010, entered into force June 27, 2010. 
78 Decree 1054 that modifies Law 26618 on Civil Matrimony. Published on the Official Journal of 
Argentina on July 22, 2010. 
79 Lov om ændring af lov om ægteskabs indgåelse og opløsning, lov om ægteskabets retsvirkninger og 
retsplejeloven og om ophævelse af lov om registreret partnerskab. Law amending the Law on Marriage 
and Divorce, law on the legal effects of marriage, and repealing the Act on registered partnerships. Act 
532, published on June 13, 2012. 
80 Resolução Nº 175, de 14 de maio de 2013. Diário da Justiça. Edição nº 89/2013. Published on May 
15, 2013.  
81 Loi 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe. Published 
on the Journal officiel de la République française  N°0121 May 28, 2013, p. 8733. 
82 Amendment to Art. 83, Civil Code. Law 19.075, published on May 3, 2013. 
83 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 (13/20). Royal Assent: April 19, 2013. 
84 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (c. 30), Royal Ascent July 17, 2013. 
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(1991), Bulgaria (1991), Vietnam (1992), Paraguay (1992), Lithuania (1992), Cambodia 
(1993), Belarus (1994), Moldova (1994), Ukraine (1996), Poland (1997), Venezuela (1999), 
Rwanda (2003), Burundi (2005), Honduras (2005), Uganda (2005), Latvia (2005), Democratic 
Republic of Congo (2005), Serbia (2006), Montenegro (2007), Ecuador (2008), Bolivia 
(2009), Cayman Islands (2009), Dominican Republic (2010) and Kenya (2010).”85 
 
In the analysis of same-sex relationships in Europe, Curry-Sumner also identifies 
three trends in European regulatory schemes, (1) allowing same-sex couples to marry 
or creating institutions akin to marriage, (2) formalizing relationships through the 
registration of their partnerships, and (3) granting rights after a given period of 
cohabitation.86 
 
D. Common-law Marriage 
 
Some common-law jurisdictions87 have admitted the legal figure of marriage even in 
the absence of a written contract. For example, the State of Colorado in the United 
States defines common law marriage “as a marriage not otherwise prohibited by law 
between a man and a woman who are at least eighteen years old that is not based upon 
a license, ceremony, or any other legal formality but upon the couple's agreement to 
have a marital relationship. Most states recognizing common law marriage require 
that the couple intend to have a marital relationship, live together, and have a 
reputation of being husband and wife.”88 The requirements for the recognition of a 
common-law marriage vary from state to state, but they all require that the minimum 
conditions for marriage be met. The more uxorio practice (as if they were husband 
and wife) is sine qua non. The legitimation of a common-law marriage represents the 
official acknowledgment of that intimacy a posteriori in the same terms as marriage, 
meaning that the state has recognized their marital behavior even if they did not sign a 
marriage license. Yet, once it has been legitimized through a court or a similar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Curry-Sumner, Ian. “Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: Trends towards tolerance?” Legal 
perspectives on Gender and Sexuality. The Amsterdam Law Forum. Vol 3:2. Netherlands: VU 
University Amsterdam, 2011. p. 48. 
86 Ibidem, pp. 52-53. See also: Curry-Sumner, Ian. “A Patchwork of Partnerships: Comparative 
Overview of Registration Schemes in Europe.” Legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Europe. 
Boele-Woelki, Fuchs (Ed.) Second Edition. Cambridge: Intersentia Publishing Ltd., 2012.  pp. 71-90. 
87 For instance, in the United States it is possible in the States of Alabama, Colorado, D.C., Iowa, 
Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Utah. 
88 “Common Law Marriage”. Law Summaries. Office of Legislative Legal Services. State of Colorado. 
August 24, 2011. 
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procedure, the structure of intimacy as far as rights and obligations is still the same: 
Traditional marriage.  
 
E. Putative Marriage 
 
Jurists describe this type of marriage as one that has been contracted in good faith by 
at least one of the spouses, ignoring facts that constitute an impediment for that 
marriage to be celebrated.89 The recognition of this type of marriage is only available 
in certain jurisdictions and in canonical law (matrimonium putativum).90 In order for 
them to be validated, the putative marriage must meet three conditions: bona fide 
(good faith) by either party, the marriage must have been solemnly celebrated and it 
must have been considered lawful by one of the parties. For example, a woman 
marries a man who is already married in another country to another woman. When 
she finds out, her marriage would be declared annulled because being married in an 
impediment to sign into a new marriage. Her marriage could then be declared a 
putative marriage so that the effects of her marriage are still valid, despite the 
condition of bigamy, owing to the fact that she acted in good faith when she married 
the man. Once the putative marriage has been approved by a legal system, the rights 
of that marriage remain effective. That is to say, the structure of (traditional) marriage 
is acknowledged and the rights and obligations become putative; in other words, 
mandatory. 
 
II.4.3. Civil Unions 
 
First of all, it should be admitted that marriage is also a civil union. Marriage is a civil 
union because it is the union of two citizens. In secular states, even if the marriage 
ceremony is a religious one, the validity of that marriage union is granted due to the 
civil recognition of that specific religion or Church, but not by the religious vow alone. 
Thus, religious ministers act as mere legitimate notaries exercising a subsidiary public 
duty and endorsing a public act as witnesses. Nowadays, the term civil union is used 
to denominate a structure of intimacy that is not religious, and also, that is not as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 "Putative marriage." A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. 
By John Bouvier. 1856.  
90 See Gasparri, De Matrimonio, I, nn. 47, 1375 (3rd ed., Paris, 1904) and Rosset, De Sacr. Matr., n. 17.!
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strong as marriage. Usually, these unions cannot be legalized otherwise but civilly. 
Civil unions generally have some sort of judicial legitimation, be it though a court, a 
civil registry or a similar ratification by the state, and the partners of a civil union 
cannot claim all the benefits a married couple would. Hence, civil unions are a 
second-class type of intimacy whose structure is also recognized. Although civil 
unions are typically associated with same-sex partners, many of them are available for 
opposite-sex partners as well. The defunct Registreret Partnerskab91 in Denmark,  
repealed by same-sex marriage, the Lebenspartnerschaft in Germany,92 the Civil 
Partnerships in the United Kingdom,93 and the Pact Civil de Solidarité (PACS) in 
France94 are prominent examples of civil unions that are similar to marriage, but are 
not. Kees Waaldijk, the Dutch member of the European Commission on Sexual 
Orientation Law, has pointed out some of the problems with the international 
recognition of civil unions like the PACS, particularly in the harmonization of rights 
and obligations of the individuals who form that intimacy when they interact at the 
international level. 95  In his classification of same-sex types of intimacy, he 
distinguishes three types: Civil marriage, informal cohabitation, and registered 
partnerships. Although this classification encompasses most types of intimacy 
according to international standards, for the purposes of this research, civil unions 
must be discerned from domestic or registered partnerships. Primarily, because civil 
unions involve more spheres of intimacy, whereas domestic or registered partnerships 
focus for the most part on cohabitation. Therefore, in the analysis of these forms of 
intimacy as legal structures it is important to detect the nuances. 
 
II.4.4. Domestic or Registered Partnerships 
 
The terms Domestic Partnerships, Registered Partnerships, Civil Partnerships and 
even Civil Unions are sometimes used as synonyms. As mentioned before, civil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Registered Partnerships. Denmark, Act on Registered Partnerships No. 372 of June 7, 1989. 
Repealed by Act 532 of June 12, 2012.!
92 Life Partnerships. Gesetz über die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft of February 16, 2001. 
93 “The Civil Partnership Act 2004” (Commencement No.2) Order 2005 No. 3175 (C.136). The 
Stationery Office Limited under the authority and superintendence of Carol Tullo, Controller of Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office and Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament. 
94 Civil Pacts of Solidarity. Decree No. 2006-1806 of December 23, 2006. Décret No. 2006-1806 du 23 
décembre 2006 relatif à la déclaration, la modification, la dissolution et la publicité du pacte civil de 
solidarité.  
95 “Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection.” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, 2010. Sec. 2, par. 27 et sqq.  
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unions have contractual obligations that are recognized by judicial systems. Domestic 
or Registered Partnerships, however, are a downgraded structure of intimacy. In 
contrast to the other structures analyzed above, these partnerships are more basic.  It 
could be said that the difference between Civil Unions and Domestic or Registered 
Partnerships is that the former are structures of intimacy with stronger legal 
consequences whereas the latter focus rather on the registration of cohabitation. 
Domestic partnerships are usually local-level registrations used for basic procedures 
such as lease agreements and access to privacy. Many countries that have domestic 
partnerships do not even recognize them in the whole country, and they are just valid 
in the jurisdiction where they were registered. For instance, the Spanish Civil Code 
does not recognize domestic partnerships. However, autonomous communities like 
Catalonia96 and Aragon97 have issued independent legislations that recognize stable 
partnerships. Domestic and Registered partnerships are week structures of intimacy 
that provide options for registration of a de facto cohabitation. These partnerships are 
normally registered at City Halls or local government offices; they grant minimal 
benefits and generate simple obligations, like the payment of a lease. 
 
II.5. The Discourse of Intimacy 
 
Intimacies are an important part of the social fabric. History shows that societies have 
evolved differently, but they all have included particular forms of unions, values, 
religions, economies, family ties, sexuality, procreation, and domesticity. Considering 
the role of intimacy in history and in additional realms beyond sexuality, it can be 
said that intimacy has a permeating effect on surrounding issues. Intimacy creates 
knowledge and power and this relationship has an impact on domains of life that go 
beyond private.  That is to say, observing a specific science like architecture, the 
influence of intimacy can also be identified. Houses are built in such a way that they 
accommodate expected social interactions of the family unit, internal and external. 
The master bedroom represents the nest for sexuality, while the distance between the 
main bedroom and additional rooms for children are meant to secure the disciplinary 
mechanisms established by parents. Therefore, intimacy has a discursive behavior that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Law 10/1998, of  July 15, regarding domestic partnerships (uniones estables de pareja). Valid until 
January 1, 2011, when they were incorporated into the Catalan Civil Code. !
97 Law 6/1999, of March 26, regarding stable unmarried couples. Valid until April 23, 2011, when it 
was incorporated into the Civil Code of Aragon.!
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allows the formation of objects as it deploys its impact onto a broader scope. Taking 
into account Michel Foucault’s discourse theory, discourse in this dissertation should 
not be interpreted as a synonym for speech; rather, it shall be interpreted as a 
transversal phenomenon:  
  
“Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, 
whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a 
regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for 
the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation - thus avoiding words 
that are already overladen with conditions and consequences, and in any case inadequate to 
the task of designating such a dispersion, such as 'science', 'ideology', 'theory', or ' domain of 
objectivity'. The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, 
concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The rules of 
formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and 
disappearance) in a given discursive division.”98 
 
Up until now, the system of dispersion of intimacy has been a system of marriage. 
Nevertheless, with the evolution and democratization of societies and human rights, 
intimacy is experiencing a transformation. This transformation includes changes in 
the current regulatory schemes of intimacy and the creation of new structures of 
intimacy. The discovery of the discursive behavior of intimacy leads this research to 
the inclusion of a dimension of discourse in the study of the legalization of intimacy, 
using Foucault’s approach, in order to understand why the State legalizes the spheres 
of intimacy.  
 
II.5.1. Foucault and Sexuality 
 
Paul Johnson argues that “Discourse, for Foucault, is both productive and 
constraining of sexuality: it is the mode by which sexuality is conceived across a 
proliferating number of sites – as a ‘scientific’ object to be studied and as a set of 
subjects to be scrutinized – and the mechanism that delimits the parameters to how it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. New York: 
Pantheon Books, Random House, 1972. p. 38. 
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is conceptualized and understood.”99 The approach to intimacy in this research, is 
therefore within the discursive analysis of the power of sexuality as both productive 
and constraining of intimacy. Michel Foucault published a compelling study on The 
History of Sexuality.100 He analyzes the influence of sex as a means of power. 
Foucault observed that towards the beginning of the eighteenth century there emerged 
a political, economic, and technical incitement to talk about sex,101 resulting in the 
transformation of sex into discourse. Claiming that the use of sex (or sexuality) by 
modern institutions was an instrument of power, he developed what he called: The 
Repressive Hypothesis. An imperative was established in the incitement to discourse 
it fostered: “Not only will you confess to acts contravening the law, but you will seek 
to transform your desire, your every desire, into discourse.”102 Sex became then a 
police matter, he argues, not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximization 
of collective and individual forces.103 The relationship between power and population 
lead states to regulate on sexual behavior. Therefore, “it was necessary to analyze the 
birthrate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and 
frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of 
unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact of contraceptive practices.”104 
Because a country’s richness and power depended on the number and uprightness of 
its citizens, on its marriage rules and family organization, but also on the manner in 
which each individual made use of its sex. Thus, in the relationship between the state 
and the individual, sex became an issue, a public one.105 This peculiar imperialism, 
that compelled everyone to transform their sexuality into a perpetual discourse, 
institutionalized, extracted and distributed the sexual discourse in the areas of 
economy, pedagogy, medicine and justice.106 The transformation of sex into discourse 
then revolved around the strict economy of reproduction, banishing casual pleasures, 
reducing and excluding practices whose object was not procreation.107 Foucault !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99  Johnson, Paul. ‘An essentially private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review (Oxford 
University Press), 10:1 (2010), pp. 71. 
100 Foucault, Michel. The history of sexuality. New York: Random House, Vintage Books Edition, 
March 1990.  
101 Ibidem, p. 23. 
102 Ibidem, p. 21. 
103 Ibidem, p. 24.!
104 Ibidem, p. 25. 
105 Ibidem, p. 26. 
106 Ibidem, p. 33. 
107 Ibidem, p. 36. 
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noticed that until the eighteenth century; Canonical law, Christian pastoral, and Civil 
Law, “they were all centered on matrimonial relations: the marital obligation, the 
ability to fulfill it, the manner in which one complied with it, the requirements and 
violence that accompanied it…its fecundity or the way one went about marking it 
sterile…the marriage relation was the most intense focus of constraints...it was under 
constant surveillance.”108 The west created two great systems for governing sex: The 
law of marriage and the order of desires.109 According to Foucault, it was in this 
discursive context that the nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, when 
the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted 
from the moment it was characterized not only as a type of sexual relations but also as 
a quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and feminine 
in oneself. “Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was 
transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a 
hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the 
homosexual was now a species.”110 And, this form of sexuality or newfound species 
was certainly not reproductive.  
 
II.5.2. From a Discourse of Sex towards a Discourse of Intimacy 
 
On May 17, 1990, the General Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
removed homosexuality from its list of mental disorders.111 This significant event 
should be interpreted not as a vindication of homosexuality, but rather as the 
endorsement and acknowledgment of different sexualities beyond heterosexuality. Up 
until this point, the discourse was focused on the sexual practice: Heterosexual 
practices were encouraged and protected, and all other forms of sexual experiences 
were hindered. The discourse of sexuality was then centered on its most basic element, 
the sexual practice or sexual behavior. Sexual practices that protected heterosexual 
life and masculinity were secured with law-enforcement and the criminalization of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Ibidem, p. 37.!
109 Ibidem, p. 39. 
110 Foucault marks Carl Westphal’s article “Contrary sexual sensations” of 1870 as the date of birth. 
(Carl Westphal, Archiv für Neurologie, 1870). Ibidem, p. 43.!
111 Official Records WHA43/1990/REC/1. Handbook of Resolutions and Decisions of the World 
Health Assembly and the Executive Board. Volume III. Third Edition. (1985-1992) 38th to 45th World 
Health Assemblies 75th to 90th sessions of the Executive Board. Geneva: World Health Organization, 
1993. 
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clashing acts like sodomy. Nevertheless, heterosexuals were also affected by this 
discourse of sex; for instance, the entire discourse around abortion (legal, moral and 
clinical discourse) sheltered the [hetero]sexual practice with its reproductive 
aspiration. As Anthony Giddens has claimed, even masturbation has come out as open 
as homosexuality.112 Hence, removing homosexuality from a compendium of mental 
illnesses meant that the sexual experience and other sexual conducts at large were 
admitted in the global consensus.  
 
Western societies are now moving away from a discourse of sex and evolving 
towards a broader discourse, i.e. the Discourse of Intimacy, from the stigmatization of 
non-genital or rather non-phallic sex, the criminalization of sexual practices (such as 
sodomy) and non-reproductive practices (such as abortion) towards the embracement 
of other forms of intimacy, which include homosexual intimacy. This discourse is 
shifting towards the defense of intimacies (in plural) as gender-equality is 
mainstreamed in the west. The sexuality of the individual loses power as the intimacy 
of individuals together as agency becomes more and more relevant every day. The 
WHO opened the path for a new variety of intimacies that have dimmed the 
ideological hegemony of heterosexuality and its masculine intimacy. Heterosexuality 
is no longer a Hobson’s choice.113 The earlier discourse of sex was the forerunner of 
the discourse of intimacy. If these discourses were to be identified in the hierarchy of 
intimacy,114 the discourse of sex now lies at the subordinate level of the wider 
discourse of intimacy. Fundamentally, the discourse of sex was one of sexual 
behavior, whereas the contemporary discourse of intimacy at the superordinate level 
now includes intimate relationships. The discourse of sex has merged into a fuller 
discourse of intimacy, which encompasses sexuality but also other domains like 
assisted reproduction, surrogacy, adoption, marriage, and legal guardianship, among 
other derivative elements. Foucault stated that “the deployment of sexuality 
established one of its most essential operating principles: the desire for sex – the 
desire to have it, to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to articulate it in 
discourse, to formulate it in truth. It constitutes ‘sex’ itself as something desirable.”115 
Nowadays, this very desire is a desire for intimacy. For sex by itself does not suffice. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Giddens, p.15. 
113 Hobson’s choice: That or none. 
114 See figure in II.2. 
115 Foucault (1990), p. 107. 
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The present discourse contemplates intimacy, the desire to have it, to have access to it, 
to discover it, and to liberate it. Intimacy in its comprehensive and all-embracing 
connotation, and not sexual behavior per se, is the object of desire. Giddens has also 
noted: "…the emergence of what I call plastic sexuality is crucial to the emancipation 
implicit in the pure relationship, as well as to women's claim to sexual pleasure. 
Plastic sexuality is decentered sexuality, freed from the needs of reproduction…it 
becomes further developed as a result of the spread of modern contraception and new 
reproductive technologies…it frees sexuality from, the rule of the phallus, from the 
overweening importance of male sexual experience."116 What Giddens has named 
plastic sexuality and pure relationships are now a part of the discourse of intimacy. 
 
 The relations of power perceived by Foucault were also “juridico-discursive.” 
He defined this as the conception that governs the thematics of repression as well as 
the theory of the law as constitutive of desire.117 This juridico-discursive relation is 
exceptionally important in the study of the legalization of intimacy. Because sex 
became a public issue in the discourse of sex, and as a consequence, intimacy is a 
public issue in the discourse of intimacy nowadays. This public issue prevails in the 
juridico-discursive relation of power through which the state legislates and legalizes 
(or illegalizes) intimacy. In his analysis of discourse, the French philosopher adds: 
“We must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical 
function is neither uniform nor stable…we must not imagine a world of discourse 
divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant 
discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that 
come into play in various strategies.”118 This multiplicity can be perceived in the 
discourse of intimacy. Giddens has observed that "...the term 'perversion' itself has 
now more or less completely disappeared from clinical psychiatry, and the aversion, 
felt by many towards homosexuality no longer received substantial support from the 
medical profession."119 Nevertheless, while the clinical discourse against homosexual 
practices has diminished its value after the WHO milestone, it still persists in the 
conservative social psyche and has barely morphed in the religious discourses.  
Furthermore, the progress in technological development has incorporated the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Giddens, p. 2.!
117 Foucault (1990), p. 82.!
118 Ibidem, p.100. 
119 Giddens, pp.13-14. 
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discourse of intimacy, recognizing its many forms. Nonetheless, the anachronic 
remnant elements of the discourse of sex find a way to coexist.120 Also, as the support 
for abortion has spread out, the discourse of sex has weakened in one of its pillars: the 
goal of reproduction. The imperative of the State is no longer to reproduce in order to 
be more powerful with a larger population. On the contrary, in this day and age after 
the impact of the baby boom generation, the discourse of intimacy is more 
environment-friendly inasmuch as it includes – among other issues – the debate on 
Planned Parenthood and alternatives to reproduction. 
 
Therefore, it is within this juridico-discursive context that intimacy must be 
analyzed. The current discourse of intimacy can be appreciated while the discursive 
elements are examined separately. The legalization of intimacy is also a legalization 
of the different discourses that concern – or overlap with – intimacy. This multiplicity 
of discourses, these interdependent components, these reciprocal constitutions of 
desire and their interaction, configure the spheres of intimacy. 
 
II.6. Conclusion 
 
This introduction to the question of intimacy has provided a working definition of 
intimacy for this dissertation.  The definition of intimacy has been discussed in such a 
way that it should be easy to identify the meaning of the term in this research, despite 
its many connotations. The broader, superordinate sense of this concept will be used 
in a comprehensive manner. It has been established that intimacy is a close reciprocal 
relationship of future-oriented companionship with attachment in different private 
domains. These private domains have been called: the spheres of intimacy. These 
spheres interact among themselves and circulate within a specific constitution that has 
been denominated structure of intimacy. While analyzing Foucault’s perspective on 
the history of sexuality, the attention has been drawn to the relationship between 
sexuality and power that he called the Repressive Hypothesis.121 Along with the ideas 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 For instance, Apple Inc. recently removed the application ”GayCure” from its application store. 
This application supposedly “helped” homosexuals to become heterosexual. See Bosker, Bianca. 
“Apple Under Fire For Approving 'Gay Cure' iPhone App From Exodus International”. The Huffington 
Post. May 25, 2011. 
121 Foucault (1990), pp. 21 et sqq. 
 57 
presented by Giddens in his read on the transformation of intimacy,122 it becomes 
clear that sexuality and intimacy have been changing since the last decade of the 
twentieth century. It was argued how these developments constitute an evolution, 
where the discourse of sex shifting towards a wider discourse of intimacy. In this 
discourse of intimacy, the discourse of sex is a subordinate component. And this 
generation might be the missing link in this evolution process. As the dominant 
heterosexual discourse has lost some of its power, this new phase in the progress of 
societies in the western world has embraced new forms of intimacy.  
 
The legalization of intimacy will be analyzed from a juridico-discursive 
perspective, as defined by Foucault, and considering the fact that the law forms 
structures of intimacy through the legalization of the elements in each of the spheres 
of intimacy. Although the discourse of intimacy encompasses many domains, what is 
important for this dissertation is the legal discourse of intimacy, because the scope of 
this study is not intimacy in general, rather, its legalization. This legalization includes 
all the collateral legislation that has an effect on the five spheres of intimacy. 
Ultimately, laws that affect one of the spheres consequently influence intimacy as a 
whole. It has been demonstrated how the emotional components of intimacy can also 
be materialized, like legal guardianship. Moral ideas are merged into intimacy as well. 
The sexual sphere, which used to have a pivotal personality in intimacy, is now just 
one more factor in terms of sexual practice, preference and identity. The reproductive 
goal of intimacy has been debated in the constructive sphere. It has been described 
how intimacies can be either horizontal or vertical, having equal value in societies. 
Intimacies in either form constitute an agency that builds citizenship. Immigration and 
intimacy have a connection that is also regulated by the state. As mentioned before, 
democratic values can come from the mere establishment of intimacy and the 
application of justice in intimacy. This chapter has also presented different types of 
structures of intimacy. Namely: relationships, marriage, civil unions, and domestic or 
registered partnerships. The biblical analysis of marriage has provided a sample of 
ideas that can still be identified in current traditional marriages. These regulatory 
schemes show how intimacy can be legalized differently. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122!Giddens, Anthony. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern 
Societies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992.!
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Now, the concept of intimacy has been understood, the discourse of intimacy 
has been discussed, the spheres of intimacy have been developed and the structures of 
intimacy have been classified. Therefore, it will be much easier to understand the 
legalization of intimacy. And, the best method to do so is by defragmenting the 
elements of intimacy in a case study. Thus, the next chapter will center specifically on 
the evolution of legal intimacy in Mexico. That is to say, the chapter will encompass 
the four structures of intimacy in Mexico, identifying all five spheres of intimacy in 
each of them. As these ideas are represented and materialized in the following chapter, 
the definitions introduced here in an abstract manner will be perceived more 
concretely within the specific context of Mexican law. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, intimacy can be embodied in different 
structures; the law creates a possibility to recognize an intimacy by enacting 
legislations that handle issues of intimacy, in the form of marriage, or some sort of 
similar civil union. These sets of provisions configure the structures of intimacy. Now, 
this chapter will appraise the current available options in Mexico, focusing 
particularly on the material aspects of such structures. This chapter is composed of 
three sections: The first one will describe the legally recognized types of intimacy in 
Mexico, as they are interpreted by Mexican law, the second one will review relevant 
court cases and decisions regarding these forms of intimacy, and the third section will 
discuss the significance of international law. This chapter explores predominantly the 
legal circumstances as they are and not as they should be. For the most part, this will 
provide an insight into this specific area of Family Law. The spheres of intimacy 
introduced in the previous chapter will be more clearly appreciated in this chapter as 
they are identified in every form of intimacy in Mexican law. The analysis of the 
jurisprudence in this chapter is limited to the cases that affect particular administrative, 
procedural and jurisdictional conflicts. The scrutiny of jurisprudence from a human 
rights perspective will be later developed in Chapter IV. Certain events of Mexico’s 
legal history have been briefly included, only in order to contextualize the current 
legal reality.  
 
III.1. The Mexican Legal System 
 
Since the Constitution of 1857, Mexico has been declared a secular state. 1 
Relationships between individuals, such as marriage, can only be formalized through 
the Civil Code and not through religious ministers. The constitutional reform of 
September 25, 1873 stated in the second provision that “Matrimony is a civil contract. 
This and other acts of civil status of a person are of the exclusive competency of 
officers and authorities of the civil order, in the terms established by law, and will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Zertuche Muñoz, Fernando. “El Congreso Constituyente de 1856-1857: El decenio de su entorno.” In  
Valadéz, Diego; Carbonell, Miguel. El proceso constituyente mexicano: a 150 años de la Constitución 
de 1857 y 90 de la Constitución de 1917. Mexico: UNAM, 2007. pp. 845-868. 
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have the effect and validity that they grant them”.2 This constitutional amendment 
embodied the essence of the previous Law on Civil Matrimony and the Organic Law 
of the Civil Registry promulgated by Benito Juarez in 1859. 
 
There are four different types of legal intimacies in Mexico: Matrimony, 
Concubinage, Cohabitation Partnerships and Civil Pacts of Solidarity. The first two 
forms are recognized throughout the country at a Federal level, whereas the last two 
are only recognized locally. Recently in summer 2013, the States of Colima and 
Oaxaca started to take action to allow same-sex civil unions and marriage respectively. 
These cases will not be discussed in this chapter, because they are still in development. 
Also, because they will not create a new or different structure of intimacy, they will 
be either civil unions or marriage without gender-bias access restrictions. The analysis 
of these four types of contract detailed above aims to review the material aspects in 
each of them, and it will be sufficient to identify the differences among them. It has 
been determined how an intimacy has at least five spheres: the Emotional, Moral, 
Sexual, Economic and Constructive Spheres. These five domains of intimacy will be 
identified in the four structures of legal intimacy as a lens of examination. That is to 
say, the portrayal of these structures will test the five spheres in all four of them. 
Moreover, a comparison and contrast of these four structures will be included at the 
end of the chapter. Mexico City has been a pioneer in many developments in 
Mexico’s legal system. The recognition of intimacy and its legalization has certainly 
been one of Mexico City’s achievements. The court cases that will be analyzed in this 
chapter demonstrate the liberal trends in the legislative agenda in the city. Also, they 
manifest the feud between the state and federal systems. The different forms of 
intimacy that Mexico City has legalized have catalyzed the evolution of the 
legalization of intimacy in the country as a whole. Furthermore, private international 
law and public international law will be considered in the section of international law 
analysis. Intimacies celebrated abroad can be harmonized into the Mexican legal 
system. The registration, validity and termination of such intimacies will be discussed 
within the context of the Supreme Court jurisprudence. The relationship between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The amendment was promoted by President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada. “Decreto que incorpora las 
Leyes de Reforma a la Constitución de 1857. 25 de septiembre de 1873.” Mexican Parliamentary 
Encyclopedia. Series III. Vol. 1. Num. 2. Mexico: Chamber of Deputies, 2007. p. 1186. 
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foreign citizens, foreign intimacies, comparative law and Mexican law will be 
detailed in this section also. 
 
III.1.1. The Origin of Matrimonial Law 
 
The types of recognized intimacy have not changed much since the first Law 
on Civil Matrimony (LCM) in 1859. When religious ceremonies were recognized by 
law before 1859, priests defined the obligations and duties of future spouses 
according to their beliefs: Catholicism, and Canonical Law. With the secularization of 
intimacy, the fifteenth article of the LCM outlined the commitments of the civil 
contract of matrimony in the iconic Epistle of Melchor Ocampo:3 
 
“…This is the only moral way to found a family, to preserve the species and to integrate the 
imperfections of an individual, who cannot reach the perfection of mankind by themself…The 
individual does not exist in a single person, but rater in the spousal duality…. Spouses must be 
and will be sacred to one another, even more than for themselves.” 
“…The man, whose sexual endowments are mainly courage and strength, must give the 
woman protection, food and direction, treating her always as the most delicate, most sensible 
and finest part of himself, and with the magnanimity and generous benevolence, that the 
strong owe the weak, essentially when the latter surrenders to the former, and for the society 
he has been entrusted with.” 
“…The woman, whose sexual endowments are mainly abnegation, beauty, compassion, wit 
and tenderness, must give and will give her husband, obedience, joy, assistance, sympathy and 
advice, treating him always with the veneration that we owe those who support and defend us, 
and with the delicacy of that who does not want to exasperate the brusque, irritable and hard 
part of herself, they owe themselves and will have respect, deference, fidelity, trust and 
tenderness for one another.” 
“…Society blesses, considers and praises good parents for the great good that they do by 
giving good and responsible citizens, and it censors and repudiates those who through their 
abandonment, misunderstood care, or bad example, corrode the sacred deposit that nature 
entrusted them with by granting them such children.”4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Melchor Ocampo drafted the Laws of Reform, including the LCM, along with President Benito 
Juarez. He has been given credit for the addition of this epistle in Art. 15. and is widely recognized as 
the “Melchor Ocampo Epistle”. “Ley de Matrimonio Civil. 23 de julio de 1859.” Mexican 
Parliamentary Encyclopedia. Series III. Vol. 1. Num. 2. Mexico: Chamber of Deputies, 2007. pp.931-
934. 
4 Ibidem. Law on Civil Matrimony, 1859. Literal translation of Art. 15. The original text in Spanish: 
“Artículo 15.- El día designado para celebrar el matrimonio ocurrirán los interesados al encargado 
del registro civil, y éste, asociado del alcalde del lugar y dos testigos más por parte de los contrayentes, 
preguntará a cada uno de ellos, expresándolo por su nombre, si es su voluntad unirse en matrimonio 
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 Through the LCM, Melchor Ocampo unintentionally created the first legal 
definition of Mexican intimacy. Despite the secularization of matrimony, this civil 
contract was irrefutably laden with the catholic moral philosophy. The content and 
rhetoric of the epistle was at least sexist, if not misogynist, but it reflected the 
mentality and social values of that decade. What is most outrageous, though, is the 
fact that this text continued to be read until 2006. The infamous epistle was a 
fragment of the LCM. Therefore, it was legally abolished when the civil code of 1870 
entered into force. For almost 150 years, the epistle was read in civil matrimonies as 
customary law, even though judges did not have the obligation to read it. On March 
14, 2006, the Congress finally approved a request to ban the epistle.5 
 
III.1.2. Code Civil 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
con el otro, …les manifestará: que éste es el único medio moral de fundar la familia, de conservar la 
especie y de suplir las imperfecciones del individuo, que no puede bastarse a sí mismo para llegar a la 
perfección del género humano. Que este no existe en la persona sola sino en la dualidad conyugal. 
Que los casados deben ser y serán sagrados el uno para el otro, aun más de lo que es cada uno para sí. 
Que el hombre, cuyas dotes sexuales son principalmente el valor y la fuerza, debe dar y dará a la 
mujer protección, alimento y dirección, tratándola siempre como a la parte más delicada, sensible y 
fina de sí mismo, y con la magnanimidad y benevolencia generosa, que el fuerte debe al débil, 
esencialmente cuando este débil se entrega a él y cuando por la sociedad se le ha confiado. Que la 
mujer, cuyas principales dotes sexuales son la abnegación, la belleza, la compasión, la perspicacia y 
la ternura, debe dar y dará al marido, obediencia, agrado, asistencia, consuelo y consejo, tratándolo 
siempre con la veneración que se debe a la persona que nos apoya y defiende, y con la delicadeza de 
quien no quiere exasperar la parte brusca, irritable y dura de sí mismo, el uno y el otro se deben y 
tendrán respeto, deferencia, fidelidad, confianza y ternura, y ambos procurarán que lo que el uno se 
esperaba del otro al unirse con él, no vaya a desmentirse con la unión. Que ambos deben prudenciar y 
atenuar sus faltas. Que nunca se dirán injurias, porque las injurias entre los casados deshonran al que 
las vierte y prueban su falta de tino o de cordura en la elección: ni mucho menos se maltratarán de 
obra, porque es villano y cobarde abusar de la fuerza. Que ambos deben prepararse con el estudio y 
con la amistosa y mutua corrección de sus defectos, a la suprema magistratura de padres de familia, 
para que cuando lleguen a serlo, sus hijos encuentren en ellos buen ejemplo y una conducta digna de 
servirles de modelo. Que la doctrina que inspire a estos tiernos y amados lazos de su afecto, hará su 
suerte próspera o adversa; y la felicidad o desventura de los hijos será la recompensa o el castigo, la 
ventura o desdicha de los padres. Que la sociedad bendice, considera y alaba a los buenos padres por 
el gran bien que le hacen dándole buenos y cumplidos ciudadanos y, la misma, censura y desprecia 
debidamente a los que por abandono, por mal entendido cariño, o por su mal ejemplo corrompen el 
depósito sagrado que la naturaleza les confió, concediéndoles tales hijos. Y, por último, cuando la 
sociedad ve que tales personas no merecían ser elevadas a la dignidad de padres, sino que sólo debían 
haber vivido sujetas a tutela, como incapaces de conducirse dignamente, se duele de haber consagrado 
con su autoridad la unión de un hombre y una mujer que no han sabido ser libres, y dirigirse por sí 
mismos hacia el bien.” 
5 The proposal to ban the epistle was submitted by congressman Ángel Pasta Muñuzuri, on April 13, 
2004. Ironically, it was submitted by a man, and a member of the conservative party. It was approved 
almost two years later on March 14, 2006 and published in the official minute of sessions on the same 
day. Parliamentary Gazzette. Chamber of Deputies. Num. 1966-III, Mexico, March 14, 2006. 
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Mexican Law has the Napoleonic influence of the Code Civil.6 All rights and 
obligations between persons are described and regulated by the Código Civil Federal, 
the Federal Civil Code. The current federal civil code dates back to 1928.7 It is a 
successor of the previous codes of 1870 and 1884. The State of Oaxaca had 
promulgated the first Civil Code in Latin America in 1829, however, that code was 
only valid within the state. 8 The code of 1870 was especially relevant for its national 
scope of application. In addition to the Federal Civil Code,9 there are 32 regional civil 
codes: One for each of the 31 Mexican States and one for Mexico City, the Federal 
District. Most of the 32 state-level civil codes have the same structure and language. 
As Jorge A. Vargas described it: “At the outset, it deserves to be mentioned that the 
language of the Federal Civil Code (as reflected in the Civil Code of 1928) has been 
literally incorporated, word by word, in each of the thirty-one local civil codes 
enacted by the Mexican States (with significant changes from very few states). 
Accordingly, this means that, de facto, regarding civil law matters the Federal Civil 
Code may be said to be the common law of Mexico governing throughout the entire 
country.”10 Civil acts performed in any state must be recognized by all others, even 
though the conditions and procedures may slightly differ.  
 
III.1.3. Mexico City 
 
Until July 26, 1994, Mexico City was considered a Department of the Federal 
Government. The mayor was then appointed directly by the President of Mexico. One 
of the largest cities in the world could not even elect its own mayor. With the new 
Government Statute for Mexico City,11 the city gained the equal status of a State. 
Although it was not literally declared a state, it is now a quasi-state with its own 
judicial, executive and legislative bodies. Nonetheless, subject to the federal powers 
in some capacities. The first election for a Mexico City mayor took place in 1997.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Code Civil des Français. (French Civil Code) Paris: Imprimerie de la République, An XII, 1804. 
7 Published in the OJF in four parts, on May 26, July 14, August 3 and 31, 1928. 
8 See Ortiz, Raul. Oaxaca, cuna de la codificación iberoamericana. (Oaxaca, the nest of Ibero-
American codification) México: Porrúa, 1974. 
9 The Federal Civil Code has a total of 3074 articles divided into four “Books”: First Book (Persons), 
Art. 22-746. Second Book (Property), Art. 747-1280. Third Book (Successions), Art. 1281-1791. 
Fourth Book (Obligations), Art. 1792-3074. 
10 Vargas, Jorge A. Features: The Federal Civil Code of Mexico. USA: LLRX, May 15, 2005. 
11 Estatuto de Gobierno del Distrito Federal. (Government Statute for the Federal District) Published: 
OJF on July 26, 1994. 
!64 
The statute reformed article 122 of the Mexican Constitution, enlisting the faculties of 
the new Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (LAFD). Among them, “(h) the 
capacity to legislate in civil and criminal matters.” This faculty would enter into force 
on January 1, 1999. Before the LAFD could legislate, the Federal Civil Code acted 
both at the federal level and at a local level in Mexico City. On May 29, 2000, the 
LAFD finally enacted its own Civil Code.12 Even though it was basically a replica of 
the federal one, it became an independent legislation subject to amendments by the 
LAFD exclusively and not by the federal congress anymore. Back then, the 31 
Mexican States were not very active when it came to amending their local civil codes. 
No one would have thought that the newly enacted code was going to be more 
dynamic in Mexico City than anywhere else in the country. Instead of analyzing every 
single civil code in Mexico, state by state, a review of the Federal Civil Code will 
depict the current forms of intimacy that are recognized by law. 
 
III.2. Types of Legally Recognized Intimacy in Mexico 
 
III.2.1. Matrimony 
 
The Civil Code does not provide a literal definition of matrimony. However, the 
essential description can be extracted from the conditions established for spouses: 
Matrimony is a civil contract between a man a woman. “In order to be joined in 
matrimony, the man must have reached the age of sixteen and the woman, must have 
reached the age of fourteen.” 13  The first differentiation or discrimination is 
established in the age condition. Before the parties reach the legal age of eighteen, a 
parental consent is necessary.14 In the case of men, their rights as a minor are 
protected until they reach the age of 16. Women, on the other hand, can emancipate 
since the age of 14. This could be seen as an advantage or a disadvantage. Be that as it 
may, the condition is not fair for one of the parties. 
 
Matrimony is a unique contract ratified by two spouses. Just as any other type 
of contract, it creates rights and obligations that have a direct impact on the future !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Official Gazette of the Federal District. Mexico. Number 88, May 25, 2000. 
13 Art.148, FCC 
14 Art.149-155, FCC 
  65 
lives of spouses, and eventually, of their descendants. The civil code outlines these 
rights and obligations on the First Book, Title 5, Chapter III. The very first obligation 
begins during courtship, when a fiancé or fiancée fails to honor their promise of 
marriage, the affected party may file a lawsuit and claim a compensation of 
damages.15 Premarital courtship is the only recognition of intimacy before matrimony 
that generates a specific right. This is the only article regarding matrimony in the FCC 
where the word intimacy is used explicitly. 
 
The Spheres of Intimacy in Matrimony: 
 
a. The emotional sphere of matrimony 
 
The decision about matrimony is a voluntary one. Spouses are obliged to help each 
other and to contribute to the purposes of matrimony.16 So, it can be said that the self-
determination to make that decision is a representation of the spouse’s emotions. The 
commitment or promise to engage in matrimony can be formalized in written form; 
but even with this spousal vow, there is no obligation to marry one’s fiancé(-e) until 
the actual act of matrimony has been celebrated.17 A negative emotion can cause the 
annulment of matrimony. Fear and violence can lead to that annulment if they were 
present during the decision-making for matrimony. 18 The legislator also sees 
matrimony as an emotional contract. One of the clearest examples of the emotional 
element is that the FCC uses the word home,19 when referring to the property where 
spouses live; whereas in the second book, regarding property, the legislator uses the 
terms “house” or “real estate”.20 As analyzed in the previous chapter, the concept of 
trust is also an emotional aspect. That trust is materialized in the cases of tutelage or 
legal guardianship,21 because the spouse becomes the legal guardian when a spouse is 
incapable of making their own decisions. A case of tutelage comes about, for instance, 
when a spouse has had an accident and falls into a coma. The spouse will have the 
obligation to make the decisions on behalf of the other spouse as long as they still !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Art. 143 FCC 
16 Art. 162 FCC 
17 Art. 139 FCC 
18 Art. 245 FCC 
19 Using the term “hogar” instead of “casa”. 
20 The second book regarding property, starting in Art. 747 FCC. 
21 Art. 449-481 FCC 
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have that marital status.22 So, a spouse must trust the other with their capacity and 
good judgment to make the right decisions whenever needed.  The spouse becomes 
the automatic guardian, children of legal age are the second priority and parents are 
third in line for legal guardians. 23  Matrimony grants minors the power of 
emancipation. Consequently, the trust that is conferred to parents until minors reach 
legal age is transferred to the spouse at the time of matrimony; given that at least one 
of the parents of that minor gave their consent for matrimony.24  
 
b. The moral sphere of matrimony  
 
Matrimony is considered the highest level of intimacy and the preferred legal 
structure for conservatives. The Mexican society embraces married men and women. 
The moral value of matrimony comes from the high value of religious marriage, 
particularly the catholic one. Spouses are forbidden to practice any activity that would 
damage the morality of the family or its structure. In cases of objection by one of the 
spouses, a judge will decide on the interpretation of that morality and decide whether 
that activity should be practiced or not.25 When fiancé(e)s fail to honor their promise 
of matrimony, the disadvantaged party can claim a compensation of damages. This 
guarantee also ratifies the moral dimension attributed to intimacy and matrimony. 26 
There is a presumption of good will in matrimony, unless the evidence proves 
otherwise. That presumption, just as the presumption of innocence in Criminal Law, 
has the moral nature granted to matrimony by the legislator.27  
 
There are two ways to terminate matrimony: through a divorce,28 or with a 
declaration of annulment.29 The grounds for divorce also show the moral components 
of matrimony. Among others, adultery is a cause for divorce.30 This shows the moral 
value of the protection of fidelity. If a husband prostitutes his wife, a divorce can be 
requested. It is remarkable, though, that the same provision does not apply to a wife !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Art.466 and Art. 486 FCC 
23 Art 486-489 FCC 
24 Art. 641 FCC 
25 Art. 169 FCC 
26 Art. 143 FCC 
27 Art. 257 FCC 
28 Chapter X. Art. 266-291FCC 
29 Chapter IX. Art. 235-265 FCC 
30 Art. 267. I. FCC 
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prostituting her husband.31 Immoral acts performed by a husband or wife with the 
purpose of corrupting their children is also a cause for divorce.32 Spouses also have 
the obligation to provide their children with an occupation or profession that is honest 
and appropriate for their gender.33 The mere use of the word gender in this article 
denotes the moral dichotomization of male and female roles in society.  
 
Matrimony comes with a moral duty to constitute a family, and it prohibits 
any action or condition established in opposition to the perpetuation of the species. 
That motivation to form a family has the moral values linked to the constructs of 
family and matrimony as codependent units. Therefore, all the moral values given to 
the concept of family are inherently transferred to the moral value of matrimony.  All 
members of the family have the right to the psychological and physical respect from 
the other members, aiming to contribute to their healthy development for the full 
incorporation and participation in the social nucleus.34 The social component of the 
moral sphere is explicitly declared in the previous sentence. Family violence is also 
typified as the use of physical or moral force against another member of the same 
family. 
 
c. The sexual sphere of matrimony 
 
As mentioned before, the concept of marital or spousal debt was developed in 
Catholicism. However, it cannot be directly identified in matrimony. There is no 
sexual obligation directly attributed as a clause in matrimony. In any case, the sexual 
elements can be pointed out. The most important one is sexual exclusivity. Adultery is 
a cause for divorce, committed by either spouse.35 Nonetheless, the affected spouse 
may only claim adultery as a ground for divorce within six months after the 
adulterous act became known. In other words, after that six months deadline, that 
adulterous act is construed as consensual.36 Beyond the moral aspect of prostitution 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Art. 267. III FCC 
32 Art. 270 FCC 
33 Art. 308 FCC 
34 Art. 323 bis. FCC 
35 Art. 267. I FCC 
36 Art. 269 FCC 
!68 
and its prohibition discussed above, the repudiation of prostitution reinforces the 
value of sexual exclusivity between spouses.37  
 
Impotence, or erectile dysfunction, is another sexual element handled in 
matrimony. One of the impediments to engage in matrimony is to be afflicted by 
impotence. 38  Incurable impotence is also a justification for divorce after the 
matrimony has been celebrated.39 The legislator does not mention that spouses have 
sexual intercourse or are obliged to have it. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that 
spouses are meant to have sex and cannot sign into matrimony if they will be 
incapable of doing so. This sexist and phallic conception of matrimony is the epitome 
of the sexual sphere, and also, it appoints the husband as the stud in matrimony. It is a 
visible discrimination or disadvantage for men, inasmuch as the husband must be able 
to have sex; or he will lose his value and will not qualify for matrimony.  
 
Women, on the other hand, have more conditions in matrimony when it comes 
to the reproductive aspect of their sexual activity. If a wife gives birth to a child 
conceived before matrimony, the husband can request a divorce and the child will be 
judicially declared illegitimate.40 Whereas a wife cannot request a divorce if another 
woman gave birth to a child whose paternity is attributed to her husband. This 
inequality protects the sexual exclusivity of the wife, but not that of the husband. If a 
woman has been married before, she cannot sign into a new matrimony until after 300 
days have passed after terminating the first matrimony unless she has given birth to a 
child in that period.41 Putting the paternity issues aside, this restriction guarantees the 
sexual and reproductive readiness that the woman will have for the new husband and 
underscores the female role of a reproductive machine. After the first matrimony, men 
can remarry without the three-hundred-day limit, and even if they have fathered 
multiple children afterwards.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Art. 267 III FCC 
38 Art. 156. VIII FCC 
39 Art. 267. VI FCC 
40 Art. 267. II FCC 
41 Art. 158 FCC 
  69 
Furthermore, the evidence confirming that spouses are under no obligation to 
have sexual intercourse in matrimony is the typification of spousal rape as a crime.42 
The Federal Criminal Code literally describes the penalty for rape in cases when the 
victim is a spouse, be it the husband or the wife.43 
 
d. The economic sphere of matrimony 
 
The protection of assets is also considered in the matrimonial contract. There are two 
basic forms for the management of goods in matrimony; namely, separate property 
and community property.44 Basically, the separate property regime stipulates that the 
assets or any goods owned by one of the spouses will remain personal property, 
regardless of their marital status. On the contrary, community property is a joint 
venture of the property of both spouses. A combination of both approaches is also 
possible, but must be indicated in the prenuptial agreement. The prenuptial 
agreement45 is a special pact signed by spouses in order to regulate the administration 
of their assets. This regulation can specify their current and/or future assets. Even if 
the matrimony began in the separate property regime, it can transform into 
community property and vice versa. The modality can be amended throughout the 
duration of the matrimonial life. With the community property system, the spouses 
become financial partners and their assets function as an entity, as if they were a 
corporation. Both spouses act as shareholders, and one of them must be appointed as 
the administrator. The community property deed or prenuptial agreement must be 
registered at the Public Registry of Property and Commerce in order to become 
effective toward a third party.46 In addition to the internal management of goods in 
matrimony, the economic dimension of matrimony also has external repercussions. 
Taxation is evidently one of them. An individual who has signed into matrimony can 
claim certain tax deductions based on their spouse.47 In the community property 
regime, some tax incentives are also applicable.48 Donations between spouses are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Art. 265 bis FCRC 
43 From eight to fourteen years in prison. Art. 265 FCRC. 
44 The exact terms used by the FCC in Spanish are “separación de bienes” and “sociedad conyugal”.  
Art. 178. 
45 Art. 179 FCC, named “capitulaciones matrimoniales” in Spanish. 
46 Art 186 FCC 
47 Law on Income Tax Return. Art. 176. I., and  Art.176.VI. 
48 Art. 218 LITR 
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regulated by the civil code,49 and are also treated as tax-exempt by the Law on 
Income Tax Return.50  
 
 Spouses can claim welfare benefits as well.  Welfare in a developing country 
like Mexico should not be interpreted as welfare in the more developed European 
countries. The Social Security Law in Mexico comprises two different regimes, a 
mandatory and a voluntary one.51 Active workers are beneficiaries of welfare because 
their employers are obliged to pay their social security contributions, whereas 
unemployed individuals do not get any benefits unless they pay the contributions 
themselves or qualify as dependents. In the latter case, being able to demonstrate you 
are a dependent is crucial. In matrimony, spouses qualify as dependents and are 
considered beneficiaries.52 Welfare benefits include a healthcare plan,53 access to a 
widowhood pension plan,54 and derivative social security coverage for their well-
being, such as day-care centers for children, sports and cultural centers and so on. 
Married individuals can also request a thirty-day salary allowance for matrimonial 
expenses.55 Probably the most fundamental element of the economic sphere is the 
obligation to provide nourishment. Spouses have the reciprocal obligation to provide 
each other with food since the beginning of the matrimonial contract. 56  This 
obligation may remain even after separation for a period to be determined by the 
judge.57 After a divorce, this responsibility is usually called alimony. It includes food, 
clothing, room and assistance in case of sickness.58 The concept of alimony is 
foundational to matrimony, not only because it shows the economic interdependence 
of spouses, but also by reason of the protection of the individual’s integrity. Alimony 
is present during and after matrimony especially with children, it remains mandatory 
until children, if there are any, reach legal age.59 
 
e. The constructive sphere of matrimony !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Art. 219-234 FCC 
50 Art. 109. XXIII LITR 
51 Art. 6 SSL 
52 Art. 5.A.XII SSL 
53 Art. 84.III SSL 
54 Art. 5. A.XIV and Art. 130 SSL 
55 Art. 165. II SSL 
56 Art. 301 FCC 
57 Art. 275 FCC 
58 Art. 308 FCC 
59 Art. 309-323 FCC 
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Family ties display the constructive sphere of a structure of intimacy. The civil code 
recognizes three types of kinship: Consanguinity, Affinity and Civil Kinship.60 
Consanguinity is that type of connection between individuals who are descendants of 
the same parent.61 Affinity is the sort of kinship generated by matrimony between the 
husband and the wife’s family or the wife and the husband’s family.62 Civil kinship is 
the type of bond established between the adopter and the adoptee. 63 The extension 
and ramification of these ties is what builds and shapes the constructive sphere of 
matrimony. As discussed before, a family can be built even with two members. In the 
case of matrimony, the founders of that intimacy are both spouses. The horizontal 
construction they form becomes a family unit even as they socialize within their 
affinity relatives. If spouses decide to build up their family in a vertical construction, 
matrimony offers two options: biological reproduction and adoption.  
 
With biological reproduction (which also involves the sexual sphere), there is 
a presumption of paternity in favor of both spouses.64 That is to say, a child born after 
the contract of matrimony has been celebrated will have the spouses as parents by 
default. Even if the husband is not the biological father, the presumption of paternity 
reigns over. The burden of proof is on the father who tries to disown the child.65 A 
mother does not have the right to disown her child.66 Children of matrimony have the 
right to take the last names of parents, to nourishment, and to the corresponding 
portion of inheritance.67 According to the Spanish tradition and as it happens in most 
Latin American countries, children take both parents’ last names, the first last name of 
the father and the first last name of the mother, in that order. It means that after two 
generations, the mother’s last name is lost and the father’s last name prevails over 
generations. The choice of biological reproduction is intrinsically linked to the 
decision to interrupt it.  That is to say, abortion is an element of the constructive 
sphere of an intimacy. Even in matrimony, abortion is a personal choice of the woman !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Art. 292 FCC 
61 Art. 293 FCC 
62 Art. 294 FCC 
63 Art. 295 FCC 
64 Art. 324 FCC 
65 Art. 326 FCC 
66 Art. 60 par. 2 FCC 
67 Art. 389 FCC 
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who bears the fetus. The husband can only make a decision on abortion when the wife 
is unable to do so and the spouse is the legal guardian; as it is the case when a woman 
is in a coma and only the fetus or the woman can be saved.68 In a situation like this 
one, the husband could determine whether an abortion should be forced.  
 
Adoption comes in two different forms: Simple and Complete.69 The most 
remarkable difference between them is that the former may be revoked, whereas the 
latter is peremptory. Adopters must be at least 25 years old and have at least a 17-year 
difference with the adoptee.70 Only one person can adopt a child, no one can be 
adopted by more than one individual, the only exception is in matrimony.71 When 
spouses agree to adopt a child, both spouses become parents and they are equally 
responsible for the adoptee. Adoptees in the complete adoption modality become 
children of adopters and are regarded as kindred in the context of consanguinity by 
the civil code.72 In the simple adoption system, the legal relationship is between 
adopter and adoptee only and does not include the extended family, while the natural 
kinship with the biological parents of the adoptee still remains unaffected.73  
 
One of the most powerful elements of the constructive sphere is the capacity 
to inherit. Both the horizontal and vertical constructions of an intimacy can have a 
legacy, and this legacy can be materialized along with the economic sphere of that 
intimacy in the form of an inheritance. Spouses and children are entitled to 
inheritance rights. There are two types of inheritance: Testamentary and Legitimate.74 
A testamentary inheritance is that acquired through a written testament. A legitimate 
inheritance is that obtained when no testament has been written, when the written 
testament has been annulled, when the person who inherits does not fulfill the 
conditions set in the testament, when the inheritor dies, or when the person did not 
specify all their property in a testament and the remnant is distributed through the 
legitimate inheritance rights.75 In the case of matrimony, testamentary inheritance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Art 486-489 FCC 
69 Named “adopción simple” and “adopción plena” in the FCC in Spanish. 
70 Art. 390 FCC 
71 Art. 391-392 FCC 
72 Art. 410.A FCC 
73 Art. 402 FCC 
74 Art. 1282 FCC 
75 Art. 1599 FCC 
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plays almost no role because the individual can declare in their testament that their 
family members will not inherit anything.  Individuals are not obliged to leave their 
inheritance to their family. In this case, if no inheritance has been granted to the 
children or spouse, they can only claim nourishment when the deceased had the 
obligation to provide it. That nourishment is then dispensed through the inheritance 
and only in the limited terms that nourishment is defined.76  Nonetheless, when there 
is no written testament and the legitimate succession is applicable, family members 
are first-preference inheritors and matrimony plays then a key role. First of all, 
inheritance rights penalize adultery. Spouses who have committed adultery, and a 
judge has ruled against them, lose their capacity to inherit.77 This is again, a clear 
mechanism of the moral sphere that the legislator uses to protect the exclusivity 
within the sexual sphere of intimacy.  Legitimate succession establishes priorities 
according to the closeness with the individual. Those who qualify for inheritance are: 
Descendants (children, grandchildren, etc.), Spouses, Ascendants (parents, 
grandparents, etc.), Collateral relatives (siblings, cousins, nephews, etc.); in that order 
and priority.78 That is to say, when descendants are still alive, ascendants, and 
collateral relatives lose their capacity to inherit from that individual. For a partner, 
matrimony becomes very important, since they are able to qualify as inheritors in the 
same proportion as a descendant is they are official spouses via a matrimonial 
contract. When discussing the issue of inheritance, the focus is usually set on the 
property and financial part of an inheritance. However, it must also be considered that 
the legacy of an inheritance may also include non-economic items, such as 
memorabilia. That is why inheritance rights lie rather within the constructive sphere 
of an intimacy and not within the economic sphere. Some inheritances may involve 
the economic sphere. But the abstract concept of an inheritance, especially in its 
conceptualization of a legacy, belongs in the generational and future-oriented 
constructive sphere. 
 
For the proper construction of a family, the Mexican Constitution protects a 
type of private property denominated Family Patrimony. This type of property cannot 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Art. 1372 FCC. Nourishment is then also interpreted as in Art. 308 FCC, food, clothes, room and 
board in cases of sickness. 
77 Art. 1316.III FCC 
78 Art. 1602-1634 FCC 
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be levied upon or seized in any way.79 The Civil Code regulates the conditions for the 
establishment of a family patrimony. A family can constitute one family patrimony 
only.80 The object that forms the family patrimony is the house where the family 
actually lives and, if applicable, the cultivable land around it.81 Unlike other types of 
private property, this one cannot be leased or used as guaranty for credit purposes. 
The family patrimony can only be used for residential purposes. Only spouses and 
those entitled to nourishment, as it is the case with children, have the right to live in 
that house and to take advantage of the produce of that land.82 After the house has 
been registered as a family patrimony in the Public Registry for Property and 
Commerce, it becomes an inalienable property. Basically, that property loses its 
commercial value as an economic asset the family can trade with, and turns into a nest 
for the incubation of the family. The family patrimony, hence, is the tool the legislator 
created to stimulate the constructive sphere of intimacy. It is regulated in the civil 
code, but most importantly, it is protected as a fundamental human right in the 
constitution: The right to own an inalienable Family Patrimony.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, matrimony is the oldest and most-respected type of intimacy contract in 
Mexican Law. It enables spouses to have a trusted legal guardian, to administer assets 
jointly or severally, to adopt children and to inherit legitimately. With a matrimonial 
contract, couples also have access to taxation exemptions and welfare benefits. 
Matrimony protects the sexual exclusivity of spouses, and it encourages the 
development of families ensuring the rights to nourishment of all family members 
with the same obligation in reciprocity. Even though the matrimonial contract 
attempts to protect equality within, some inconsistencies still lean the scale in favor of 
the man. Matrimony at the federal level in Mexico is until now a contract between a 
man and a woman, that is to say, only available for opposite-sex couples. 
 
III.2.2. Concubinage 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Art. 27. XVII Mexican Constitution of 1917. 
80 Art. 729 FCC 
81 Art. 723 FCC 
82 Art. 725 FCC 
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Although the word “concubine” tends to be linked to polygamy and infidelity, the 
term concubinage in the Mexican Civil Code is used as a form of legally recognized 
intimacy precisely opposed to polygamy. Concubinage is another admitted structure 
of intimacy with specific characteristics and limitations. In matrimony, the pillars of 
that structure are spouses, husband and wife. In concubinage, the partners are called 
concubines and they must also be opposite-sex partners. Same-sex couples are 
ineligible for concubinage inasmuch as they fail to qualify for civil matrimony. One 
of the most distinguishable elements of concubinage is the lack of a written contract. 
Unlike spouses in matrimony, concubines do not reveal themselves in the initiation of 
their intimacy through a civil ceremony. They simply start acting more uxorio,83 as if 
they were married without signing any civil document. However, after concubinage 
has been established and recognized, concubines do undertake certain rights and 
obligations despite the absence of a legal contract.  Concubinage in Mexico can be 
compared to the legal figure of a common-law marriage in common-law systems.84 
Federal laws recognize the phenomenon of concubinage; yet only matrimony is a 
legal act that can be initiated as an a priori recognition of a prêt-à-commencer85 
intimacy, whereas concubinage can only be recognized a posteriori.  
 
Even without a contract, concubinage has a consuetudinary type of 
legitimation. When spouses need to demonstrate their civil relationship, the 
matrimonial certificate is used for third-party effectiveness. Since there is no written 
testimony in concubinage, the recognition of that intimacy is granted differently. In 
cases where the acknowledgement of the concubinage must be established; in 
inheritance trials for instance, the evidence can be presented during the same judicial 
process. When the recognition is not mandatory, the establishment is also possible 
through a Voluntary Jurisdiction procedure.86 The Federal Code for Civil Procedures 
enables this type of process for individuals who require the intervention of a judge, 
but it is not a trial with the duality of a plaintiff and defendant. Cohabitation is the 
ruling principle, concubines must prove that they have lived together for five years 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 According to the matrimonial custom. 
84 As it can be found for instance in many jurisdictions in the United States: Alabama, Colorado, the 
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
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85 Ready to begin, in French. 
86 Art. 530-537 FCCP 
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and at least two witnesses must ratify that. The five-year requirement is waived when 
concubines have at least one child.  
 
The Spheres of Intimacy in Concubinage: 
 
a. The emotional sphere of concubinage 
 
When a woman and a man decide to start living together and commence their 
intimacy, it can be assumed that their concubinage begins. The decision to move in 
together determines the volition that secures the precondition of concubinage. If the 
couple has had a relationship before, but they do not live together, they would not be 
considered concubines and would be regarded as simple lovers. Concubines must then 
strengthen their mutual treatment as husband and wife before society. For the mere 
act of cohabitation does not certify concubinage if concubines do not introduce each 
other as partners when meeting other people. There is a component of pride in this 
type of intimacy. The fact that the intimacy must be made public forces concubines to 
externalize their relationship proudly in order to have it recognized later. Because 
when concubines attempt to get the recognition of their concubinage, they will have 
to demonstrate the five years of cohabitation and provide at least two witnesses who 
have been aware of their intimacy as if they were spouses. 
 
Uncertainty is a common feeling in concubinage. The lack of a written 
contract in concubinage goes hand in hand with the lack of a civil ceremony. Not 
having a symbolic event can be interpreted as a lack of emotional value for 
concubines, owing to the fact that the absence of a commitment ritual is insufficient to 
provide the emotional support and affirmation so characteristic in civil matrimonies. 
Moreover, the exit mechanisms are as simple as the initiation. Terminating the 
cohabitation ends concubinage immediately, and this decision can be made 
unilaterally. After an unexpected death of a concubine, for instance, the survivor 
concubine is left unprotected. There are very few exceptions where the concubine can 
find protection, as it is the case with the subrogation of rental contracts for concubines, 
applicable as if they were spouses. This is not only a protection of the concubine, but 
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also the assurance for the tenant, that the lease will still be honored.87 A benefit like 
this one is also representative of the core element in concubinage: cohabitation. 
 
As mentioned in III.2.1.a, the right to legal guardianship for spouses is an 
element of trust. In matrimony, spouses have the legal guardianship whereas 
concubines do not have a right to be their concubine’s guardian while they are 
incapable.88 Furthermore, concubines do not even get automatic hospital visitation 
rights. The civil code does not trust concubines as guardians, and the legal 
guardianship remains with ascendants or adult descendants, if any. In a similar way; 
when two minors sign into matrimony, they are able to legally emancipate from their 
parents. If they decide to cohabitate, e.g. to begin concubinage, they will still be 
legally tied to their parents and will not be able to emancipate, regardless of their 
domicile and cohabitation. Hence, albeit physically and emotionally separated from 
their parents, they will be legally linked to them.  
 
b. The moral sphere of concubinage 
 
Before society, concubines do not have the same status as spouses. Concubinage is 
seen as a second-class type of intimacy and not as a desired type of union. The 
legislator uses the word house and domicile when referring to the place where 
concubines reside, and not the word home as it is used for spouses when describing 
matrimony. The emotional value granted and reserved for matrimony is not given to 
concubinage. Concubines are regarded as single individuals, even if their concubinage 
is recognized for all effects, their legal status remains as single. This non-binding 
legal status depicts the perspective of the legislator, recognizing concubinage as a 
non-binding intimacy. One of the requirements for the recognition of concubinage is 
that concubines must not be married; and if concubines get married at some point, 
their concubinage ends automatically. The following clause: “…as long as both of 
them [concubines] have remained free of matrimony during their concubinage”,89 
subordinates concubinage to matrimony and makes it more susceptible to termination. 
Since concubines keep their legal status of “single” individuals, they can engage in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Art. 2448-H FCC 
88 Art. 466 FCC, only applicable to spouses and not to concubines.  
89 Art. 1635 FCC 
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matrimony at any point even without the consent of their concubines. This freedom to 
engage in matrimony reflects the lack of commitment of the legislator to protect 
concubinage, or concubines for that matter. While spouses change their legal status to 
“married” and cannot create another type of intimacy until that legal status has 
changed, concubines always have the liberty to create new intimacies. This very 
liberty comes with the risk of the multiplicity of intimacies.  
 
 Polygamy, in both its polygyny and polyandry forms, is forbidden in 
matrimony. In concubinage, however, there is no restriction to engage in more than 
one intimacy simultaneously. There is no moral protection of the intimacy of 
concubinage as a loyal commitment, and its recognition lacks a mechanism to secure 
the exclusivity of concubines. The law protects spouses from concubines, but not 
concubines from spouses. As discussed in Chapter II, some marriages are declared 
putative when at least one of the spouses acts in good faith and believes that their 
marriage is valid; concubines do not have the option of a putative concubinage, rather 
quite the opposite. When more than one concubinage coexists, all concubines lose 
their rights. That means they are all penalized by the non-exclusivity, even if they 
were the victims of that concurrency.90 
 
c. The sexual sphere of concubinage 
 
Although the initial connotation of the term concubine may be a sexual one; as well as 
in matrimony, there is no sexual obligation in concubinage. The criminal code has 
defined the crime of spousal rape, this same principle and penalty is applicable to 
concubines. 91  Not having an obligation to have sexual intercourse with their 
concubines is another indication of the primary purpose of concubinage, the element 
of cohabitation. Any type of physical or psychological violence, which would thus 
include rape, is prohibited between concubines and it is typified as domestic violence 
in the civil code as well.92 Voluntary sexual activity, however, does help concubines 
in at least two aspects. First of all, it demonstrates that they act as husband and wife. 
And secondly, if they have a child through biological reproduction, it will accelerate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Ibidem, par. 2. 
91 Art. 265 bis. FCRC. From eight to fourteen years in prison. 
92 Art. 323 ter FCC 
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the recognition of their intimacy. The five-year cohabitation requirement is by-passed 
if they have a child together. Adopting a child would not be the same, because only 
one of them would be the adopter. As discussed in III.2.2.2.e, only married couples 
may adopt as a family unit.93 In any case, having a biological child with reproductive 
assistance would not require any sexual activity, and yet, it would by-pass the longer 
cohabitation requirement. Consequently, the means of reproduction in concubinage 
(e.g. via sexual intercourse) are not as relevant as the goal of reproduction, having a 
child. And that phenomenon of parenthood is not precisely sexual; it belongs rather in 
the constructive sphere of concubinage. 
 
It is noteworthy, that there is no sexual exclusivity protection either. A man or 
a woman may have as many sexual partners as they wish. As underlined before, they 
would only qualify as concubines if they live together or if they have a child together. 
Therefore, if a man has children with different single women, they would all be his 
concubines. Also, if a woman gives birth to children of different men as a single 
mother, all those men would qualify as her concubines as long as they are not married. 
Fundamentally, childbirth (and not just their sexual activity) becomes a fast-track 
evidence for the recognition of their concubinage. Sexually, concubinage may be 
considered a more liberal type of intimacy. Not because it is a polygamous intimacy 
per se, but rather because it lacks a legal mechanism that secures the commitment for 
sexual exclusivity. 
 
d. The economic sphere of concubinage 
 
It has been pointed out before that in Matrimony, spouses can decide upon either a 
separate property or community property regime. In concubinage, assets remain 
separate property throughout the duration of that intimacy. This is a clear 
disadvantage for concubines, because if their patrimony has grown as their 
concubinage developed, there is no way to control a fair redistribution of assets in 
case of separation. In a similar way, it is much more difficult for concubines to build a 
patrimony because they cannot claim the collateral support that a spouse would 
provide as guarantor in credit applications. Their belongings will always be the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Art. 390-392 FCC 
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property of two different individuals and can never be quantified as a family unit. 
Concubines do have the obligation to provide each other with nourishment as they 
would if they were spouses.94 This obligation will remain even after a separation, as 
long as concubines satisfy the provisions outlined for inheritance.95 The obligation 
and limitations of nourishment are also considered temporary after a separation.96 A 
judge must determine the entitlement, duration and proportion of that alimony 
according to the specific details of their intimacy. 
 
The welfare dimension of concubinage is also very similar to that of 
matrimony. Taxation benefits and restrictions are applicable for concubines in the 
same manner they are for spouses.97 The taxation provision on community property of 
spouses does not affect concubines because they are unable to opt for the community 
property regime.98 However, donations between concubines are not tax-exempt as 
donations between spouses are. 99  Furthermore, social security benefits are also 
granted to concubines as if they were spouses. The Social Security Law explicitly 
recognizes concubines as beneficiaries.100 The types of benefits they can claim as 
dependents are equal to those of spouses, as long as there is no spouse who can claim 
them. Widowhood benefits are also included as long as the concubinage has lasted at 
least five years or the dependent has had a child with the main holder of the social 
security insurance.101 If there is more than one concubine, none of them will be able 
to claim the benefits. Again, the figure of the concubine is subject to the existence, or 
rather, non-existence of the more protected spouse or concurrent concubines. 
 
e. The constructive sphere of concubinage 
 
In concubinage, the constructive capacity is somewhat reduced in comparison with 
matrimony. First of all, concubines cannot adopt as a couple.  If they decide to adopt a 
child, only one of the concubines will be recognized as the adopter and the legal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Art. 302 FCC 
95 Art. 1635 FCC 
96 Art. 320 FCC 
97 Art. 176.I, Art. 176.VI and Art. 212 LITR 
98 Art. 218 LITR 
99 Art. 109.XIX.A LITR 
100 Art. 5.A.XII SSL 
101 Art. 84.III SSL 
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rights and obligations will only apply to that concubine, whereas in matrimony, 
spouses are able to adopt as a family unit.102 When it comes to having biological 
children, concubines do not have that disadvantage anymore. In the Law on Family 
Relationships of 1917, there was a distinction between natural and legitimate 
children.103 Natural children were those recognized by their parents out of wedlock, 
and only those born to married parents were considered legitimate. This distinction 
disappeared in the Federal Civil Code of 1928. Therefore, regardless of the marital 
status of parents, all children have the same rights. This is particularly important when 
it comes to inheritance rights. 
 
 All children are entitled to inheritance even if they were born out of wedlock 
or if they coexist with siblings born in matrimony.104 The multiplicity or coincidence 
of concubinage and matrimony does not affect children in their inheritance. However, 
it does impact the capacity to inherit of the surviving concubine. If the deceased 
concubine had signed into matrimony, their spouse would be entitled to inheritance 
and the concubinage would be declared invalid. Thus, concubines can only inherit 
when the following conditions are met: (a) their concubinage existed in the five years 
immediately preceding the death of the concubine or a child was born during that 
concubinage, (b) both concubines remained unwed during the duration of their 
concubinage, (c) no other concubines coexist. If these prerequisites are complied with, 
the concubine will inherit in the same proportion as a spouse would have. But, if there 
were multiple concubines, none of them will be able to claim inheritance rights.105 As 
mentioned in III.2.1.e, the legal figure of Family Patrimony protects the integrity of 
the family and is both a constructive and economic aspect of an intimacy. 
Unfortunately, concubines cannot constitute a family patrimony. Only the spouse and 
those entitled to nourishment (children) have access to the constitution of the family 
patrimony. 106  Consequently, if concubines have children they will be able to 
constitute the family patrimony but only one of the concubines will appear in the 
constitution. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Art. 391 FCC 
103 Chapter XI Art.186-219 LFR 
104 Art. 1602.I FCC 
105 Art. 1635 FCC 
106 Art. 725 FCC 
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Conclusion 
 
Essentially, concubinage can be defined as a second-class type of intimacy whose 
structure is recognized without a written contract. Concubines do not have the same 
rights as spouses and their rights are always subject to the concurrency of another 
concubinage. Concubines are not each other’s legal guardians and they manage their 
assets separately. Children in concubinage get the same rights from parents as if they 
were married. Inheritance restrictions only affect the concubine, but not their 
descendants. The welfare dimension of concubinage includes social security coverage 
and some taxation benefits. Since there is no exclusivity clause in concubinage, there 
is always a susceptibility to immediate termination or a penalization of benefits due to 
the multiplicity of intimacies. Ultimately, concubinage can only be established 
between a man and a woman. 
 
III.2.3. Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
On November 9, 2006, the Legislative Assembly in Mexico City passed a new bill: 
the so-called “Ley de Sociedad de Convivencia” (Cohabitation Partnership Law), a 
new law that would enable same-sex or opposite-sex couples to legalize their status 
for the first time in Mexican history. This milestone in the Mexican legal system had 
been in debate for more than five years before the legislation was approved. Enoe 
Uganda was the most prominent advocate of this proposition.107 The decree was 
published on November 16, 2006 and the law entered into force on March 17, 
2007.108 Unlike matrimony and concubinage, the CPL is not found within the civil 
code. This legislation is a local decree that is only valid in Mexico City, but not at the 
federal level. Cohabitation partnerships are equated to matrimony and concubinage in 
some elements. And, even when a right or obligation is matched, the connection is 
made with the Mexico City civil code. That is to say, the equivalent effects of 
matrimony and concubinage described in this law correspond to those of the Mexico 
City local code, but not the Federal Civil Code that has been analyzed before and that 
has legal effect in the entire country.  This concise legislation has been structured in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 De La Mata Pizaña, Felipe and Roberto Garzón Jiménez. Sociedades de Convivencia. Mexico: 
Editorial Porrúa-Universidad Panamericana, 2007.  p. 17. 
108 Official Gazette of the Federal District. Mexico. Number 136, November 16, 2006. 
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twenty-five articles. Beyond the formalities, further effects are encapsulated in the 
equalization to the rights or treatment of other forms of intimacy already framed 
within the civil code. The following chart outlines the content of this law. The most 
important fact is that the Cohabitation Partnership Law initiated the path for a new 
type of structure of intimacy, Cohabitation Partnerships,109 which for the first time in 
history in Mexican law allowed the recognition of an intimacy between same-sex 
partners.  
TABLE 1: COHABITATION PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Art. 1 Subject-matter 
Art. 2 Definition 
Art. 3 Obligation to mutual support 
Art. 4 Monogamy – Relatives 
Art. 5 Concubinage – Civil code 
Chapter II Registration of a Cohabitation Partnership 
 
Art. 6 District where the home will be established 
Art. 7 Requirements (Patrimonial administration) 
Art. 8 Proper identification of parties  
Art. 9 Modifications – Dynamism 
Art.10 Registration process and effect towards third parties 
Art.11 Certificates 
Art.12 Exclusivity 
Chapter III The Rights of the Cohabitants 
Art.13 Reciprocal obligation to provide nourishment (Alimony)  
Art.14 Inheritance rights 
Art.15 Legal Guardianship  
Art.16 Civil Code 
Art.17 Act of good will – compensation of damages 
Art.18 Patrimonial relationships regulated by law 
Art.19 Denial of rights by wrongdoing 
Chapter IV Ending the Cohabitation Partnership 
Art.20 Termination:  
Unilateral, matrimony, concubinage, abandonment, death. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Sociedades de Convivencia in Spanish. 
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Art.21 Nourishment 
Art.22 Vacate in three months 
Art.23 Subrogation in lease agreements  
Art.24 Notification within 20 days 
Art.25 Jurisdiction: First Instance Judge 
 
So far, the spheres of intimacy have been identified in Matrimony and 
Concubinage. Cohabitation Partnerships, as any other structure of intimacy, are made 
up of different elements. All of these elements itemized in the articles above, belong 
in different spheres of intimacy and they will be analyzed individually in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
The Spheres of Intimacy in the Cohabitation Partnership Law: 
 
a. The emotional sphere of the Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
It has been pointed out before that the ability to choose one’s legal guardian is a 
demonstration of an individual’s emotions. The component of trust has been included 
in the CPL. Article 15 states that when one of the cohabitants has been declared in 
state of interdiction in the terms foreseen by the CCFD, the other cohabitant will be 
called upon to perform the duties of a legal guardian.110 The precondition is that the 
Cohabitation Partnership must have been celebrated at least two years before, or it 
will be automatic when there is no other relative who may act as legal guardian. This 
article literally equated the figure of legal guardianship to the status of spouses. The 
CCFD states that spouses not only have the right for their spouse’s legal guardianship, 
but rather the obligation to act as guardians.111 Therefore, Art.15 in the CPL bridges 
the CCFC’s Art. 486 directly. Although the CPL grants cohabitants less rights than 
concubinage and matrimony, legal guardianship is a unique advantage of matrimony 
that has been included in the CPL even though concubinage does not have it as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Art. 15 CPL. In Spanish: “Cuando uno de las o los convivientes sea declarado en estado de 
interdicción, en términos de lo previsto por el Código Civil para el distrito Federal, la o el otro 
conviviente será llamado a desempeñar la tutela siempre que hayan vivido juntas o juntos por un 
periodo inmediato anterior a dos años a partir de que la Sociedad de Convivencia se haya constituido, 
aplicándose al efecto las reglas en materia de la tutela legítima entre cónyuges o sin que mediare este 
tiempo, cuando no exista quien pueda desempeñar legalmente dicha tutela”. 
111 Art. 486 CCFD 
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previously discussed in III.2 .2.a. Furthermore, the emotional impact of the CPL is 
embodied in the celebration of the cohabitation ceremony. Beforehand, it had been 
mentioned how concubinage lacks the symbolism of an official act to initiate the 
intimacy; in the case of cohabitation partnerships, the partnership begins with the 
official act of registration. The partnership must be constituted in written form and 
ratified before the administrative body of the district where the cohabitation will be 
established. 112  In the case of Mexico City, there are sixteen boroughs. 113  The 
registration and public ratification must take place in the corresponding borough 
according to the cohabitants’ domicile. Just as in a matrimonial ceremony, cohabitants 
must appear in person and have witnesses to testify their ratification.114 However, this 
legal act is not performed in a civil registry. The registrar is not a judge either, who 
admits the registration of the cohabitation partnership is just an administrative officer 
who will collect the application forms, and will then stamp and sign the copy that 
cohabitants will keep.115 This partnership has third-party effects immediately after 
registration. Having the category of a public act, cohabitation partnerships are 
registered at the General Archive for Notaries where any citizen may have access to a 
registered copy. 
 
b. The moral sphere of the Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
For the most part, the CPL was initially criticized harshly from a moral point of view 
because it opened the possibility for same-sex couples to structure their intimacy. 
Even though the CPL is far from being close to civil matrimony, the legislator 
attempted to offer a legal acceptance of these intimacies. The wording of the law also 
reflects the moral character of the legislator. The definition of a Cohabitation 
Partnership is presented in Article 2: “The Cohabitation Partnership is a bilateral legal 
act, constituted when two individuals of the opposite or same sex, of legal age and 
with legal capacity, establish a common home, with the purpose of permanence and 
mutual support”.116 The use of the word “home” instead of “house” is noteworthy. As 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Art. 6 CPL 
113 “Delegaciones” in Spanish. 
114 Art. 8 CPL 
115 Art. 10 CPL 
116 Art. 2 CPL. In Spanish: “La Sociedad de Convivencia es una acto jurídico bilateral que se 
constituye, cuando dos personas físicas de diferente o del mismo sexo, mayores de edad y con 
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examined before, the word “home” is only used in matrimony in the FCC and the 
local legislator in the LAFD has opted for this word. 
 
The core element of the CPL is cohabitation. But a mere cohabitation is not 
considered a cohabitation partnership, because the purpose of this law is to recognize 
a new type of intimacy. That is the reason why relatives within the fourth degree of 
separation may not establish a cohabitation partnership even if they live together. This 
explicit prohibition117 depicts the moral conception of the legislator, considering 
cohabitation partnerships within the treatment of intimacy. Also, it is clearly stated 
that for any legal order, cohabitation partnerships will be aligned in the terms of 
concubinage and the legal relationships that derive from it.118 In the same manner, 
partners in cohabitation partnerships are still considered single individuals and their 
legal status as citizens does not change.  
 
The establishment of a cohabitation partnership is also seen as an act of good 
will. Cohabitants are expected to constitute the partnership in good faith. Therefore, 
their wrongdoing is penalized. If either partner engaged in the cohabitation 
partnership by wrongdoing, they will lose any rights conferred by it and they will be 
liable for the compensation of damages.  
 
c. The sexual sphere of the Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
Cohabitation Partnerships are not necessarily sexual unions. The legislator did not 
characterize these partnerships with a sexual element. However, sexual restrictions 
are also present. There is an explicit prohibition of the multiplicity of intimacies. This 
limitation simulates the ban on polygamy so distinctive in matrimony. Nonetheless, 
even this prohibition is not precisely sexual, but rather contractual; because it blocks 
the simultaneity of cohabitation partnerships. 
 
The monogamous element is included in Article 4: Individuals united in 
Matrimony, Concubinage or those who have a current Cohabitation Partnership will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
capacidad jurídica plena, establecen un hogar común, con voluntad de permanencia y de ayuda 
mutua”. 
117 Art. 4 par. 2 CPL 
118 Art. 5 CPL 
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not be able to constitute a new Cohabitation Partnership. Relatives in the same 
bloodline or collateral relatives up until the fourth degree of separation cannot form a 
Cohabitation Partnership either.119 Although the sexual element is not clearly spelled 
out, these restrictions of kinship, concubinage and matrimony are established as a 
sexual restriction. This is the tacit evidence of the ulterior conception of the 
Cohabitation Partnership in the mind of the legislators. A cohabitation partnership can 
be terminated a) voluntarily by either partner, b) by abandonment, c) by death, d) by 
wrongdoing establishing the partnership, or e) if one of the partners engages in 
concubinage or matrimony.120 This very last option is outstanding because it ranks 
Cohabitation Partnerships below matrimony and concubinage, making it a weaker 
structure of intimacy more susceptible to termination. It also implies that the 
cohabitation partnership must terminate when any other type of recognized sexual 
relationship has begun.  
 
When a cohabitation partnership is formed, the document constituting the 
partnership must indicate - among other things - the explicit manifestation of both 
partners to live together in a common home, with the purpose of continuity and 
mutual support. 121 Nevertheless, this declaration of housing intentions does not 
include a sexual motivation or obligation. Therefore, as it has been stated before in 
the cases of matrimony and concubinage, involuntary sexual acts even within the 
cohabitation partnership could be considered crimes. 
 
d. The economic sphere of the Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
One of the most remarkable assets of the CPL is the ability of partners to regulate 
their patrimony. As in a matrimonial structure of intimacy, cohabitation partners have 
to option to manage their goods in community property or separate property. During 
the constitution and registration process of the cohabitation partnership, partners must 
establish the conditions on the management of their patrimony. If they do not arrange 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Art. 4 CPL. In Spanish: “No podrán constituir una Sociedad de Convivencia, las personas unidas 
en matrimonio, concubinato y aquéllas que mantengan vigente otra Sociedad de Convivencia. 
Tampoco podrán celebrar entre sí Sociedad de Convivencia, los parientes consanguíneos en línea 
recta sin límite de grado o colaterales hasta el cuarto grado.” 
120 Art. 20 CPL 
121 Art. 7 CPL 
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them since the beginning, the property will be managed separately by default.122 This 
opens the possibility of a prenuptial agreement that concubinage lacks. Moreover, at 
any point throughout the duration of the cohabitation partnership, members may 
establish, add, delete or modify any of the clauses regarding the administration of 
their patrimony. 123  This alternative makes the economic sphere of cohabitation 
partnerships very dynamic.  Patrimonial conditions are always expressed in written 
form and officially registered as the cohabitation partnership. According to art. 3, the 
cohabitation partnership has effects towards third parties. So, partners may benefit 
from a cohabitation partnership when they apply for credits, for their economic 
capacity as a two-member financial unit may increase. But also, as Adame Goddard 
has pointed out, it could also be diminished.124 Furthermore, the obligation to provide 
mutual support includes nourishment. The right is reciprocal and is regulated 
according to the rules for nourishment in the Civil Code for the Federal District.125 
Even after the cohabitation partnership has ended, and regardless of the reasons that 
caused that termination, partners may demand nourishment within the following year 
after the date the partnership came to an end.126 They will be entitled to nourishment 
for a period of half the duration of the cohabitation partnership. They may only claim 
that right if they lack any financial means and have not engaged in matrimony, 
concubinage or another cohabitation partnership. 
 
 What remains very unclear within the economic sphere is the application of 
welfare in cohabitation partnerships. The CPL does not mention any social security or 
taxation benefits. The Social Security Law and the Law on Income Tax Return does 
not mention cohabitation partnerships either, for these legislations were passed before 
cohabitation partnerships existed. Notwithstanding, the CPL includes a provision that 
equates cohabitation partnerships to concubinage for other legal regulations. Article 5 
states that regarding other legal ordinances, the Cohabitation Partnership will be 
governed, when applicable, in the terms of concubinage and the legal relationships 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Art. 7. IV CPL 
123 Art. 9 CPL 
124 Adame Goddard, Jorge. “Análisis y juicio de la Ley de Sociedades de Convivencia para el Distrito 
Federal”. Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, XL, Num. 120. Mexico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM, Sep.-Dec. 2007. p.939. 
125 Art. 301-323 CCFD 
126 Art. 21 CPL 
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that derive from the latter will be generated in the cohabitation partners.127 Thus, it 
can be said that any legal right granted to concubines can be claimed by cohabitation 
partners if not directly specified. 
 
e. The constructive sphere of the Cohabitation Partnership Law 
 
A structure of intimacy may also grant partners inheritance rights. In the case of the 
CPL, cohabitation partners are also entitled to these rights. Article 14 underlines that 
some of the rights of cohabitants are inheritance rights. They become effective 
immediately after the registration of the cohabitation partnership and these rights are 
regulated according to the legitimate inheritance of concubines. 128  Unlike 
concubinage at the federal level, in the Civil Code for the Federal District 
concubinage is established after only two years; whereas five years are necessary for a 
concubinage recognized at the federal level in the FCC. That is to say, inheritance 
rights are enabled faster. 129  Cohabitation partners must meet the conditions 
established for concubines in the federal district, but not the conditions set out for 
concubines at the federal level.130 The constructive capacity of cohabitation partners 
may only be horizontal. The CPL does not include any provisions regarding adoption 
or any other schemes that would make the construction of that intimacy a vertical one. 
However, if cohabitation partners have had a child together the two-year requirement 
for the recognition of concubinage would be waived. Consequently, they would be 
entitled to all rights applicable to concubinage immediately, including the capacity to 
inherit. And the children originated from that cohabitation partnership may inherit 
even if their parents are not married, because both the FCC and the CCFD grant them 
inheritance rights through the recognition of parenthood in a birth certificate 
independently of the marital status of parents.131  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Art. 5 CPL. In Spanish: “Para los efectos de los demás ordenamientos jurídicos, la Sociedad de 
Convivencia se regirá, en lo que fuere aplicable, en los términos del concubinato y las relaciones 
jurídicas que se derivan de este último, se producirán entre los convivientes.” 
128 Art. 14 CPL. In Spanish: “Entre los convivientes se generarán derechos sucesorios, los cuales 
estarán vigentes a partir del registro de la Sociedad de Convivencia, aplicándose al efecto lo relativo a 
la sucesión legítima entre concubinos.” 
129 Art. 291 Bis CCFD 
130 Art. 1635 CCFD 
131 Art. 1607-1614 CCFD and Art. 1607-1614 FCC 
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Although the CPL does not automatically grant adoption rights, it has been 
detailed how any other rights applicable to concubinage have a tacit effect in the CPL 
according to Art. 5. Adoption in the federal district outlined in the CCFD is more 
flexible than adoption at the federal level in the FCC. The CCFD does not 
differentiate simple and complete adoption; there is only one type of adoption.132 At 
the federal level only spouses are able to adopt as a family unit, but in the federal 
district concubines also have that right. 133  Therefore, it can be argued that 
cohabitation partners also have that right through the implicit application of article 5 
of the CPL.134  
 
Furthermore, the nest for the construction of this intimacy is the home that 
will be formed by cohabitants. Thus, it was very important that the legislator 
protected that domain. The CPL allows cohabitants to subrogate rental contracts when 
one of the cohabitants dies. If the deceased cohabitant was the holder of the lease, the 
survivor partner will be entitled to all the rights and liable for all the obligations of 
that contract.135 This territorial provision only applies to rental agreements, but not 
mortgages. Regarding property, the CCFD also allows concubines to constitute family 
patrimonies.136 Hence, as in the case of adoption, it could be claimed that the 
application of article 5 of the CPL would also allow cohabitants to constitute their 
family patrimony. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cohabitation Partnerships are a new structure of intimacy introduced by the 
legislators of Mexico City in 2006. It is only possible to constitute a cohabitation 
partnership within the federal district. Same-sex or opposite-sex partners may 
establish a cohabitation partnership and the registration process is simple. These 
partnerships, however, do not go through a civil procedure and partners keep the legal 
status of single individuals. Such partnerships also allow a dynamic and joint 
administration of assets. Cohabitation partnerships rank below concubinage and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Art. 390- 401 CCFD!
133 Art. 391-392 CCFD 
134 De La Mata, et al, p. 67. The authors grudgingly admit that adoption is also possible through the 
application of art. 5 CPL. 
135 Art. 23 CPL 
136 Art. 724 CCFD 
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matrimony as a weaker structure of intimacy, more susceptible to termination. The 
decision to terminate the partnership can be unilateral, and after a partner notifies 
their purpose to end it, the other partner will have a deadline of only three months to 
vacate.137 In spite of the fact that cohabitation partnerships are not as solid as 
matrimony or concubinage, they are constituted in written form. Therefore, and unlike 
concubinage, the act of constitution has a greater emotional value for cohabitants. 
 
III.2.4. Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 
After the social impact of the Cohabitation Partnerships in Mexico City and the 
evident influence of the French Pact Civil de Solidarité, the Mexican State of 
Coahuila enacted a legislation that targeted the same issue: The recognition of a civil 
union between members of opposite-sex or same-sex. This new structure of intimacy 
is only valid within the state of Coahuila and not at the federal level. The State 
Congress on January 11, 2007 approved the Civil Pact of Solidarity138 (CPS) as 
Decree Number 209. The decree amended a series of articles in the state civil code 
that were related to matrimony and concubinage. With this amendment, the CPS was 
incorporated directly into the State Civil Code, differently from the CPL, which was 
legislated as a separate law. The decree modifies forty-four articles of the State Civil 
Code and ten articles of the Law on the Civil Registry. 
 
A Civil Pact of Solidarity, as the Civil Code of the State of Coahuila now 
defines it, is a contract celebrated by two individuals, of legal age, of the same or 
opposite sex, to organize their life in common. Those who celebrate it will be 
considered civil partners. They owe each other mutual support and assistance, 
consideration and respect, as well as reciprocal gratitude and they will have the 
obligation to act in common interest; in the same manner, they will have the 
obligation to provide each other with nourishment.139  
 
The CPS is legally binding toward third parties after its celebration and 
registration. Just as matrimony, these acts are celebrated solemnly in the Civil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 Art. 22 CPL!
138 Pacto Civil de Solidaridad in Spanish.!
139 Art. 385-1 CCSC 
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Registry.  The act becomes public and is registered in the books as any other civil act. 
The termination of a CPS is also possible and is registered as a divorce. These pacts 
may include conditions on the economic administration of assets and they generate 
inheritance rights. The decree that created the CPS also modified a specific article of 
the civil code that defines the concept of family, the new version of that article 
currently states that those individuals united by matrimony, a civil pact of solidarity 
or by kinship who live in the same house and have, by law or voluntarily, unity in the 
administration of that home, are considered a family.140 
 
This new structure of intimacy seems very comprehensive.  However, the CPS 
includes limitations as well, such as the explicit ban on adoption by both or either 
civil partner. In the development of this chapter, the five spheres of intimacy have 
been identified in the structures of Matrimony, Concubinage and Cohabitation 
Partnerships. Now, these same spheres will be recognized in the CPS. 
 
The Spheres of Intimacy in the Civil Pact of Solidarity: 
 
a. The emotional sphere of the Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 
Signing a CPS is an emotional civil act celebrated at a Civil Registry in the same 
manner as matrimony. The symbolism and solemnity of this act consolidate the 
emotional sphere of this civil contract. Art.195-5 CCSC describes the protocol of the 
ceremony, which is very similar to that of matrimony. The Civil Registry officer must 
verify the identity of witnesses and of the civil partners, and ratify their will to 
celebrate the CPS. Besides the solemnity of the act, the CPS grants both parties a new 
legal status: the condition of Civil Partners. Citizens joined in matrimony are 
considered spouses and have that legal treatment. Unlike concubines and those who 
sign a cohabitation partnership, the signatories of a CPS do get a new legal status. 
Officially, these individuals are not single anymore. Being able to legally change the 
status from single to civil partners has a strong emotional impact. Furthermore, it 
legitimates partners to claim any sort of benefits and to use that status on behalf of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Art. 714 CCSC!
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other in any act or business.141 For instance, in everyday situations such as collecting 
a private certified letter, a civil partner could collect that mail in automatic legal 
representation of their partner. These nuances in common life have a significant 
emotional value for partners. 
 
 The fact that civil partners can introduce their partners before society as their 
legal partners has a sentimental magnitude. The legislator has also opted for the term 
home when referring to the domicile of civil partners. Moreover, and as pointed out 
before when analyzing other structures, the element of trust is represented in the 
ability to act as legal guardian. In the case of civil partners of a CPS, the legal 
guardianship is not granted explicitly. However, it can be argued that according to Art 
384-4 par. 3 CCSC, the legal guardianship should be automatic as it is for spouses 
because this provision enables partners to claim any benefit granted by law based on 
that civil partnership. In any case, the CCSC has the option of designating a legal 
guardian before a notary public.142 Therefore, civil partners could even include this 
clause in the constitution of the legal partnership, that they will be appointed as each 
other’s legal guardian in order to avoid conflict with other relatives entitled to claim 
legal guardianship in the state of interdiction. 
 
b. The moral sphere of the Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 
The legislator aimed to grant the CPS a high social value, including the modification 
of the legal status of civil partners and the wording chosen for this legislation. The 
moral standard of the CPS includes the protection of civil partners with the right to 
claim a compensation of damages if affected by their civil partner.143 Especially, 
when the partner has committed a crime, when the partner exercises violence or 
intimidation at home, when the partner does violence to close relatives, when the 
partner has hidden they are affected by sexually transmitted diseases and when the 
partner has signed into the CPS while still being joined in a previous matrimony or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Art. 385-4 CCSC 
142 Art. 616 CCSC!
143 Art. 385-15 CCSC 
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CPS.144 These situations denote the moral standards of civil partners as well as the 
mentality of lawmakers, banning polygamy, dishonesty and violence.  
 
Moral provisions also highlight some of the prejudices against same-sex civil 
partners; for instance, the direct link with sexually transmitted diseases. One of the 
requirements to celebrate a CPS is to provide health certificates indicating that neither 
partner has a contagious disease; and if they do, that the other partner is aware of that 
situation. While providing such certificates is a prerequisite for matrimony as well, it 
is handled differently.  In matrimony, having a sexually transmitted disease (STD) 
like AIDS is an impediment to celebrate the matrimony. Whereas in CPS, a partner 
with this illness can celebrate the pact as long as the other partner is aware of it. Once 
in matrimony, getting an STD becomes a ground for divorce145 inasmuch as it 
diminishes the constructive capacity of that intimacy. However, this is not a ground 
for termination of a CPS, unless the disease was not informed to the affected partner 
and they claim an annulment of the CPS.146 Likewise, the legislator has linked 
transsexuality to the CPS, emphasizing that acquiring the condition of transsexuality 
will not be an impediment to celebrate a CPS.147 Needless to say, transsexuality per se 
is not a limitation to sign any type of legal act because the requirements will be 
fulfilled or not depending upon the individual’s sex, the state of being male or female 
by law and not by the physical aspect or metamorphosis. These connections or 
associations between the CPS, and transsexuality and STDs depict the biased moral 
perception of the CPS.  
 
c. The sexual sphere of the Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 
Civil Partners are not obliged to have sex. As analyzed in matrimony, concubinage 
and cohabitation partnerships, the sexual element is present; nevertheless, the 
structure of intimacy does not force the members of that intimacy to have sexual 
intercourse. In the case of the State of Coahuila, involuntary sexual intercourse is also 
typified as a crime. The penalty for rape ranges from seven to fourteen years in prison, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Art. 385-15. I-V CCSC 
145 Art. 363.VI CCSC 
146 Art. 385-12. IV and Art. 385-15. V CCSC 
147 Art. 384-2. Par.2. CCSC!
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similar to that penalty at the federal level, from eight to fourteen years.148 It is 
noteworthy, however, that when it comes to spousal rape, the penalty in the state of 
Coahuila ranges only from three to six years.149 It means that an individual in 
intimacy is less protected when it comes to spousal rape, which might be applicable to 
civil partners. Although the legislation does not clearly name incidences regarding the 
criminal code, in terms of equivalency and proportionality, the same penalty would be 
applicable to civil partners.  
 
Also, the clause regarding STDs underscores the tacit notion of the sexual 
element in the CPS. Civil partners must be aware of any contagious diseases before 
they celebrate the CPS and if they are not, the CPS can be annulled. This is a means 
of protecting the pure sexuality of that intimacy. The fact that Art.385-2 CCSC 
mentions transsexuality is not an obstacle to form a CPS indicates that a different 
sexual identity does not interfere with the constitution of this intimacy. Sexual activity 
is also regulated from a reproductive or constructive perspective, namely, with the 
presumption of paternity. When the CPS is celebrated between opposite-sex partners, 
any children born during the validity of the pact are considered children of the male 
partner. Paternity is attributed to him as well when the child is born within the 300 
days immediately following the termination of the CPS. Therefore, this legislation 
assumes that civil partners are responsible for their sexual activity and that any sexual 
activity is exclusive of civil partners, thus directly allocating paternity as in 
matrimony. This only applies to opposite-sex partners, because when it comes to 
same-sex partners, paternity issues are handled as if the CPS did not exist at all. That 
is to say, joint paternity of same-sex individuals will not be recognized even if one of 
the partners is the biological parent.  
 
d. The economic sphere of the Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 
In terms of the economic side of this intimacy, the options are equal to those of 
matrimony: separate property and community property. 150  When the CPS is 
constituted, partners must indicate whether they will opt for community property or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 Art. 384 CRCSC and Art. 265 FCRC 
149 Art. 385 CRCSC 
150 Art. 385-10 CCSC 
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not. If they do not clearly notify the type of management of assets, the CPS will be 
established in the separate property modality by default. The prenuptial agreement 
regarding assets must be registered within the deeds of the CPS. All formalities and 
prerequisites of property management are exactly the same as in matrimony. Actually, 
Art. 385-11 links the economic aspect of the CPS to the same principles of the 
economic aspect in matrimony. If a CPS begins in the separate property modality, it 
can later be changed to community property and vice versa. The community property 
assets have third-party effects as soon as the CPS is registered. This may be helpful to 
increase a couple’s financial capacity. If civil partners decide to terminate their pact, 
they must also settle the liquidation of the community property before the termination 
of their CPS can be registered.151  
 
Besides the type of property management the partners choose, the CPS grants 
them access to welfare. This entitlement is explicitly declared as a particular effect of 
the pact.152 The acquired status of civil partners legitimates both parties to claim any 
benefits, pensions, welfare, legacy, or equivalent perquisites. This broad inclusion of 
collateral benefits allows partners to claim all the benefits that spouses are able to 
claim in matrimony. These advantages also come with attached obligations, for 
instance, the obligation to provide nourishment and to care for civil partners.153 When 
one of the partners is ill, in state of interdiction, or physically disadvantaged, the pact 
cannot be terminated unilaterally by the other partner unless a judge has already 
established an alimony.154 A family judge must adjudicate the corresponding rights 
and obligations when the termination is initiated unilaterally;155 and the applicable 
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the domicile where the CPS has been 
established.156 
 
e. The constructive sphere of the Civil Pact of Solidarity 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Art. 385-13 par. 2 CCSC 
152 Art. 385-4 par. 3 CCSC. In Spanish: “El estado adquirido como compañeros civiles, legitima a los 
interesados para reclamar las prestaciones que, bajo las modalidades de pensiones, disposiciones 
testamentarias especiales o beneficios o provechos por prestaciones sociales u otros análogos, 
contemplen las leyes.” 
153 Art. 402 CCSC!
154 Art. 385-14 par. 3 CCSC!
155 Art. 385-5. II CCSC 
156 Art. 385-16 CCSC!
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The introduction of the CPS in the State of Coahuila motivated the legislator to 
introduce a definition of “Family” in the civil code. The amendment of Art.714 CCSC 
now embraces civil partners within the concept of family.  The CCSC declares that 
every family has the right to enjoy a dignifying homestead. In this context, the term 
“family” is to be construed as those people united in matrimony, a civil pact of 
solidarity or kinship who cohabitate in the same domicile and have, by law or 
voluntarily, unity in the administration of that home.157 Not only does this definition 
grant access to the constitution of a family patrimony, but also it may guide judges to 
decide upon conflict on the applicability of this concept to civil partners. It is clear 
that civil partners with or without children do form a family. And their patrimony can 
be safeguarded as in matrimony, so their home cannot be levied upon if they 
constitute the family patrimony.158  
 
Regarding children, it has been previously mentioned that in an opposite-sex 
CPS, the recognition of paternity is automatic and mandatory throughout the duration 
of the CPS and up until 300 days after its termination.159 In biological reproduction, a 
CPS does not affect the civil registration process because it is regulated independently 
of the legal status of parents. The problem arises when same-sex civil partners cannot 
have children biologically or opt not to, because adoption is strictly prohibited.160 One 
of the most outstanding limitations of a CPS is that when civil partners celebrate it, 
they are voluntarily waiving their right to adopt children. The legislator included this 
ban specifically targeting same-sex partners. The impediment is applicable to civil 
partners both as individuals and as a family unit. Furthermore, if same-sex civil 
partners have already had children, the legal guardianship of minors cannot be shared 
or adjudicated to the other civil partner. These provisions are an explicit 
discrimination to same-sex civil partners in a CPS, opposite-sex civil partners are not 
affected by this. This differentiation shows the moral value that legislators designated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 Art. 714 CCSC modified on January 12, 2007. In Spanish: “Toda familia tiene derecho a disfrutar 
de una vivienda digna y decorosa. Para los efectos de este título, se entiende por familia a las personas 
que estando unidas por matrimonio, pacto civil de solidaridad o por parentesco consanguíneo, civil o 
afín, habitan una misma casa y tienen, por ley o voluntariamente, unidad en la administración del 
hogar. Para los mismos efectos se entiende por familia a las personas que viven juntos como si 
estuvieran casados sin estarlo y sin que exista en ellos ningún impedimento no dispensable para que 
contraigan matrimonio.” 
158 Art. 714-755 CCSC 
159 Art. 385-6  CCSC 
160 Art. 385-7 CCSC 
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for this structure of intimacy. Same-sex intimacy is allowed, however reducing the 
constructive capacity of civil partners.  Therefore, a same-sex CPS can only build a 
horizontal type of intimacy. 
 
Inheritance rights are also included in the CPS and civil partners are protected. 
In all the relevant articles regarding testamentary and legitimate inheritance, civil 
partners through a CPS get the same proportion of inheritance as spouses in 
matrimony. When there are no descendants, the civil partner is entitled to 50% of the 
legacy and the remaining 50% is given to ascendants.161 When there are descendants, 
civil partners are entitled to a fragment of that endowment as if they were a 
descendant.162 That is to say, the assets will be divided in equal parts for all children 
and the civil partner. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Civil Pacts of Solidarity are a new structure of intimacy legislated in the State of 
Coahuila and not recognized at the federal level, only locally. When two individuals 
celebrate this pact, their legal status changes and the pact is registered in the civil 
registry. The pact is signed in a solemn ceremony at the civil registry just as 
matrimony. The pact has third-party effects after its registration. Civil partners may 
manage their assets jointly or severally. All the welfare benefits that a spouse would 
get are also applicable to civil partners. The right and obligation to provide 
nourishment is also a condition of this pact, along with any other condition mutually 
established by partners. Civil partners may constitute a family patrimony as well. 
Unfortunately, when same-sex partners celebrate the CPS, they explicitly lose their 
right to adopt children; opposite-sex partners do not give up that right. This ban 
particularly targets and discriminates same-sex couples. 
 
III.2.5. Conclusion (Compare and Contrast) 
 
After the thorough analysis of these four structures of intimacy recognized legally in 
Mexico, it is easy to acknowledge some similarities and differences among them. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Art. 1077 CCSC 
162 Art. 1075 CCSC 
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Now, in a more graphic manner, the following table compares some core items that 
can be found in the four structures.  These material elements are included in the five 
spheres of intimacy; and as it can be easily appreciated, they are weaker or stronger, 
available or not applicable, according to each structure. So, in the form of a matrix, 
with the structures of intimacy on one axis and the material elements of the spheres of 
intimacy on the other, these comparative advantages and/or disadvantages will be 
clearly identified. This table also shows the way structures of intimacy and spheres of 
intimacy interact, as discussed in the precious chapter. In order to interpret this 
information adequately, a comparative and contrasting review is provided in the 
paragraphs following this table. 
 
Table 2: 
 
  Matrimony Concubinage Cohabitation 
Partnership 
Civil Pact of 
Solidarity 
Em
ot
io
na
l 
Solemnity of 
Civil Act: 
Ceremony 
At the civil 
registry 
None At a simple 
administrative 
office 
At the civil 
registry 
Individual’s 
legal status 
Married Single Single In civil 
partnership 
Legal 
Guardianship 
Automatic Not 
applicable 
Automatic 
after two 
years of 
cohabitation 
Not 
automatic, 
but possible 
M
or
al
 
Gender Opposite-sex 
spouses 
Same-sex 
spouses only 
allowed in 
Mexico City 
Opposite-sex 
concubines 
Same-sex or 
opposite sex 
cohabitation 
partners 
Same-sex or 
opposite sex 
civil partners 
Termination Divorce 
procedure, 
must justify 
grounds 
Automatic Unilateral, 
must register 
termination 
Unilateral, 
must register 
termination 
Se
xu
al
 Sexual 
practice 
Sexual 
Exclusivity 
No sexual 
obligation 
No sexual 
obligation 
No sexual 
obligation 
No sexual 
obligation 
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Ec
on
om
ic
 
Management 
of Assets 
Community 
or separate 
property 
Separate 
property 
Community 
or separate 
property 
Community 
or separate 
property 
Welfare 
benefits for 
partners 
Eligible Eligible Not directly 
eligible 
Eligible 
C
on
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
Family 
Patrimony 
Spouse 
included 
Concubines 
not included 
Cohabitation 
partners not 
directly 
included 
Civil Partner 
included 
Paternity Automatic Not 
automatic 
Not automatic Automatic 
Adoption Possible Individual 
adoption, not 
as a couple 
Individual 
adoption, not 
as a couple 
Forbidden 
for same-sex 
couples 
Inheritance Eligible For exclusive 
concubines 
After two 
years of 
cohabitation 
Civil partners 
are eligible 
 
Matrimony and Concubinage are recognized at the federal level, whereas 
Cohabitation Partnerships and Civil Pacts of solidarity are only recognized locally. 
The disproportionality of the rights conferred by these different types of intimacy 
contracts contributes to the deeper differentiation of social classes in Mexico. It can 
be said that there are first-class (Matrimony), second-class (Concubinage) and third-
class intimacies (Cohabitation Partnerships and Civil Pacts of Solidarity). Spouses in 
Matrimony get the recognition of all their rights as soon as they celebrate their civil 
ceremony. Concubines have to demonstrate their concubinage exists, having more 
difficulties with the burden of proof. Concubinage can only be corroborated a 
posteriori while all other structures are certified a priori. The emotional protocol of a 
civil ceremony represents an important step in the lives of many individuals. These 
solemn ceremonies in matrimony and civil pacts of solidarity are celebrated in civil 
registries; cohabitation partnerships are registered in a simple government office and 
concubines never reach a phase of ceremonial recognition. For many people, being 
unable to celebrate the commencement of their intimacy at a civil registry demerits 
their union. Furthermore, throughout their lives, citizens like to show their legal status 
before any legal procedure. Those united in matrimony will change their status to 
married, as well as those in a civil pact of solidarity who will change their status to 
civil partners. Nonetheless, concubines and cohabitation partnerships do not alter an 
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individual’s legal status and they will remain to be considered single individuals. It 
hinders the public recognition of their intimacy, a very remarkable element of 
socialization that sometimes affects and individual’s capacity to claim perquisites in 
the private sector, such as benefits at work for married employees vis-à-vis the lack 
thereof for single employees. Besides, members of an intimacy may be each other’s 
legal guardians. In matrimony, spouses get an automatic legal guardianship of each 
other, including hospital visitation rights. Concubines do not qualify as legal 
guardians and cohabitation partners may only claim guardianship after their 
cohabitation has matured for at least two years. Civil partners may qualify as legal 
guardians; not because the legislation grants it explicitly, but rather because they can 
be appointed as any other individual and can claim it before a judge.  
 
When an intimacy is about to begin, not many people think about the 
possibility of terminating it. Yet, the requirements to finish an intimacy are clearly 
defined and available in the civil code; partners should consider them before they 
legalize their intimacy. Matrimony has the social weight and religious expectation to 
last forever. Therefore, spouses who request a divorce must be able to justify their 
grounds, and the civil procedure is rather long and stern. Concubines can terminate 
their intimacy at any time, for there are no formalities to begin concubinage and 
neither are there any procedures to cancel it. Cohabitation Partnerships and Civil 
Pacts of Solidarity do have to register their termination, but the process is quite simple 
and unilateral. These structures are legally binding, but do not bind partners forever 
against their will. 
 
Although many people would guess that having sexual intercourse is a given 
fact in any type of intimacy, it has been mentioned individually while analyzing these 
structures that there is no obligation to engage in sexual activity with one’s spouse, 
concubine or partner. The intentions and motivations are clearly shown, forbidding 
relatives to sign into these intimacies and with other factors like monogamy and the 
limitation to begin a further intimacy contract. Nevertheless, the members of an 
intimacy must be willing to engage in any sexual practice. Otherwise, it would be 
considered a crime that has already been typified in the criminal codes. Out of these 
four types of intimacy structures, only matrimony requires sexual exclusivity. 
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Concubinage, cohabitation partnerships and civil pacts of solidarity do not regulate 
adultery or any consequence arising from adulterous behavior. 
 
The economic capacity of an intimacy plays a big role in its socialization, 
integration, survival and success. When couples can choose the type of management 
they consider best for their assets, they can shape their finances. These structures of 
intimacy allow couples to decide between a community property and a separate 
property modality, all of them except concubinage. In addition to the management of 
their own belongings, couples may be eligible for welfare benefits such as pensions, 
social security benefits, tax deductions and so on. Matrimony offers this welfare 
protection for spouses, concubines qualify for welfare when there is only one 
concubine and it is not concurrent with a different type of intimacy such as 
matrimony. Cohabitation partners may be eligible for welfare even though the CPL 
does not explicitly state that. Civil partners do get derivate welfare benefits according 
to the CPS. In this respect, concubines and cohabitation partners are less protected.  
 
Moreover, the constructive sphere of an intimacy varies in these structures. An 
intimacy may be built in a horizontal or a vertical construction. The constitution of a 
family patrimony is not available for concubines and may apply for cohabitation 
partners although it is not directly granted in the CPL, the concept of family does not 
embrace them. In the cases of matrimony and civil pacts of solidarity, the concept of 
family is inclusive for spouse and civil partners. If couples want to expand their 
constructive sphere in a vertical direction, adoption is only permitted in matrimony. 
Concubines and cohabitation partners may adopt as single individuals but not as a 
family unit. For same-sex civil partners in a CPS, adoption is out of the question, 
inasmuch as they give up this right when they celebrate their pact. Regarding 
biological reproduction, paternity is automatically established in matrimony and 
opposite-sex civil pacts of solidarity. In concubinage and cohabitation partnerships, 
paternity is recognized according to the general principles of a newborn’s registration. 
That is to say, only a father and a mother, or the mother alone can register a child. So, 
again, same-sex couples face a problem if they want to claim a joint paternity or 
maternity for that matter. Only one of the members of that intimacy will be able to 
claim parenthood and the child or children will not belong (legally) to the family unit, 
but rather to the individual as a separate entity. Also, these structures grant inheritance 
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rights to the members of that intimacy. Spouses and civil partners are eligible for 
inheritance directly. Concubines, though, only qualify as heirs if they demonstrate 
that there was not multiplicity of concubines, that their concubinage lasted at least 
five years or that they had a child during their concubinage. The condition for 
cohabitation partners is that they must have cohabitated for at least two years in order 
to qualify for inheritance. 
 
Finally, there are also gender-based access restrictions to these types of 
contracts. Matrimony and concubinage are only available for opposite-sex couples. 
Partners of the same sex may only choose between a cohabitation partnership, a civil 
pact of solidarity, or matrimony in Mexico City. But, as it will be further discussed in 
the next section of this chapter, these options are only available at the state level; the 
federal level offers matrimony and concubinage for heterosexuals only. 
 
III.3. Court Cases and Decisions 
 
In the previous section of this chapter, all four structures of intimacy as regulated in 
Mexico have been analyzed. A distinction has been made between the types of 
intimacy contracts that are recognized at a state level and those accepted at the federal 
level. Now, it will be explained how a state legislation in the form of a federal 
structure of intimacy has created social, administrative and constitutional 
controversies. These conflicts will show the incompatibility of state legislations with 
federal institutions. Especially, as local legislations begin to be more flexible, the 
federal structure remains rigid. The administrative challenges of the federal system in 
Mexico end up affecting an individual’s spheres of intimacy as well.  
 
First of all, it is necessary to discuss the amendments made to the structure of 
matrimony in Mexico City. The case landed in the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice 
(SCJN), with a motion of unconstitutionality. This section will describe, in a brief 
manner, the decision made by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the actual 
examination of the grounds for this decision, the opinions and human rights 
evaluation will be discussed in Chapter IV.4. Then, the lawsuits against the Mexican 
Institute of Social Security (IMSS) will depict the administrative barriers same-sex 
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married couples face even after their matrimony has been celebrated.163 Matrimony is 
not the end, but rather a life instrument. The necessities that arise after celebrating a 
civil matrimony come from all five spheres of intimacy. Unfortunately, the public 
administration is not prepared to face new types of intimacy. Such inconsistencies 
underline the fact that a structure of intimacy has many ramifications. And, the 
regulations of the intimacy contract per se, do not suffice unless there is a holistic 
approach, adjusting all the secondary legislation that overlaps with the structure of 
intimacy as a whole. It is important to note that jurisdictions are different; a local 
legislation affects the operation of a federal institution. But, up to which point can a 
local legislative assembly override the faculties of a federal jurisdiction? This can 
only be understood after analyzing the case of civil matrimony in the Federal District, 
Mexico City, where the state/federal feud is evident.                       
 
III.3.1. Matrimony in Mexico City 
 
On December 21, 2009, the Legislative Assembly in Mexico City passed another 
extraordinary legislation: the modification of Civil Matrimony in the Federal District. 
The decree was published in the Official Gazette of the Federal District on December 
29, 2009.164 This bill is actually very concise; it modifies eight articles of the Civil 
Code of the Federal District and the Code of Civil Procedures of the Federal District. 
The amendments mostly replace the wording of these articles, with a more gender-
neutral language, allowing both men and women to claim these rights. The most 
important amendment was made to Art. 146, now stating: 
 
“Matrimony is the free union between two persons in order to accomplish life community, 
where they owe each other respect, equality and mutual support. It must be celebrated before 
a Judge of the Civil Registry and with the formalities that this code stipulates.”165 
 
Entering into force forty-five days after its publication, since March 4, 2010, 
matrimony for same-sex couples is now available as well; however, only if the civil 
matrimony is celebrated within Mexico City. This new wording grants access to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social in Spanish (IMSS). 
164 Official Gazette of the Federal District. Mexico, December 29, 2009 pp. 525-526. 
165 In Spanish: “Artículo 146.- Matrimonio es la unión libre de dos personas para realizar la 
comunidad de vida, en donde ambos se procuran respeto, igualdad y ayuda mutua. Debe celebrarse 
ante el Juez del Registro Civil y con las formalidades que estipule el presente código.” Art. 146 CCFD!
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same-sex couples to a structure of intimacy that remained until then exclusive of 
opposite-sex couples. Therefore, all the elements of matrimony discussed in the five 
spheres of intimacy, including adoption, are now offered to same-sex spouses. The 
legislation has not been embraced with the same excitement by all political parties. 
The bill passed with 39 votes in favor, 20 against and 5 abstentions.  
 
 Mexico’s Attorney General submitted a Motion of Unconstitutionality166 
before the Supreme Court of Justice on January 27, 2010. According to the Federal 
Constitution, Art.105.II.C, the Attorney General may submit a motion of 
unconstitutionality whose thesis is to exhibit the possible contradiction of a general 
norm and the Constitution. The deadline to submit these actions is thirty calendar 
days after the publication of that supposedly conflicting law. The Attorney General, 
Mr. Arturo Chavez Chavez, managed to submit the action last-minute and the request 
was admitted for review.167 The motion of unconstitutionality was based upon the 
following grounds: 
 
a. The Legislative Assembly did not justify the need to pass the bill.168  
b. This legislation damages the ideal [heterosexual] family model.169  
c. Adoption by same-sex couples damages and discriminates children.170 
d. It diverts the federal order, with the recognition of same-sex matrimony in the 
entire country.171 
e. It violates the constitutional normative hierarchy.172 
 
The Supreme Court of Justice ruled against the Motion of Unconstitutionality on 
August 16, 2010, supporting the amendment made by the Legislative Assembly of the 
Federal District with nine votes in favor and only two against it. This sentence ratified 
the bill amendments made to the civil code in Mexico City and it reiterated the 
following: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Acción de Inconstitucionalidad in Spanish. 
167 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Mexico, Vol. XXXII, 
December 2010. File number 00002/2010-00.!
168 Art. 16 MexCon 
169 Art. 4. I MexCon 
170 Art. 4. VI-VII MexCon 
171 Art. 14, Art. 16, Art. 121. IV MexCon 
172 Art. 133 MexCon 
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a. Matrimony between same-sex spouses in the Federal District is constitutional, 
because Mexican States have the faculty to legislate in local civil matters. 
b. A civil matrimony signed in and recognized by the Federal District must be 
recognized by the remaining 31 states in the Federation. 
c. Same-sex spouses must not be discriminated against, so they also qualify for 
adoption as much as opposite-sex spouses do. 
 
This sentence endorsed the legislation of the local legislative assembly in the 
Federal District, simultaneously commanding other states to acknowledge the validity 
of same-sex intimacy, even if constituted in a different jurisdiction in Mexico. The 
positive effects of this jurisprudence can be exemplified in the specific case of a 
lesbian couple who fought against the Federal Social Security System in Mexico City 
claiming their rights as spouses. 
 
III.3.2. Castañeda v. the Mexican Institute of Social Security173 
 
Mrs. Lol Kin Castañeda Badillo and Mrs. Judith Minerva Vazquez Arreola are two 
social activists in Mexico City, Castañeda is the President of the Pride Committee and 
Vazquez gave up her dream of becoming a nun when she realized she was a lesbian, 
so she joined the social cause as well. Castañeda and Vazquez were pioneers in many 
aspects; they were the first same-sex couple to sign into matrimony in Mexico on 
March 11, 2010,174 the first female matrimony in Latin America, and also, the first 
same-sex matrimony to face the nightmare of the Mexican bureaucracy. Castañeda 
was already working and was thus a beneficiary of social security.175 After their 
matrimony, she decided to register her now wife as her dependent so that she could be 
eligible for social security benefits as well. On April 12, 2010, the IMSS rejected their 
application arguing that only opposite-sex spouses qualified for social security 
benefits. They attempted to solve the issue at different levels within the IMSS. 
However, a notification received on August 2, 2010, officially terminated their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 Injunction submitted on August 23, 2010 before the District Court in Labor Matters in Mexico City.  
The case was filed as an appeal for a constitutional injunction called Amparo in Mexico. The so-called 
Amparo Law is very similar to the German Verfassungsbeschwerde figure. The discussion on the 
specific violation of Constitutional rights will be further developed in Chapter IV. 
174 Marriage license number 875781. 
175 Social Security Number: 4592762489-5. 
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request for application.176 It did not take long before Castañeda used her right to 
appeal for a constitutional injunction. The appeal was submitted at the Fourth District 
Court for Labor Matters and approved on November 9, 2010, the judge order the 
IMSS to proceed with the registration. Nonetheless, the Federal Government appealed 
the judge’s decision on November 22, 2010. A few weeks later, the Federal 
Government withdrew the appeal and the verdict made on November 9, 2010 was 
declared firm.177 The judicial process was quite political; the truth is that Art. 5 of the 
Social Security Law states that spouses and concubines are considered beneficiaries. 
Nowhere does the article mention gender, or rather opposite-gender, as a precondition 
for eligibility. Daniel Karam, Secretary of the IMSS opposed the application, due to 
his party affiliations (the PAN) he maintained a rather conservative approach to this 
case in general. The result of the lawsuit was expected, because the wording of the 
SSL is clear. As soon as Castañeda and Vazquez signed into matrimony, they became 
spouses. Therefore, they could claim any rights conferred to spouses, regardless of 
their gender. 
 
III.3.3. Conclusion 
 
After the Castañeda case, Mexico City residents may now register their same-sex 
spouses as beneficiaries in the social security system. This process, however, is not 
automatic. The IMSS has the policy of denying the applications for registrations, 
same-sex spouses will only be admitted after the judicial process has ended and the 
applicants provide a court order. The interpretation of article 5 has been ratified by 
judges as they decide on social security registration cases. Nonetheless, the IMSS is 
reluctant to act proactively and change the requirements for applicants. The SSL does 
not need to be modified, because the word spouse is actually gender-neutral. The 
administrative procedures of the IMSS show the opposition of the federal government 
to acknowledge the rights granted to same-sex couples at the state level in Mexico 
City. If same-sex couples have to go through this legal process before a right can be 
acknowledged, they will incur in additional expenses that many citizens might not be 
able to afford. Moreover, time is of the essence in medical cases. A delay in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS). Notification number 35 01 60 61 9100/AV/1670, 
signed by Mr. Samuel Palafox Pichardo. 
177 AMD. Grupo Formula. Ratifican amparo a matrimonio gay para que IMSS inscriba a cónyuge. 
January 6, 2011. Mexico City, Mexico. 
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registration process could represent severe problems and could cause irreparable 
damage. It still remains to be seen whether any of these affected couples will end up 
suing the IMSS for a compensation of damages in a civil or criminal lawsuit. 
 
III.4. International Law and Intimacy 
 
The analysis of Mexican law by itself cannot be complete unless it is ordered within 
the international law context and from a comparative perspective. It is important to 
review where Mexico stands in comparison to foreign jurisdictions and within the 
Americas, including both North and South America. There are different issues to be 
considered in this section regarding international law and intimacy: 
 
a. Applicable law to transnational/non-Mexican intimacies 
b. International law applicable to all intimacies 
c. The comparative perspective 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter, it has been discussed how Mexican Law 
recognizes and structures intimacy. Nonetheless, in a world of globalization and 
multiculturalism, intimacies nowadays involve partners of different nationalities, legal 
systems and jurisdictions. Thus, the recognition and legalization of an intimacy 
becomes a matter of private international law with the subsidiary repercussions or 
international treaties signed by states, i.e. public international law. It should be 
considered that an intimacy will be affected by the location where it is constituted, by 
subsequent locations of residency and, if applicable, by the jurisdiction where it is 
modified or terminated. The nationalities of the members of that intimacy as well as 
the set of laws that governs their structure of intimacy are foundational elements.  
 
This section will review the issues that have an effect on an intimacy 
inasmuch as it includes an international component. An intimacy may not only be 
registered in order to claim its recognition and benefits, but also by obligation. 
Especially in cases where one of the parties is a foreign citizen, the responsibility to 
notify and to register an intimacy may be linked to their legal residency status. The 
omission of this duty could bring negative consequences to that (foreign) citizen. It is 
necessary to analyze the applicable law and the legal treatment given to foreign 
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intimacies in Mexico. The economic sphere of intimacies is particularly important, for 
it may have an impact on third-party transactions and involve other areas of law. 
Furthermore, even if an intimacy has been constituted abroad, partners might desire to 
modify it or to terminate it while residing in Mexico. The determination of the 
applicable law and procedural viability of a divorce will also be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
III.4.1. International Law and International Intimacies 
 
Mexico has ratified many international instruments that affect or are related to the 
recognition of intimacies; such as the multilateral “Inter-American Convention on 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards”178 and bilateral 
agreements like the “Spain-Mexico Agreement on the Recognition and Execution of 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Civil and Commercial Matters”,179 among others. 
At the end of 2010, Mexico joined the International Commission on Civil Status 
(ICCS)180 as well. Some of the provisions ratified in these international commitments 
have already been incorporated into the Federal Code of Civil Procedures, articles 
543-577. In section III.2, the four available structures of intimacy were described and 
analyzed. These structures, however, are the options to begin an intimacy in Mexico. 
An intimacy that has begun abroad has a different behavior in Mexican law.  
 
a. Registration and Validity. 
 
In order to claim the validity of an intimacy that has been celebrated abroad, it must 
be registered in a Mexican Civil Registry. Nonetheless, the only structure of intimacy 
that can be harmonized into Mexican law and subsequently registered is matrimony. 
The foreign marriage license must be registered in the civil registry that corresponds 
to the new Mexican domicile of spouses. The FCC sets a relative deadline of three 
months after the arrival in Mexico.181 If the matrimony is registered in Mexico within 
this deadline, the validity will be retroactive since the date that matrimony was 
celebrated. After the three months have passed, spouses may still register their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Montevideo, May 7, 1979. 
179 Madrid, April 17, 1989. 
180 Mexico joined the ICCS but has not ratified all instruments yet.!
181 Art. 161 FCC!
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intimacy but its legal effects will begin on the day of the delayed registration. The 
FCC does not specify any conditions that the foreign matrimony must meet; it only 
adds the provisions for the deadline.  
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, it was explained how religious matrimonies 
have no legal effect in Mexico since the introduction of the Law on Civil Matrimony 
by President Benito Juarez in 1859. Thus, it is ironic how religious matrimonies are 
recognized in Mexico if they are celebrated abroad, at least since the jurisprudence of 
June 2, 1960. The SCJN resolved then in the constitutional injunction 5752/59 that 
matrimonies celebrated abroad – including the religious ones – are recognized by 
Mexico and have all legal effects.182 The justification of that decision was that 
Mexico had international commitments on that matter. Nevertheless, as Jorge A. Silva 
has pointed out, Mexico had not signed any international conventions about this at 
that point.183 Having said that, the common denominator in the analysis of many 
sentences by the SCJN over the period of 1917 to 2011 is that the principles of private 
international law are applicable to this matter; namely locus regit actum184 and lex 
patriae.185 Justice Mariano Azuela, who would later become Chief Justice of the 
SCJN, elaborated on his thesis of February 14, 1968: “…This is admitted [the 
recognition of a foreign matrimony] for practical and logical reasons, because it 
would not be possible that a matrimony were celebrated according to the forms and 
laws of all countries on earth in order for it to be valid worldwide, or that the 
condition of spouses were only valid in the country where they got married, or that 
the matrimony were celebrated in every country. Therefore…it is extraterritorial, 
because the personal statute of spouses follows them everywhere.”186 His arguments, 
if nothing else, were genuine common sense. 
 
Regardless of the country where the matrimony was celebrated and whether it 
is a religious or civil matrimony, the marriage certificate must be duly registered in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 Constitutional Injunction 5752/59. Rosario Marcos Sánchez de Sena. June 2, 1960. Unanimous 
decision. Lead Justice: José López Lira. Case registration number: 271398. 
183 Silva, Jorge A. Los efectos en México del matrimonio celebrado conforme a una ley extranjera. 
Revista de Derecho Privado. Year 8, Num. 24. Mexico: UNAM, 1997. p. 80. 
184 In Latin, the applicable law is that of the place where the act was celebrated. 
185 In Latin, the law of the nationals. 
186 Constitutional Injunction 5649/67. Juan Gari Pallares et al. February 14, 1968. Lead Justice: 
Mariano Azuela. Case registration number: 269381.!
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the country where it was celebrated and duly legalized, either via a consular 
legalization or with the Apostille,187 and a sworn translation into Spanish (when 
applicable) so that it can be registered in Mexico and have legal effects. This is true 
when a) two Mexican citizens celebrate their matrimony in a foreign country, b) when 
the spouses are a Mexican and a foreign citizen, or c) when both citizens are non-
Mexican. The FCC already constrains the validity of that matrimony according to the 
date of registration subject to the conditions of Art. 161. The registration of the 
foreign matrimony is detailed as an administrative procedure, but not as an obligation. 
It remains unclear whether spouses are obliged to register their matrimony celebrated 
abroad if they do not want to claim its legal effects. In any case, the SCJN has stated 
that spouses are obliged to register at least the patrimonial administration of that 
matrimony, i.e. the economic sphere is very relevant, and it must be clear whether 
their matrimony contract has a separate property or community property modality.188 
Justice Ernesto Solís Lopez explained: “…the registration is for the benefit of third 
parties who establish legal relationships with spouses. This is obvious, for the 
transcription is a means to make the act public, so that everyone knows and in order to 
avoid prejudice against those who might be affected by ignoring their civil status…” 
This sentence made a distinction between the family or moral effects, and the 
patrimonial ones. The SCJN considered that the validity in terms of the family law 
effects was given even without the registration, but the registration of their 
patrimonial regime was mandatory. Furthermore, foreigners have a constitutional 
restriction to purchase land along the coastline in Mexico, as set out in Art. 27.I. The 
SCJN ruled that when the foreigner had a Mexican spouse in a community property 
regime, this constitutional restriction did not apply because the foreigner did not 
purchase the land directly but rather it was considered a joint asset.189 This sentence 
shows again, how important it is to register the patrimonial modality of that 
matrimony. 
 
b. Termination: Divorce and annulment. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 The Apostille legalization of The Hague Convention of October 5,1961 Abolishing the Requirement 
of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents. Mexico is a member of this convention.!
188 Constitutional Injunction 9288/67. Evangelina Contreras de Cenizo. September 13, 1968. Lead 
Justice: Ernesto Solís López. Case registration number: 803670. 
189 Constitutional Injunction 206/75. María Guadalupe Terroba Canaliza widow of Bella. June 30, 
1975. Unanimous decision. Lead Justice: Efraín Angeles Sentíes. Case registration number: 254577. 
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So far, it is clear how a foreign intimacy or an intimacy that has begun abroad can be 
recognized in Mexico. The partners of that intimacy may also choose to terminate it 
while in Mexico. While the Mexican legal system did not intervene when the 
intimacy was constituted, it will play an important role when terminating it. The 
judicial process to discontinue that intimacy, i.e. the divorce procedure is tightly 
linked to the immigration provisions for foreigners in Mexico. For instance, during 
the conservative period of Spain, while in transition towards a democracy, the SCJN 
resolved a very important case regarding a divorce of a Spanish citizen.190 Spanish 
Laws, still legacies of the Franco dictatorship, did not offer a divorce as an option to 
spouses. The case that landed in the SCJN was particularly relevant because on one 
hand it discussed the possibility of terminating a matrimony celebrated in a country 
where a divorce was impossible, and on the other hand, the grounds for divorce had 
occurred in Spanish territory. In this case, the SCJN ruled that while the Spanish 
citizen had the right to the protection of Mexican laws in this civil matter, the right 
was generated when she moved to Mexico; thus, the six-month deadline began at that 
point disregarding the events that had happened in Spanish territory. In contradiction 
to this sentence, the Court did admit evidence of events that supposedly had taken 
place beyond the Mexican borders in the divorce case of Mrs. Maria Cristina de 
Borbón de Patiño,191 who was accused of adultery. Her husband did not have any 
direct evidence to prove his case, but through declarations and documentation he was 
able to prove his wife had travelled abroad with her friend and stayed at hotels 
together while travelling.  The SCJN ruled that adultery had taken place (even without 
conclusive evidence), because it was not “normal” that a woman travelled abroad with 
another man “without her husband’s authorization.” The Court assumed that the 
overnight stays at hotels in other countries had been sexual encounters. There is no 
evidence for a reader to decide whether this sentence was gender-bias, except for the 
wording itself. 
 
 Just as a religious matrimony celebrated abroad is recognized in Mexico, the 
annulment of a religious marriage has legal effects as well. In the constitutional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 Constitutional Injunction 1891/77. Enrique Bernat Suárez. December 1, 1978. Unanimous decision. 
Lead Justice: J. Ramón Palacios Vargas. Case registration number: 913801. 
191 Constitutional Injunction 7803/58. María Cristina de Borbón de Patiño. 9 de diciembre de 1959. 
Mayoría de cuatro votos. Disidente: Gabriel García Rojas. Ponente: Mariano Ramírez Vázquez. 
Registro No. 271632. 
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injunction of 1978192 the court ruled that the sentence issued by the ecclesiastical 
tribunal was valid because it was considered res judicata.193 The appeal lacked any 
solid grounds, inasmuch as the sentence had fulfilled the legal requirements of the 
Code of Civil Procedures. Again, the secular legal system in Mexico recognized the 
applicability of canonical law. In this case, the emphasis was laid on the procedure 
formalities of that sentence. Formal requirements become important from the 
immigration perspective also. Foreign citizens in Mexico must demonstrate that they 
have legal residency in order to file a divorce. The domicile will determine whether 
the divorce is admitted; and in addition to other requirements, foreigners must submit 
evidence of their legal status in Mexico according to the Jurisprudence Report of 
1973.194 However, when the foreign citizen is the defendant, they are not required to 
submit their residency permit in order for their defense to be valid.195 This is, of 
course, independent of the obligations that foreigners have in Mexico in order to 
reside legally. And, a divorce may also lead to the expiration of a foreigner’s 
residency permit. 
 
III.4.2. Summary  
 
The case of religious matrimonies, being valid in Mexico when celebrated abroad 
even when Mexican law does not recognize religious matrimonies, proves the 
applicability of private and public international law in civil matters in Mexico. While 
the separation of church and state in Mexico still remains intact, the secular legal 
system allows for the recognition of religious acts from abroad. Although the 
recognition of a foreign matrimony is possible, other international forms of intimacy 
cannot be harmonized into a Mexican structure of intimacy other than matrimony. 
Foreign forms of intimacy that may resemble concubinage, a civil pact of solidarity or 
a cohabitation partnership cannot be registered. Partners may sign into one of these 
forms when they arrive in Mexico, but their foreign intimacy will have no effects. 
They will only have legal effects related to the new structure of intimacy that they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 Constitutional Injunction 1891/77. Enrique Bernat Suárez. December 1, 1978. Secretary: Agustín 
Urdapilleta Trueba. Case registration number: 387712. 
193 In Latin, a matter already judged.!
194 Report of 1973, First Part, General Assembly, p. 250. “Legal Requirements that Foreigners must 
fulfill in order to submit a divorce procedure”. Case registration number: 233169. 
195 Constitutional Injunction 118/91. Ruth Adelina Marseh. April 26, 1991. Unanimous decision. Lead 
Justice: Joaquín Dzib Núñez. Secretary: Jorge Valencia Méndez. Case registration number: 222505.!
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form in Mexico.  The SCJN cases analyzed underline the fact that intimacies are 
affected many times by more than one legal system and that Mexican law may apply 
to foreign civil contracts. This is also a consequence of globalization, neither positive 
nor negative, simply another global issue that must eventually be considered: 
matrimonium in itinere. 
 
III.5. Conclusion 
 
Now that the structures of intimacy have been analyzed, it is easier to understand and 
to identify the spheres of intimacy in each of them. This closer inspection of the legal 
recognition of intimacy in Mexico has provided a description of the types of 
relationships that individuals can constitute. The table of contrasts presented in III.2.5 
exhibits the key aspects that each structure of intimacy encompasses. These elements 
demonstrate that Matrimony, Concubinage, Cohabitation Partnerships and Civil Pacts 
of Solidarity are much more than a mere contract, because they have subsidiary 
effects in different areas and they overlap with other legislations beyond the 
provisions regarding civil unions in the civil code. Emotional issues like the solemnity 
of a civil act may be very relevant for partners who want to legitimate their intimacy, 
while the access to legal guardianship may be considered more important by others. 
Gender-bias wording has been pointed out in this chapter; it shows that legislators, 
who are for the most part men, have not reached a level of impartiality that is 
necessarily in democratic legislative bodies. Although the term of intimacy is 
generally associated with sexual practice, it has been proved how all four structures 
treat the sexual matter in a different way, but none of them indicates a sexual 
obligation. The financial provisions of an intimacy are ever so relevant in a century of 
capitalism. So, especially with the application of welfare, it has been discussed how 
the type of civil unions can be a criterion that affects the wellbeing of partners. 
Furthermore, the constructive capacity is a component that partners usually do not 
want to give up. The right to constitute a family, be it a vertical or horizontal one, is 
inherent to any structure of intimacy. The restrictions on adoption, however, show 
how choosing the most adequate type of structure is critical. 
 
Another feature in this chapter was the evaluation of court cases that have 
exposed the struggle between the state level and the federal level in Mexico. The case 
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of Castañeda v. The Mexican Institute of Social Security underscores the bureaucratic 
obstacles that a legally constituted same-sex intimacy still has to face in order to 
claim basic rights. The Motion of Unconstitutionality that tried to revoke same-sex 
matrimony in Mexico City was – fortunately – unsuccessful. Yet, these examples in 
III.3 confirm the resistance of conservative groups who are still fighting the 
recognition of intimacy between same-sex partners.  It is appalling that cases must 
land in the Supreme Court in order to claim basic benefits of an intimacy contract. A 
comprehensive, more holistic approach must still be applied to subsidiary legislations 
so that they can actually be effective.  
 
Globalization and contemporary trends of the 21st century have proved to be 
closely related to intimacy. Therefore, the review of private and public international 
law along with its impact on intimacy in Mexico has confirmed that legal systems are 
not completely independent of each other. Mexico does not exist in autarchy, and the 
mobility of intimacy and individuals around the world ends up shaping the decisions 
on the recognition, validity and termination of that very intimacy when they are 
subject to the jurisdiction of Mexican Law. The SCJN cases discussed in this chapter 
revealed the international ramifications of intimacy and the problems that partners 
face nowadays. The differences between the four structures of intimacy that were 
thoroughly examined include subtle and crucial factors; access is definitely a very 
important one. Access denotes who is allowed to join a certain structure of intimacy 
and who is not. In this context, the gender of partners determines whether they may or 
may not have the right to use the legal protections embodied in a specific form of 
intimacy. Whether this and other limitations represent a discrimination or not, the 
subject must be analyzed from a human rights perspective. And this human rights 
argument cannot be found in the civil code that this chapter has studied in detail, it 
arises rather from the kernel of law, the constitutional protection of fundamental 
human rights. This profound debate will be the matter of the following chapter. 
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IV.1. Introduction 
 
Up until now, this research has studied the question of intimacy in general and the 
particular legal status of intimacy in the Civil Code. It is now necessary to analyze 
intimacy from a perspective of the fundamental rights that protect it. Thus, this 
chapter will review the connection between intimacy and constitutional law, human 
rights and international treaties from a comparative law approach. The first section of 
this chapter will review Mexican Constitutional Law, examining constitutional human 
rights provisions and the constitutional framework that makes intimacy and its 
legalization possible. Especially, the difference between privacy and intimacy will be 
discussed along with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The relevance of 
privacy and intimacy will also be juxtaposed with other constitutional rights in order 
to determine the constitutional value of privacy and intimacy. At the end of this 
chapter, it will be clear that intimacy cannot be studied without privacy. The 
constitutional approach to intimacy requires the examination and inclusion of privacy 
and its synergy with the concept of intimacy. Hence, a three-layer abstraction of 
privacy is presented in this section to discern intimacy from privacy and to pinpoint 
their interconnection.  
 
The review of human rights will include the recent amendments to the 
constitution of June 2011, and their direct impact on human rights and intimacy. 
Furthermore, all the relevant international treaties ratified by Mexico in this matter 
will be examined, particularly looking for their applicability with regards to intimacy. 
As a comparative analysis, this section will discuss U.S. Constitutional Law 
jurisprudence. There are four pertinent cases that will help compare intimacy and 
privacy in a neighbor legal system. They will also provide an example for a better 
comprehension of intimacy and privacy in general.  
 
Last, but certainly not least, this chapter will discuss the emblematic battle for 
intimacy that landed in the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN) in 2010. When 
Mexico City passed a bill to legalize same-sex marriage, the Attorney General 
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submitted a Motion of Unconstitutionality to revoke that bill. This landmark case 
ignited a national debate that concluded with a significant decision by the Supreme 
Court a year and a half later. The arguments, constitutional attacks, and defenses of 
this battle will be explored in detail as well. This chapter is important for this research, 
because constitutional law provides the nest for the subsequent legalization of 
intimacy. If nothing else, before the beginning of Chapter V it will be evident that, 
fundamental rights in Mexico provide a foundation for the legalization of intimacy 
and that intimacy is a human rights issue. Therefore, the support for the legalization 
of alternative types of intimacy promotes a more inclusive protection of human rights. 
 
IV.2. Constitutional Law and Intimacy 
 
The Mexican Constitution of February 5, 1917, with its multiple amendments, is still 
in force. It was considered one of the most modern constitutions at the time it was 
approved. Drafted after the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and during a period when 
communism was thriving, this constitution managed to incorporate social provisions 
regarding labor, a mandatory secular education system, a separation of powers based 
on Montesquieu’s three branches, a federal system, and most importantly, the 
foundations of human rights in Mexico. The first title of the constitution, from Article 
1 to 29, details the core set of human rights. These rights were originally called the 
Individual Guarantees; the name was actually quite appropriate, it showed that 
Mexico – as a state – was the guarantor of this fundamental protection. Although 
some authors1 debate the euphemisms and differences around the concepts of human 
rights and individual guarantees as explained by the constitution, in a practical sense 
and from a comparative law perspective, these individual guarantees shall be 
interpreted as human rights.  
 
Constitutional provisions include first-generation and second-generation 
human rights, respectively, embracing the individual’s intrinsic personal rights and 
also the rights of individuals as social beings.2 Jorge Carpizo argues that human rights !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Martínez Bullé-Goyri, Victor M. “Las garantías individuales en la constitución mexicana de 1917.” in 
Estudios jurídicos en torno a la Constitución mexicana de 1917, en su septuagésimo quinto aniversario. 
Mexico: UNAM, 1992. pp.1-18. The author discusses nuances around these concepts. 
2 Lara Ponte, Rodolfo. Los Derechos Humanos en el Constitucionalismo Mexicano. Mexico, UNAM-
IIJ, 1993. pp.157-158. 
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are general ideas whereas guarantees are individualized and concrete ideas.3 In his 
analysis of human rights in the constitution, he classifies the provisions in three parts: 
the rights of equality, the rights of liberty and the rights of legal protection.4  
 
The rights of liberty are divided into three groups, the guarantees of the person 
as a human being, the guarantees of the person as a citizen and the guarantees of 
persons as social individuals. The guarantees of individuals as human beings are 
classified as physical liberties or spiritual liberties. In addition to these individual 
guarantees, there are other human rights clauses conceived as social guarantees. They 
can be found in the first twenty-nine articles along with the individual guarantees, but 
also in article 123, regarding work and social welfare. According to Carpizo’s 
classification system,5 constitutional human rights provisions could be represented in 
the following chart: 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Quoted from Lara, idem, p. 186. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 163-164.!
5 See Lara, p. 186. 
Human Rights in 
the Constitution 
Individual 
Guarantees!
Equality 
Art. 
1,2,3,4,12,13 
Liberty 
Person-
Human 
Physical 
Art.5,10,11,22 
Spiritual 
Art.6,7,24,16 
Person-
Citizen 
Art. 9,15 
Social 
Person 
Art. 9 
Legal 
Protection 
Art. 
8,14,16,17,18,20,22,23 
Social  
Guarantees 
Art. 3, 27,123 
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IV.2.1. A review of constitutional human rights and individual guarantees 
 
In order to understand that there is a constitutional framework for the legalization of 
intimacy, it is necessary to analyze these rights and guarantees in their relationship 
with privacy. Some constitutional articles describe a specific right, while others are 
more complex and encompass more than one right. This review will present a 
discussion of the most important rights in the first chapter of the constitution, 
considering the subsequent applicability of these rights in their relationship with 
intimacy. 
 
A. Constitutional provisions for the protection of Equality and Dignity 
[Art. 1, 3, 4, Mexican Constitution]  
 
This first article of the constitution, beyond its introductory tone, is particularly 
important because of its scope. It provides a non-discrimination clause and it presents 
the essence of human rights: Equality, Liberty and Dignity. The non-discrimination 
clause included in Art. 1 par. 5 prohibits any discrimination based on ethnicity, 
citizenship, gender, age, disability, social or health conditions, religion, opinions, 
sexual preferences, civil status, or any other form of discrimination that diminishes 
the rights and liberties of people.  
 
In a constitutional injunction currently in review,6 the SCJN is discussing Art. 
143 of the Civil Code in the State of Oaxaca. This article shows a restriction for 
matrimony, allowing only opposite-sex spouses. The first chamber of the SCJN has 
published an isolated thesis7 (not yet jurisprudence) concluding that, this restriction is 
implicitly based upon a suspicious category because the matrimonial union relies on 
the sexual preferences of people, which constitute one of the criteria in the last 
paragraph of Art. 1. In other words, with this statement, the SCJN is acknowledging 
that reducing marriage to opposite-sex spouses (at least within the context of the 
Oaxaca Civil Code) is a hidden form of discrimination incompatible with the non-
discrimination principle in Art. 1. This is a first step towards the recognition of this de !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Constitutional Injunction in review 581/2012. December 5, 2012. Lead Justice: Arturo Zaldívar Lelo 
de Larrea. 
7 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Thesis. 10th Epoch. Book XIX, Vol.1. April 2013. p. 963. !
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facto discrimination. Furthermore, the SCJN is allocating sexual preferences within 
the scope of matrimony as well. Once this constitutional injunction has become a firm 
decision, it will produce changes in the civil code of Oaxaca, and it may influence 
future jurisprudence on other local civil codes in Mexico. 
 
Also, education is conceived as a social guarantee by the state and as an 
individual guarantee. The right to education reinforces equality, due to the fact that all 
individuals can access the free education system provided by the State. Moreover, this 
very education system is a mechanism that must perpetuate human rights. This article 
serves simultaneously as a human right to education and as an education of human 
rights. According to Article 3 par 3.II.c., reformed on February 26, 2013, the State 
shall contribute to the appreciation and respect for cultural diversity, dignity, the 
integrity of the family, the conviction of the general interest in society, the ideals of 
fraternity and equality of all, avoiding the privileges of races, religion, groups, sexes 
or individuals. Considering that the purpose of this article is to foster values in the 
education system, and in accordance with the principles of diversity and equality 
mentioned in the same article, the State should reform the curricula of the public 
education system in such a way that it accommodates new forms of family formations 
that embrace same-sex parenthood.  
 
The principle of equality established in Article 4 par. 1. states that “men and 
women are equal before the law”. The second paragraph introduces the right to self-
determination linked to the decision to have children. If individuals can decide upon 
the number of their children, there is a strong argument for abortion claiming the 
rights conferred by this article. If an individual decides to have an abortion, their self-
determination is then to have cero children.8 The seventh paragraph states that every 
family has the right to enjoy a dignifying house. In the commentary by Roberto Lara, 
he states that the group of rights framed by a globalizing family security in this article 
encompasses: Legal equality for both sexes, the protection and motivation of the 
family unit and responsible parenthood; the fundamental rights of children, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See commentary in Lara, p. 168. 
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protection of health, the right to adequate housing and the protection of indigenous 
groups.9 That is to say, this article secures equality, dignity and the family. 
 
B. Constitutional provisions for the protection of Liberty and Privacy 
[Art. 6, 7, 10, 16, 20, 24, 27, Mexican Constitution] 
 
In Article 6, the freedom to express one’s thoughts is guaranteed while protecting the 
rights of third parties and the public order. It is important to analyze liberty and 
privacy together, because the constitution reduces liberty in proportional relation to 
the protection of privacy, Art. 6 par. 2. II. states that the information regarding private 
life and personal data will be protected in the terms and with the exceptions set out by 
the law. This liberty granted by Art. 6 is linked to Art. 7, which forbids censorship of 
any kind. However, in a decision on a constitutional injunction last year,10 the SCJN 
decided that this very freedom of speech granted by Art. 6 does not protect 
homophobic discourse. The Court added, “such discriminatory treatment implies a 
form of submission, through a hierarchy in sexual preferences, granting 
heterosexuality a superior rank.” In other words, the Court identified and banned the 
element of heteronormativity in homophobic discourse. 
 
Also, the liberty to choose and to practice one’s religion is granted by Art. 24, 
that is to say, religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution. Evidently, 
individuals may also choose not to practice a religion. In other words, laicism can be 
equally practiced. Considering the moral sphere of intimacy, Art. 24 provides the 
constitutional right to religious freedom. The religious validation of an intimacy 
through a ceremony or ritual is permitted. Nonetheless, as mentioned in Chapter 
III.4.1.a., the legality of that intimacy is not recognized by law, unless it is a foreign 
structure of intimacy harmonized into Mexican law.11  
 
Marco Celis points out in his commentary on intimacy as a fundamental right 
for Mexicans, that the there is no explicit right to intimacy in the constitution. He 
argues, that the constitution does acknowledge some of the rights associated with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Ibidem, p. 183.!!
10 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Constitutional Injunction 2806/2012. Thesis: CXLVIII/2010. 
First Chamber. 10th Epoch. Vol. XX, May 2013, Book 1, p. 547. 
11 See Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Third Chamber. 6th Epoch; Vol. CXXVIII, Fourth Part. p. 39. 
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intimacy, and therefore, intimacy is partially guarded.12 Nonetheless, as the following 
section in this chapter will show, the jurisprudence of the SCJN does include intimacy 
and privacy and fundamental rights protected by the constitution. Article 16 
introduces the legal protection of liberty, for the most part, in regard to privacy. As 
guaranteed by Articles 6, 7 and 10, this article protects the privacy of individuals in 
their personhood, in their family, domicile, documents and possessions. It is 
noteworthy that an individual’s family is linked to their personal sphere by this clause. 
Thus, there is an explicit acknowledgement that an individual’s family falls within 
that individual’s privacy. Paragraph 12 adds that, private communications are 
inviolable and that the law shall criminalize acts that threaten their liberty and privacy. 
This validates, on one hand, the liberty to establish private communications, and on 
the other, the inclusion of communication within privacy. From a different approach, 
in the relationship between decisional privacy and secrecy, Art. 20 protects the rights 
of an accused individual to remain silent.  This article protects the liberty of the 
individual making that decision, and maintains their privacy in the context of secrecy, 
not being obliged to disclose information. One of the characteristics of privacy is its 
connection with self-disclosure. In judicial processes, this legal protection clause 
grants the accused the right to remain silent. In other words, it defends their privacy 
and autonomy for disclosure of information. 
 
With a language that resembles the Second Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America,13 Article 10 grants the liberty to keep and bear arms at 
home. This liberty of individuals creates a de facto personal jurisdiction within their 
domicile. Although bearing arms is considered a crime in general, it is not typified as 
such within a private domicile.14 In other words, it reiterates the autonomy of 
individuals to exercise their liberties within their private sphere, within their domicile.  
Articles 6 and 7 treat the issue of privacy in connection with personal information 
regarding the private life of individuals, whereas privacy in article 10 is location-
specific. Hence, the physical space of an individual at their domicile is to be 
considered as an extension of their privacy. Also regarding private property, Art. 27 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Celis Quintal, Marcos A. “La protección de la intimidad como derecho fundamental de los 
mexicanos” in Estudios en homenaje a Marcia Muñoz de Alba Medrano. Protección de la persona y 
derechos fundamentales. Mexico: UNAM-IIJ, 2006. p. 94.!
13 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Second Amendment. U.S. Constitution. 
14 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. 9th Epoch. Vol.  XX, July 2004, p. 1676.  
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par. XVII, protects the privacy of families through the figure of the family patrimony. 
This provision also outlines the difference between public and private property and its 
legal protection.  As discussed before in Chapter III, the family patrimony is protected 
by the constitution as a fundamental right. Although this article lacks a definition of 
the concept of “Family”, it is an important element in the constructive sphere of an 
intimacy.  
 
IV.2.2. The constitutional framework for intimacy 
 
It has been mentioned that the articles in the constitution that relate to human rights 
do not discuss intimacy directly. As a matter of fact, the word intimacy is not 
mentioned in the constitution at all.  There are inconsistencies in the use of 
terminology, by scholars,15 by the Mexican Supreme Court,16 by commentators,17 and 
by citizens in general, because the terms privacy and intimacy are sometimes used as 
synonyms in Spanish. The constitution grants a right to privacy and a right to 
intimacy; and these rights are limited where the privacy of others begins. Thus, the 
treatment of privacy is a defensive one. If the right to intimacy is not explicit in the 
constitution, how does the Supreme Court handle it in the jurisprudence? And, how 
do commentators and scholars interpret it? Also, the allocation of intimacy within the 
scope of privacy and its range of application requires a deeper analysis. The 
constitutional framework for intimacy is supported within articles 6, 7, 10 and 16. 
These articles actually protect privacy, and not intimacy directly. However, the 
production of law, the jurisprudence, claims and defenses, function under the premise 
that intimacy lies within privacy. And, that the protection of privacy includes the 
underlying protection of intimacy. These are the issues that shall now be addressed in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
Privacy vs. Intimacy 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Jorge Carpizo’s use of intimacy as synonym of privacy in the interpretation of Article 16. In 
Lara, p. 163. 
16 See usage in Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Second Chamber. 9th Epoch; Book XXVII, May 
2008. p. 229. 
17 For instance: Fernandez, Jose. Lo público y lo privado en internet. Intimidad y expresión en la red. 
Mexico: UNAM, 2004. pp. 85 et sqq.!
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Since the approval of the constitution of 1917, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice 
(SCJN) has resolved 96 cases that involve the concept of intimacy. In some decisions, 
the Supreme Court has an interpretation of intimacy that differs from the literature. 
But, it is surprising that the Supreme Court itself has conflicting interpretations of 
intimacy in the jurisprudence. Out of these 96 cases that the SCJN has reviewed, 60 
cases have been admitted between 2000 and 2012. This represents more than 62 per 
cent in just over the last decade, and the remaining 38 per cent between 1917 and 
1999, 82 years. These figures may indicate that the issue of intimacy has become 
more relevant today and that the debate around it is contemporary.  
 
An analysis of these 96 cases in depth, leads to the observation that the 
interpretations of intimacy by the SCJN can be classified or grouped into six different 
connotations: 
 
1. Privacy. Intimacy used as a synonym of privacy in its broader definition. (65 
cases)18 
2. Isolation. Intimacy interpreted as isolation from other human beings, in 
solitude. (1 case)19 
3. Dyadic relationship. Intimacy seen as a dyadic relationship between two 
friends, colleagues at work, etc. (7 cases)20 
4. Sexual Activity. Intimacy described as a sexual practice. (7 cases)21 
5. Frequent contact. Intimacy defined as a frequent interaction of two individuals. 
(2 cases)22 
6. Structure of Intimacy. Intimacy understood as a close reciprocal relationship 
of future-oriented companionship with attachment in different private domains. 
(14 cases)23 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See for example: Constitutional Injunction 9129/41. Herrera García, Efraín. August 24, 1955. Lead 
Justice: Juan José González Bustamante. Case registration number: 384427. 
19 Constitutional Injunction 2093/55. December 2, 1955. Lead Justice: Teófilo Olea y Leyva. Case 
registration number: 803536. 
20 See for example: Constitutional Injunction 3395/55. January 21, 1956. Lead Justice: Luis Chico 
Goerne. Case registration number: 293730. 
21 See for example: Constitutional Injunction 8697/61. Aureo Zepeda Muciño. April 20, 1964. Lead 
Justice: Mario G. Rebolledo F. Case registration number: 270201. 
22 See for example: Constitutional Injunction 889/43. Lazcano, Catalina. April 30, 1943. Lead Justice: 
Eduardo Vasconcelos. Case registration number: 375330. 
23 See for example: Constitutional Injunction 3637/52. López de Beltrán, María de los Angeles. April 
17, 1953. Lead Justice: José Castro Estrada. Case registration number: 341750.!
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These six different connotations may indicate that there are some inconsistencies 
within the jurisprudence. While it is clear that the SCJN recognizes that intimacy lies 
within the realm of privacy in all 96 cases, the conflict of interpretation remains 
outstanding. On May 23, 2007, Justice Olga Sánchez Cordero de García Villegas 
provided a definition that would help better understand the nuances between intimacy 
and privacy:  
 
“Life is constituted by the private domain reserved for each person and in which everyone else 
is excluded, whereas intimacy is integrated with the most personal extremes of life and the 
family surrounding, whose knowledge is reserved for the members of the family unit. Thus, 
the concept of private life encompasses intimacy as the most protected nucleus with care and 
strength because it is understood as essential in the configuration of a person, that is to say, 
private life is something generically reserved and intimacy –as a part of the former- is 
something radically closed, the most personal; therefore, while being two different rights, 
since one is a part of the other, when intimacy is affected, the private life is aggravated.”24  
 
This clear definition, unfortunately, has not become a doctrine in the interpretation or 
disambiguation of these two terms: privacy and intimacy. The use of these concepts, 
in cases after 2007, shows that the terminology is still unsettled. For instance, Justice 
Victor Francisco Mota Cienfuegos revisits the debate around intimacy a year later, 
using the terms intimacy and privacy indistinctively. 25  Nonetheless, the SCJN 
acknowledges that there is a right to privacy and a right to intimacy and that both of 
them are protected by the individual guarantees in the constitution. 
 
In the literature of privacy and intimacy in Mexico, some commentators and 
scholars use the terms of privacy and intimacy as synonyms. Marco Celis has 
published a comprehensive analysis of the protection of intimacy as a fundamental 
right in Mexico.26 He argues that the difference between privacy and intimacy is not 
fundamental, and he uses both terms indiscriminately, considering that they are used 
as synonyms in the doctrine.27 It is true that they are widely used as synonyms in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Constitutional Injunction 402/2007. May 23, 2007. Lead Justice: Olga Sánchez Cordero de García 
Villegas. Case registration number: 171883. 
25 Constitutional Injunction 73/2008. May 6, 2008. Lead Justice: Víctor Francisco Mota Cienfuegos. 
Case registration number: 168944. 
26 Celis Quintal, pp.71-108. 
27 Ibidem, p. 73. 
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Mexican literature. However, the difference between the two concepts is pivotal for 
the legalization of intimacy; it is the crux of the legal argument, because the inclusion 
of the right to intimacy is not needed if intimacy is allocated within the right to 
privacy. When Celis uses the common law in the United States as reference, he 
mentions the “right of privacy,” literally in English, as support for his intimacy 
arguments. But, the Spanish language has two words that translate into privacy and 
intimacy, respectively, privacidad and intimidad. Thus, translating privacy into 
intimidad is an obvious fallacy. Even well known scholars like Jorge Carpizo use the 
word for intimacy when describing the rights of privacy in the constitution.28 
 
 Although the semantic conflict can be seen in the literature and jurisprudence 
in Mexico, the debate on this subject-matter in the United States is more mature both 
in the philosophical and legal branches. These debates lean rather towards the 
definition provided Justice Olga Sánchez, as quoted above.  
 
Julie C. Inness has noticed that “the debates between the legal and 
philosophical literature [around intimacy and privacy] can be grouped into three 
categories: (1) the skeptical debate about the conceptual and moral distinctiveness of 
privacy; (2) the debate about the two components of a definition of privacy – the 
function of privacy and the content of privacy; (3) the debate about the value of 
privacy.”29 She claims that constitutional privacy protects the agent’s freedom of 
action in a privacy sphere that includes the home, sexuality, the body, and the 
family.30 This privacy is control-based, because the agent has control over access and 
information, without separation from others, given that the state of privacy does not 
require isolation.31 In Mexican privacy law, the element of control and consent is 
fundamental; especially in the criminal code, consent determines the typification of 
the violation of privacy,32 and in the civil code, it can lead to a compensation of 
damages.33  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Lara, p. 163. 
29 Inness, Julie C. Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. p. 23.!
30 Ibidem, p. 16. 
31 Ibidem, p. 17. 
32 FCRC, Art. 210 -211bis 7. 
33 FCC, Art. 1916.!
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The constitution protects the information regarding private life in Articles 6 
and 7. In article 10, it recognizes the spatial privacy of the home with the right to 
possess arms for legitimate defense. And, in article 16, it reinstates the privacy of 
home and the family, also including private communications. As Inness has pointed 
out, “even when we think about the privacy in non-spatial contexts, we still place an 
emphasis on separation from the public realm, for example, we tend to describe the 
privacy of the family in terms of its separation from the power of the state and that of 
the body in terms of its separation from the access of others.”34  
 
Privacy can be territorial, but the element of privacy is also transportable. The 
SCJN has resolved that the interpretation of Art. 16 regarding the inviolability of 
domicile includes an objective element, a usual residency, but also a subjective 
element, any space where private and intimate acts of an individual take place.35 
Intimate is again the operative word.  
 
Inness sees intimacy as the core of privacy, considering that “to claim that an 
act or activity is intimacy is to claim that it draws its meaning and value from the 
agent’s love, liking, or care.”36 She adds that intimacy links together the bulk of tort 
and constitutional privacy law,37 being “not merely the conceptually distinguishing 
feature of constitutional privacy claims – intimacy is also their morally relevant 
feature.”38 This is true as observed in the Mexican criminal and civil codes, the 
compensation of damages represents moral damages based upon the defense of 
intimacy. Hence, the arguments provided by Inness are compatible with the definition 
of Justice Olga Sánchez Cordero de García Villegas and vice versa. Inness identifies 
intimacy as the core of privacy, drawing its meaning from the agent’s love, liking or 
care; and Sánchez interprets it as its nucleus, limited to the members of the family 
unit. 
 
Privacy & Intimacy vs. other Constitutional rights 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Inness, p. 43. 
35 Contradiction of thesis 75/2004-PS. January 17, 2007. Lead Justice: Olga Sánchez Cordero de 
García Villegas. Case registration number: 171779. 
36 Inness, p. 90. 
37 Ibidem, p. 117. 
38 Ibidem, p. 122. 
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When the rights of privacy and intimacy clash with other constitutional rights, the 
SCJN has determined that the principles of rationality and proportionality must be 
observed. The following situations show that privacy and intimacy can indeed be 
legally violated, although they are protected as fundamental constitutional rights. 
However, these restriction have to be justified and proportional. For instance: 
 
a. Due process clause. Article 17 grants individuals the right to the 
administration of justice. This guarantee of legal protection represents the due 
process clause. The jurisprudence defends that the right to due process may 
restrict the right to privacy. An individual’s chance to submit evidence during 
a trial may justify the right of another individual to their own privacy. 
Nonetheless, the principles of rationality and proportionality must always be 
applied. The intervention of the state in an individual’s intimacy is justified as 
a gift to the right to submit evidence so that the state can effectively 
administer justice, but that intervention must be authorized only when 
necessary and up to a certain degree, protecting as much as possible the 
privacy of a person.39 
 
b. Visitation rights. The protection of privacy includes the safekeeping of a 
family’s home according to Art. 16. However, there is a conflict when two 
parents begin a separation process and both of them keep the legal 
guardianship of children. In such cases, the privacy of the home and the 
intimacy of the family are involved. Up to which extent will the leaving parent 
have the right to violate the privacy of the home they are leaving? The 
jurisprudence supports that as long as both parents are legal guardians, they 
will not lose their right to visit their children unless there is a clear danger for 
the minor. In order to protect the healthy development of children and their 
personal and emotional stability, the state will intervene though a trial and will 
designate the most appropriate system to exercise the visitation rights of 
parents so as to foster the socialization with their children. Therefore, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Constitutional Injunction in review 265/2006. Javier Quijano Baz. June 7, 2007. Lead Justice: 
Francisco J. Sandoval López. Case registration number: 168890. 
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protection and wellbeing of children as envisaged in Art. 4 may justify the 
restriction of a parent’s personal right to privacy.40 !
c.  Alimony. In a case of family law, a judge requested private information from 
an individual to their employer. The judge’s intention was to gather enough 
information to determine the alimony for a child. The parent filed an appeal 
for a constitutional injunction claiming that the judge had violated their right 
to privacy. The SCJN decided that since that parent had the obligation to 
provide nourishment, and that the child’s subsistence and their access to 
justice according to Art.14 was more important than the parent’s right to 
privacy. An individual’s life and their physical integrity shall be more 
important than another individual’s privacy.41 This case shows a justified 
restriction in privacy and personal data protection. 
 
d. Warrant. According to Art. 16, authorities need a warrant before they can 
access an individual’s domicile. This spatial protection of privacy is not 
limited to the actual residence, but rather, it includes any private place. Even 
though the wording of Art. 16 uses the word “domicile” in the first paragraph, 
the use of the word “place” in the eighth paragraph has broadened its 
interpretation in criminal law. The violation of privacy with the justification of 
the due process clause is admitted because it protects another individual’s 
right to justice. Nevertheless, when state authorities violate privacy without a 
warrant as provided in Art. 16, the evidence they gather will not be admitted 
in a criminal trial. That is to say, the invasion of privacy by another individual 
claiming the protection of Art. 17 is allowed, but the invasion of privacy by 
authorities is not justified without a warrant.42  
 
With these decisions, the jurisprudence of the SCJN has set the boundaries for the 
violation of privacy. Essentially, the right to due process, the access to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Constitutional Injunction 3656/2003. August 7, 2003. Lead Justice: Gustavo R. Parrao Rodríguez. 
Case registration number: 177259. 
41 Constitutional Injunction in review 485/2003. October 31, 2003. Lead Justice: Leonardo Rodríguez 
Bastar. Case registration number: 182497. 
42!Contradiction of thesis 75/2004-PS. January 17, 2007. Lead Justice: Olga Sánchez Cordero de 
García Villegas. Case registration number: 171779.!
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administration of justice and the right to life are more important that the right to 
privacy and intimacy. As seen in the provisions above, an individual’s privacy can be 
restricted with valid and proportional justifications. This may include violations of 
privacy among family members, as mentioned above in the case of alimony. 
Considering that family members are a part of an individual’s privacy and intimacy, 
how can individuals be vulnerable in their privacy that way? The best way to answer 
this question is by understanding the different layers of privacy.  
 
The layers of privacy and intimacy 
 
So far, the terms privacy and intimacy have been used in many contexts as synonyms 
that create fallacies and nebulous definitions; and as constitutive components, where 
intimacy is the heart of privacy. In order to understand the difference between the 
terms privacy and intimacy in the context of the legalization of intimacy, this section 
provides an approach to define these terms as juxtaposed elements. This approach 
works under the following premises: (a) privacy and intimacy are two different 
matters, (b) the right to privacy is an individual right, not a collective one, and (c) 
intimacy exists after privacy.  
 
First of all, in order to identify privacy and intimacy as two distinct features, it 
is necessary to discern the span of privacy. The best way to do so is by recognizing 
three layers of privacy: an intrinsic privacy of individuals, a shelter of privacy, and an 
atmosphere of privacy. The graph below shows these layers in different shades: 
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Intrinsic privacy is the innermost range of privacy. This layer of privacy 
protects personal autonomy and self-determination. An individual has complete 
ownership over their intrinsic privacy and it exists even during intimacy. This 
intrinsic privacy is valued, as Inness would say, “because it embodies our respect for 
persons as choosers.”43 The capacity to make personal decisions regarding sexuality, 
getting a tattoo, having an abortion, etc., is determined by the intrinsic privacy of 
individuals. Intrinsic privacy empowers the individual to take control over their 
personal actions. Intrinsic privacy shall be interpreted as a human right because it 
belongs to a specific human being.   
 
The second layer is a shelter of privacy that covers one or more agents. This 
shelter can be a home, a workplace, a car, but it can also be non-spatial, such as an e-
mail account. A shelter of privacy provides the infrastructure (solid or not) for the 
security of an individual’s privacy. The spaces created by individuals build a domain 
that must be protected beyond the individual’s physical or intrinsic privacy. Such 
spaces are also protected by constitutional rights as extensions of one or more 
individuals, sheltered from external influences or third parties that do not belong in 
that shelter of privacy. The decisional power of an individual, their intrinsic privacy, 
defines who the members of the shelter of privacy are and the rules for interaction 
within that shelter. 
 
Lastly, the third layer of privacy is an atmosphere of privacy. This layer is an 
external level of privacy that floats over the public realm.  For example, when an 
individual sends a letter to another person, there is a guardianship of privacy in the 
public space that involves more than one agent outside the shelter of privacy to make 
sure that the privacy of that letter is not violated. The atmosphere of privacy allows 
for the privacy of many individuals to be protected simultaneously. Data protection 
laws, for example, determine the extent of the atmosphere of that informational 
privacy. Also, sanitary regulations for restrooms in public and rules for the prison 
system determine the atmospheres of privacy in public places. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Inness, p. 22. 
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Thus, considering the layers of privacy, where is intimacy located? As 
introduced in Chapter II, intimacy is a close reciprocal relationship of future-oriented 
companionship with attachment in different private domains. Intimacy requires two 
different agents, and each agent is entitled to their own intrinsic privacy. Therefore, 
intimacy is that link between the intrinsic privacies of two individuals within a shared 
shelter of privacy, as displayed above. Justice Olga Sánchez in her definition of 
intimacy points out that it is integrated with the most personal extremes of life and the 
family surrounding; and what she sees as a nucleus of privacy can be seen as a shelter 
of privacy. Because every family member has their own right to privacy, 
independently of the shelter of privacy that they share. Inness argues that, “if close 
relationships require that the agent necessarily possess a zone of autonomy to realize 
them, then privacy, by providing and protecting this zone of autonomy, does enable 
these relationships to be realized.”44 What she sees as a zone of autonomy can be 
related to an intrinsic privacy that enables these relationships: Intimacy. She adds, 
“privacy is valuable because certain relationships cannot be established between 
individuals without privacy.”45  
 
Intimacy is closeness, that closeness that can only arise in and from privacy, 
but the establishment of that intimacy does not destroy the personal, individual, 
intrinsic privacy. Inness defends that “privacy is the state of the agent having control 
over a realm of intimacy, which contains her decisions about intimate access to 
herself (including intimate informational access) and her decisions about her own 
intimate actions.”46 It is this control what allows the agent to engage in intimacy. And, 
“to be respected as a person with the capacity for love, care, and liking, an agent 
needs a zone with two characteristics: a zone in which she possesses autonomy of 
action and a zone that gives rise to duties of noninterference from external parties.”47 
This non-interference from external parties is a shelter of privacy. She has admitted 
that privacy is not necessarily individualistic, because as soon as one individual 
encounters another, no matter the nature of the encounter, privacy is necessarily lost.48 
Inness consistently talks about an agent’s capacity for love, care and liking. However, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Ibidem, p. 97. 
45 Ibidem, p. 22. 
46 Ibidem, p. 56.!
47 Ibidem, p. 110. 
48 Ibidem, pp. 43-44. 
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she does not give the second agent enough relevance. Intimacy has been defined as a!
close reciprocal relationship; therefore, in order to understand the legalization of 
intimacy and its connection with privacy, this research cannot rely exclusively on 
Inness’ terminology for the nuances of privacy. 
 
It must be acknowledged that to love, to care and to like are transitive verbs. 
Consequently, agent A loves, cares about or likes agent B. Intimacy is that connection 
between the two agents.  Considering that intimacy is interpersonal; it takes place 
within the atmosphere of privacy and it bridges two personal perceptions of privacy. 
Intimacy requires, inherently, an invasion of personal privacy from the inside while 
protecting the collective privacy from external violations and creating a shelter of 
privacy. So, although intimacy presupposes agent A invading the privacy of agent B 
and vice versa, both of them are still protected from agent C, that could be a third 
party or the State, in their shelter of intimacy. Jean Cohen in her analysis of 
constitutional privacy in the domain of intimacy does acknowledge the second agent, 
in her analysis she talks about “entity privacy”, attached to the family as a unit;49 In 
the establishment of intimacy, both individuals consent to the recurrent invasion of 
their personal privacy by their intimate partner. This is the premise under which 
intimacy operates. The mutual understanding and consent to this breach of privacy is 
sine qua non.  
 
 Privacy and its three layers are construed in this research as positive concepts. 
Nonetheless, there is also a critique of privacy in the literature. Judith Thomson 
reduces privacy as a derivative element of property, she diminishes the right to 
privacy to its relationship with property: “It begins to suggest itself, then, as a 
simplifying hypothesis, that the right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights, and that it 
is not a distinct cluster of rights but itself intersects with the cluster of rights which 
the right over the person consists in and also with the cluster of rights which owning 
property consists in.”50 Understanding privacy in this reductionist perspective makes 
it difficult to find a specific area for intimacy. Privacy shall be understood as a 
separate right that enables intimacy. Other critics, such as Richard Posner view !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Cohen, Jean. Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm. USA: Princeton University Press, 2002. p. 
26.!
50 Thomson, Judith. “The Right to Privacy.” Philosophy & Public Affairs. 4 (1975), p. 306. 
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privacy in economic terms. Posner defines privacy as a richly ambiguous and highly 
charged word with three distinct meanings: Secrecy, seclusion and autonomy.51 In the 
Economics of Justice his analysis focuses on the quantitative side of privacy and its 
relevance for tort law; he argued: “My economic analysis implies that privacy of 
business information should receive greater legal protection, in general, than privacy 
of personal information.” 52  In the legalization of intimacy, privacy cannot be 
interpreted only in economic terms, because intimacy, as explained before, 
encompasses five spheres; and the economic sphere is just one of them, but the 
remaining four spheres are just as important. 
 
Feminists also may see privacy as something negative and not as a positive 
right. As Judith DeCew has argued: “There is no single version of the feminist 
critique of privacy, yet it can be said in general that many feminists worry about the 
darker side of privacy, and the use of privacy as a shield to cover up domination, 
degradation and abuse of women and others.” 53  This critique from a feminist 
interpretation relates to the secrecy associated with privacy. However, if you refer 
back to the layers of privacy above, it can be seen that this sort of negative privacy 
would only find its place in a corrupted shelter of privacy. Only the actors, with their 
decision-making capacity arising from their intrinsic privacy can create a shelter, 
positive or negative, and they are responsible for that. Nonetheless, privacy as a 
human right that includes all layers, is not negative per se. 
 
IV.2.3. Conclusion  
 
In sum, the Constitution provides a framework for the legalization of intimacy in 
Mexico. Although the individual guarantees do not mention an explicit right to 
privacy, the jurisprudence has admitted the right to privacy exists in Art. 6, 7 and 16. 
Subsequently, the right to intimacy has been developed as a cognate right. If 
individuals engage in intimacy, why must the State intervene? With the 
acknowledgement that intimacy is a dyadic relationship, and that intimacy requires 
the invasion of personal privacy, the State must also establish the limits of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Posner, Richard A. The economics of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  1981. p. 231. 
52 Ibidem, p. 248. 
53 DeCew, Judith, "Privacy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.) Section 2.4.!
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invasion of that privacy. The social contract requires that the state be the intermediary 
between individuals. Article 17 states that all individuals have the right to the 
administration of justice and that the laws will foresee alternative mechanisms for the 
resolution of controversies. Therefore, the state should provide a platform for the 
legalization of intimacy. Considering that intimacy will require an invasion of another 
individual’s privacy, the platform for the legalization of intimacy should include 
features for the regulation of consent to that invasion in all five spheres of intimacy. 
This legal platform should allow individuals to exercise their liberty, self-
determination and autonomy, because these rights are protected in the constitution as 
individual guarantees, just as privacy and intimacy. In Chapter VI, this research will 
discuss a proposal for the legalization of intimacy that will be coherent with the 
constitutional rights to privacy and intimacy. 
 
IV.3. Human Rights and Intimacy 
 
In the previous section, intimacy has been identified as a constitutional right in 
Mexico. The protection of intimacy in the constitution shows that it may be 
considered a fundamental right of individuals. Also, and probably most importantly, it 
may be construed as a human right. The allocation of intimacy as a human right is 
crucial. It determines its relevance along with other constitutional rights, and this very 
acknowledgment of intimacy as a human right finds a broader protection within the 
international treaties ratified by Mexico, because international treaties are integrated 
into constitutional law. Particularly after the constitutional amendments of June 2011, 
the relevance and effectiveness of international treaties has increased. Now, in order 
to understand intimacy from a human rights perspective, it is necessary to review 
these recent amendments to the constitution, the international law applicable to 
intimacy, and a comparative analysis of intimacy, considering the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court in the United States. 
  
IV.3.1. Recent amendments to the constitution and their direct impact on human 
rights and intimacy 
 
The constitutional amendments of 2011 represent the most important development in 
human rights protection in Mexico in over three decades. Signed by President Felipe 
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Calderón on June 9, 2011, these reforms entered into force on June 11, 2011.54 The 
essence of these amendments has been so remarkable, that it marked the beginning of 
a new epoch in the SCJN.55 Among other things, this amendment incorporated a more 
gender-neutral language, changing words like “men” (masculine) to “persons” 
(genderless). The following observations are the most outstanding modifications 
introduced by these reforms: 
 
Literal wording. The title of Chapter I was renamed. It used to be called “Of the 
Individual Guarantees”, and it is now called “Of the Human Rights and their 
Guarantees.” Before the change of this wording, it was unclear whether individual 
guarantees were the same as human rights. Scholars like Victor Martínez have 
discussed this issue in depth, portraying individual guarantees as something different 
to human rights, and backing up their point of view with plenty of literature 
supporting this argument.56 However, it is now clear that Human Rights have a 
constitutional status in Mexico, and the wording is no longer controversial. Moreover, 
gender-neutral language was introduced in Article 1, the first paragraph of this article 
acknowledges human rights recognized by the constitution and also by international 
treaties ratified by Mexico. It includes a non-discrimination provision based on sexual 
preferences and it adds that all authorities at all levels of government must protect the 
application of human rights. In this article, this gender-neutral language changed the 
word in Spanish “individuo” (male individual) to “persona” (person), securing a 
broad interpretation of the application of human rights, to all individuals regardless of 
their gender. Nonetheless, the meaning of the word persona is so broad in Spanish, 
that a recent decision by the SCJN had to limit the interpretation. In Mexican tax laws, 
an individual is called “persona física” (physical person) and a company, or a legal 
entity, is called “persona moral” (moral person). Since both individuals and 
companies are considered personas in the literal wording, a private company filed a 
constitutional injunction based on human rights grounds, claiming that the amount of 
taxes they were paying were so high that it violated their dignity as human beings, 
because with this taxation scheme, they were being used as a means to collect taxes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Official Journal of the Federation. Mexico, June 10, 2011. First Section, pp. 2-5.!
55 The SCJN sorts out its jurisprudence by epochs, every major constitutional reform leads to the 
initiation of a new epoch. These reforms of June 9, 2011 have started the 10th epoch. The 
establishment of the Constitution of 1917 marked the beginning of the 5th epoch, and there have been 
only four other important reforms before this one.!
56 See: Martínez Bullé-Goyri, pp. 1-18. 
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and not as human beings. The SCJN decided that the word persona in human rights 
provisions in the constitution was applicable to human beings only, and not to 
companies.57 
 
Interpretation and procedural changes. Human rights must be interpreted according 
to the constitution and according to international treaties on human rights. In the past, 
the interpretation of the constitution had supremacy over any other legal provisions, 
including international treaties. This represented a problem before, individuals were 
not able to claim any rights conferred by international treaties directly. Any claim 
regarding human rights had to be justified according to legal provisions in national 
law. As a consequence, the material scope of international treaties had to be 
transposed into Mexican law so that individuals could claim a specific right. With this 
amendment, international human rights treaties and their jurisprudence are integrated 
into constitutional law, and this has modified the procedural access. Now, individuals 
can claim a right granted by an international treaty ratified by Mexico, even if that 
treaty has not been transposed into federal or local legislations. This has established a 
mechanism similar to the one European states have undergone when ratifying the 
Council of Europe (ECHR). In the European Union, member states must transpose 
directives, regulations and jurisprudence. In a similar way, Mexican laws, judges and 
courts must integrate international treaties from now on. So, any individual can claim 
and appeal to constitutional rights, international human rights and also their 
corresponding jurisprudence. Furthermore, if there is a conflict of interpretation, 
whichever interpretation is most favorable to the individual will be applicable.  
 
These new approach to the direct interpretation of human rights could be 
identified in a recent divorce matter. A Mexico City tribunal made a decision on the 
interpretation of the obligations to provide nourishment after marriage.58 Their thesis 
is that women have the right to alimony after a divorce even if they did not have 
children during that marriage. The tribunal argued that the requirement of procreation 
for alimony was a discriminatory measure against women, with particular 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Constitutional Jurisprudence.  10th Epoch. Book XXIII, Vol. 3, 
August 2013; p. 1408.!
58 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Third Tribunal on Civil Matters, First Circuit. 10th Epoch. Book 
XVIII, March 2013, p. 1908. 
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disadvantage to men or to same-sex couples, who did not have that requirement in the 
Cohabitations Partnership Law. The decision added:  
 
“The conception of women that serves this interpretation and institutionalizes gender 
inequality is that of woman-mother, woman-child bearer, woman-sexual object, but it does not 
treat women as a person. This is a historic social interpretation made from a masculine logic 
(androcentrism), because even if the decision to have children belongs to the couple, it is not 
the male, but rather, the female who is judged for the lack of procreation.”59 
 
This decision separates the constructive and economic sphere of matrimony when it 
comes to executing the right to alimony. The tribunal based its thesis on Art. 4 
MexCon (men and women are equal before the law) and Art. 16 par. 1 of The United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW): “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations 
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women…”60 This 
thesis issued by the tribunal is important for this research due to its material scope and 
to its procedural approach. The scope includes marriage and gender equality, using 
the term androcentric to describe the logic of the discriminatory measure. And from a 
procedural point of view, it can be seen that a lower tribunal is directly applying an 
international treaty (CEDAW), without the intermediation of the SCJN. As mentioned 
before, international treaties have been integrated into constitutional law. Therefore, a 
Mexico City tribunal can directly integrate these treaties as constitutional law into 
their decision-making.   
 
Basic conditions. In the temporary suspension of human rights due to a state of 
emergency as described by Article 29, this reform introduces restrictions for the 
application of such suspension mechanism. Even during the temporary state of 
emergency, human rights shall be protected, forbidding torture and capital 
punishment. The fifth paragraph of Art. 29 also foresees a review mechanism by the 
SCJN of any executive decrees passed during the state of emergency. The protection 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Ibidem 
60 Ratified by Mexico on March 23, 1981. United Nations. Treaty Series. Vol. 1249. New York: United 
Nations Secretariat, 1990. pp. 13 et sqq.!
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of human rights is also applicable for citizens in basic conditions; Article 18 
introduces the respect for human rights within the prison system. 
 
Foreigners. Article 33 reinforces the human rights of foreign citizens, limiting the 
executive power of the President to expel foreign citizens without justification. After 
this amendment, the deportation process cannot discriminate a specific foreign citizen 
without a cause and a due process. Also, the amendments reinforce the protection of 
foreigners through asylum. 
 
Delegation. The duty to protect human rights is also delegated to entities beyond the 
Supreme Court. These reforms grant the National Commission for Human Rights 
(NCHR) the proactive capacity to investigate human rights violations. The NCHR is 
currently entitled to submit Motions of Unconstitutionality. Any federal or sate law, 
as well as treaties ratified by Mexico can be challenged by the NCHR if it considers 
that they would constitute a violation of human rights. Also, public servants in general, 
according to Article 102, are now obliged to respond to the recommendations and 
claims regarding human rights issues. The public officer with the highest rank, the 
President, is now responsible for the protection of human rights as well. Article 89 
includes the protection and promotion of human rights as another duty of the 
President.  
 
IV.3.2. International Law 
 
Mexico has signed and ratified many international treaties in human rights matters. As 
a member of the Organization for American States (OAS) since its very beginning, 
Mexico ratified its Charter on November 23, 1948. Subsequently, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), also know as the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, 
was ratified on March 2, 1981.61 In this convention, Article 11 describes the right to 
privacy:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 United Nations. Treaty Series. Vol. 1144. New York: United Nations Secretariat, 1987. pp. 123 et 
sqq. 
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(1) Everyone has the right to have his62 honor respected and his dignity recognized;  
(2) No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his 
home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation;  
(3) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.  
 
Furthermore, Article 17 defines the rights of the family:  
 
(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the state;  
(2) The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, 
if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the 
principle of nondiscrimination established in this Convention;  
(3) No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses;  
(4) The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate 
balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage, and in the event of its 
dissolution. In case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children 
solely on the basis of their own best interests;  
(5) The law shall recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock. 
 
These provisions are in accordance with the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) from the General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 
December 10, 1948. They relate to Article 12 for privacy: 
 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks;”  
 
and Article 16 for family and marriage:  
 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the 
right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.  
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.  
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 The use of masculine possessive pronouns appears in the text of the conventions, it was not modified 
in this research. 
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Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, 
which was ratified by Mexico on March 23, 198163  reinstates the protection of 
privacy in Article 17,  
 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation; 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Directly linked to this Convention, there is the case of Joslin et al v. New Zealand,64 
decided on July 17, 2002, where the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) rejected the arguments, stating that the New Zealand law regarding 
marriage did not violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Fortunately, this is now irrelevant, because same-sex marriage became legal in that 
country on April 19, 2013. However, it does show precedent regarding the approach 
of the UNHRC towards this issue. 
 
In a similar way, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, ratified by 
Mexico on September 21, 1990,65 protects the privacy of children in Article 16,  
 
(1) No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation.  
(2) The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
John Tobin and Ruth McNair have analyzed the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child extensively and they question whether it imposes an obligation on states to 
allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt.66 At least, there is no clear prohibition and the 
convention does not limit the term “parent” to a male-female couple constellation. In 
their findings, they share that, “There is no credible evidence that such relationships !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 United Nations. Treaty Series. Vol. 999. New York: United Nations Secretariat, 1983. pp. 171 et sqq.!
64 Dorsen, Norman, et al. Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials. Second Edition. USA: 
West, 2010.  p. 640. 
65 United Nations. Treaty Series. Vol. 1577. New York: United Nations Secretariat, 1999. pp. 44 et sqq. 
66 Tobin, John and Ruth McNair. Public International Law and the Regulation of Public Spaces: Does 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child impose an obligation on states to allow gay and lesbian 
couples to adopt? International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 23 (2009), Oxford University 
Press, pp. 110-131. 
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[same-sex] cause harm to the development of children by virtue of the sexual 
orientation of their parents. On the contrary, there is an overwhelming and growing 
body of evidence to suggest that people living in same-sex relationships are just as 
capable of fulfilling their duties and responsibilities towards the children in their care 
as parents living in heterosexual relationships.”67 
 
Regarding the protection of women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women ratified by Mexico on March 23, 1981,68 provides 
specific details regarding the rights of women in marriage and family life; Article 16 
states: 
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all 
matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full 
consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters 
relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to 
have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption 
of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the 
interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a 
profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration. 
 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, 
including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration 
of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Ibidem, p. 127. 
68 United Nations. Treaty Series. Vol. 1249. New York: United Nations Secretariat, 1990. pp. 13 et sqq.!
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 Comparing these multilateral treaties, what all of them have in common is that 
they grant the right to some sort of privacy and they protect the rights of the family. 
However, they do not mention the concept of intimacy and they do not define the 
concept of family. Reviewing the layers of privacy discussed in IV.2.2., the term 
privacy is being used in these conventions as a shelter of privacy in  the umbrella of 
private life that secures its protection from external interference. Although the term 
family is not clearly defined by any of these international conventions, the UDHR 
does acknowledge in Art. 16 par. 3. that the family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and that it is entitled to the protection by society and the State. It 
is noteworthy that the recognized fundamental group unit is the family, not marriage. 
As Chapter VI.1. will argue later on in this research, the most important institution 
when it comes to the legalization of intimacy is not marriage, but rather, the family. 
And the UDHR already acknowledges the family as the most important unit. As 
mentioned before, with the recent amendments to the constitution, international 
treaties and their jurisprudence become constitutional law. Hence, how do these 
conventions affect the protection of intimacy in Mexico and the decisions of the 
SCJN?  
 
In terms of jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
issued seven sentences in trials that involved Mexico. However, none of these cases 
has dealt with the issue of privacy, intimacy, marriage or the family yet. Eventually, 
any changes in the jurisprudence, even in cases that do not involve Mexico, will be 
used to interpret human rights according to Mexican Constitutional Law. Although 
the concept of intimacy is not mentioned in these treaties, it has been explained how 
the SCJN identifies intimacy within privacy. Justice Jose Ramón Cossío Diaz has 
clearly underlined the applicability of international human rights treaties in cases 
regarding privacy and intimacy:  
 
“What does not constitute public life; the reserved area in relation to the action and knowledge 
of others; what one shares only with those one chooses; the activities of persons in the 
particular sphere related with home and family…The right to private life (or intimacy) is 
recognized and protected in the declarations and treaties on human rights included in the 
Mexican legal order, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 12), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 17), the American Convention on 
Human Rights (article 11) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 16). 
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Interpreting these provisions, the international organizations have pointed out that the notion 
of private life corresponds to the sphere of life where people can freely express their identity, 
be it in their relationships with others or individually, and they have underscored its link to a 
wider scope of rights, such as the inviolability of correspondence and communications in 
general, the inviolability of home, the guarantees regarding personal and bodily registrations, 
those relate to gathering and registering personal information in databases and other devices; 
the right to an adequate homestead, to health and equality, reproductive rights and the 
protection against forced evacuations.”69  
 
In this decision, Justice Cossío Díaz had already taken into account international 
treaties and their jurisprudence, even though this constitutional injunction was 
resolved before the constitutional amendments mentioned above. Now, the 
effectiveness of these amendments will be seen at all levels of the justice system, not 
only at the SCJN, as shown by a recent decision in June 2013.70 In this decision, the 
Mexico City tribunal acknowledged that even though the Mexican constitution does 
not make a specific reference to the right to a person’s honor, intimacy and personal 
image, these shall be considered inherent to the human being because they are 
inseparable from the holder. And thus, fall within the protection of human rights in 
the constitution. The tribunal argued that according to the new wording of Article 1, 
these rights were protected by international treaties ratified by Mexico; namely, the 
ACHR and the ICCPR. Therefore, there were indirectly integrated into Mexican 
constitutional law although they were now explicitly there.  
 
 Regarding the legalization of intimacy in Mexico, it is important to observe 
that the international treaties discussed above are now an integral part of Mexican 
constitutional law. Therefore, the rights they grant may have an impact on the 
legalization of intimacy in Mexico. These conventions do not grant the right to same-
sex marriage directly, but they do not prohibit it either. In the analysis of CEDAW’s 
Art. 16, some of the spheres of intimacy can be found: emotional (consent, legal 
guardianship, official registration of marriage), economic (occupation, ownership, 
acquisition, enjoyment, disposition and management of property), constructive 
(adoption, family name, procreation). Rereading Art. 16, par. 1. b), the convention !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Constitutional Injunction in review 2044/2008. June 17, 2009. Lead Justice: José Ramón Cossío 
Díaz. Case registration number: 165823. 
70 Judicial Gazette of the Federation. Fifth Tribunal on Civil Matters, First Circuit. 10th Epoch. Book 
XXI, Vol. 2. June 2013, p. 1258. 
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provides a right to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage with free and full 
consent; hence, the right to choose a same-sex spouse should be interpreted as a right 
to freely choose a spouse within the protection of CEDAW.  The UDHR protects the 
right to marry and to found a family in Article 16. Nowhere does the declaration state 
that this right shall be limited to opposite-sex spouses. Considering these provisions 
for marriage and their direct applicability in Mexican constitutional law; there is a 
strong case for the constitutional legalization of same-sex intimacy in Mexico. 
 
IV.3.3. Comparative Law 
 
The debate around privacy and intimacy is not exclusive of Mexico. Other legal 
systems have established relevant jurisprudence with cases that have also reached the 
highest courts. Comparing this matter with the United States is of particular interest, 
because of its proximity and unique influence on Mexico.  
 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis ignited the legal discourse on privacy in 
the United States back in 1890 with the publication of the famous article in the 
Harvard Law Review, The Right to Privacy.71  They triggered the foundation of tort 
privacy law.72 And their analysis includes the connection of the right to privacy not to 
a specific property, but rather to the individual. As Robert Post has pointed out, the 
central substance in their article is to disentangle privacy from property.73 Warren and 
Brandeis defended Judge Cooley’s argument for the right to be let alone. Years after 
the publication of their article, when Brandeis became a Supreme Court Justice, he 
expressed his ideas on privacy on a permanent basis. A landmark case was his dissent 
on Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where he argued in favor of the 
protection of privacy invested in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. The actual 
protection of privacy and intimacy by the U.S. Supreme Court would arrive in the 
jurisprudence years later, with the cases that will be reviewed in the following 
paragraphs: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Warren, Samuel D. and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy”. Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, 
No. 5, Boston. December 15, 1890. pp. 193-220. 
72 Inness, p. 116.!
73 Post, Robert C. “Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation”. Yale 
Law School. Case Western Reserve Law Review. 41 (1991).  p. 648. 
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
 
The Executive Director and Medical Director of the Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut were convicted for providing advice to married couples on how to 
prevent conception and for the prescription of contraceptive materials for wives. 
While the prevention of contraception was a crime, the appellants argued that the 
statute in the State of Connecticut violated the Fourteenth Amendment, in its 
substantial due process clause. Justice Goldberg concluded that the concept of liberty 
was not so limited and that it embraced the right of marital privacy even though the 
right was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.74 Justice White considered that 
the law in the State of Connecticut deprived married couples of their liberty without 
the due process of law.75 This decision overturned the ruling of Olmstead v. United 
States, establishing for the first time in history, a constitutional right to privacy, and 
adding to the concept of marital privacy. This right, as supported by Justices, was 
linked to the liberties of individuals. Thus, any intervention by the State to reduce 
liberty was an invasion of privacy, in this case, marital privacy.  
 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
 
Anti-miscegenation statutes in the State of Virginia prohibited interracial couples. An 
African-American76 woman and a white man who got married in the District of 
Columbia, were charged with a felony for marrying out of state and returning, leaving 
the state to evade law. This form of discrimination was analyzed from the perspective 
of the equal protection and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief 
Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court explaining that, “Marriage is one of 
the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To 
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all 
the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 381 U.S. 486 (1965) 
75 381 U.S. 502 (1965) 
76 The Supreme Court records, in fact, use the words “Negro woman”. 388 U.S. 2 (1967). 
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requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial 
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person 
of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.”77 
This case confirms the idea that marriage is an extension of the application of liberty, 
including the decision whether to get married or not, and choosing the person you 
want to marry, without classification of individuals based upon their race. 
 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
 
In the State of Texas, it was a crime to procure an abortion according to the Criminal 
Code. Jane Roe, unmarried and pregnant, wanted to terminate her pregnancy through 
a legal clinical procedure with qualified physicians, even though her life was not 
threatened by the pregnancy as allowed by the statutes. The State of Texas was then 
represented by Henry Wade. The primary arguments were that the statutes invaded 
the rights of the pregnant woman, particularly the right to liberty of the due process 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment and claiming the protection of privacy 
vindicated in Griswold v. Connecticut only eight years before. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the right of privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Although the Court established 
that right was not absolute, because the pregnant woman could not be isolated in her 
privacy, it associated this determination to a right of privacy. This right was 
acknowledged, but also the potentiality of human life was protected by the State of 
Texas, and a woman’s right to privacy and subsequently to terminate that pregnancy, 
was determined accordingly, establishing the conditions when an abortion was legal.78 
The Court defended a patient’s right to privacy in their communication with a doctor. 
Furthermore, it acknowledged a single person deserves privacy, not only in cases of 
family units, married couples as in Grisworld, but also as an unmarried person. 
 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 388 U.S. 12 (1967). See also: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541 (1942) and 
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). 
78 410 U.S. 114 (1973) 
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This decision overruled the decision in of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
directly, the Court decided that intimate sexual activity (including sodomy) is part of 
the liberty of individuals. Therefore, it is protected under the substantive due process 
clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although in Bowers the Court had stated 
that there was no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy, seventeen 
years later, the Court interpreted this issue from a liberty and privacy perspective. 
Adding that, “The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons 
the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their 
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”79 Justice Kennedy lead 
the opinion of the Court with a clear explanation of the right to engage in sexual 
activity in private, declaring that, “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted 
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the 
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. 
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The 
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more 
transcendent dimensions.”80 Even with the clear dissent of Justice Scalia, arguing that 
there was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy,81 this ruling constituted a de 
facto invalidation of sodomy laws in thirteen states that criminalized homosexual 
behavior. Again, the opinion of the Court has an emphasis on the right to liberty and 
the right to privacy protected by the Constitution in substantive due process. As 
argued by Dorsen et al, “Sexuality can be understood both as a decisional aspect of 
the right to privacy and as an emanation of the right to autonomy.”82 Furthermore, as 
this research will discuss further in V.5.2., the privacy and liberty that allow 
individuals to exercise their sexuality freely is linked to the legalization of desire. 
 
In Europe, there are also very important cases from the European Court of 
Human Rights that deal with the issue of privacy. For instance, Dudgeon v United 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 539 U. S. 558 (2003) 
80 539 U. S. 562 (2003) 
81 539 U. S. 594 (2003) 
82 Dorsen, Norman, et al. Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials. Second Edition. USA: 
West, 2010.  p. 628. 
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Kingdom83 (Criminalization of private consensual sexual activity); Norris v Ireland84 
(Criminalization of private consensual sexual activity); Modinos v 
Cyprus85 (Criminalization of private consensual sexual activity); Smith and Grady v 
United Kingdom86 (Discrimination in employment, armed services); Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v United Kingdom 87  (Discrimination in employment, armed services); 
Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal88 (Discrimination in custody of a child);  A.D.T. 
v United Kingdom89 (Criminalization of private consensual group sexual activity). All 
these cases fall within the scope of protection of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which, in a very similar way to other international 
conventions, protects the right to respect for private and family life, including home 
and correspondence. In all of these cases, a violation of Article 8 has been 
acknowledged. Also, their common denominator is that they recognize the right of 
individuals to private life, regardless of their sexuality or sexual practices. As 
reminded by Paul Johnson, “the Court has held that ‘private life’ is ‘a concept which 
covers the physical and moral integrity of the person, including his or her sexual 
life.”90 
 
IV.3.4. Conclusion 
 
Human Rights are the most fundamental rights in any legal system. This section has 
presented the relationship between human rights and intimacy. Mexico has given 
human rights the highest rank in the Constitution with these recent amendments, even 
subordinating the Constitution itself to International Treaties regarding human rights. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 7525/76, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, October 22, 1981. 
84 Norris v. Ireland, 10581/83, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, October 26, 
1988. 
85 Modinos v. Cyprus, 7/1992/352/426, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, March 
23, 1993. 
86 Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, September 27, 1999. 
87  Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, 31417/96; 32377/96, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, July 25, 2000. 
88 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 33290/96, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, December 21, 1999. 
89 A.D.T. v United Kingdom, 35765/97. Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, July 31, 
2000. 
90  Johnson, Paul. ‘An essentially private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review (Oxford 
University Press), 10:1 (2010), p. 75. 
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The comparative analysis with the United States has shown that privacy is protected 
as a fundamental right as well. International Human Rights Treaties, Mexico and the 
United States, all of them defend a right to privacy, a right to form a family and a 
right to marry. Intimacy is protected under the umbrella of privacy; the constitutional 
protection of privacy in the U.S. embraces intimacy, just as the Mexican constitution 
includes intimacy within privacy. Dorsen et al point out that “Self-determination, 
privacy and dignity, as well as the right to respect for who one is and aspires to be, 
may provide the constitutional basis on which to consider intimate relationships and 
sexuality, including sexual activities as well as sexual orientation.”91 The respect for 
marriage equality and same-sex intimacy requires an understanding of an individual’s 
right to privacy and the concept of intimacy as inherent to privacy. Currently, the 
jurisprudence both in Mexican and in U.S. constitutional law are moving in that 
direction. 
 
The contemporary evolution of human rights is also opening its scope for gay 
rights. On December 6, 2011; former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton gave 
a speech at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Her approach to the 
recognition of the International Human Rights Day is clearly exemplified in the 
following sentence: “Some have suggested that gay rights and human rights are 
separate and distinct; but, in fact, they are one and the same…Gay rights are human 
rights, and human rights are gay rights.”92 She added: “I am talking about gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender people, human beings born free and given bestowed 
equality and dignity, who have a right to claim that, which is now one of the 
remaining human rights challenges of our time.” Her speech reminded the 
international community of the need to understand gay rights as human rights. While 
some people oppose marriage or other forms of intimacy between same-sex partners, 
the question is not whether to accept gay marriage, but rather, to acknowledge human 
rights violations. As explained in Chapter II, gay marriage is nothing but traditional 
marriage; the difference is who has access to this structure of intimacy. If a legal 
system does not allow same-sex individuals to get married, the problem is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Dorsen, Norman, et al. Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials. Second Edition. USA: 
West, 2010.  p. 628. 
92 U.S. Department of State. Remarks in Recognition of International Human Rights Day by Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. United Nations. Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. 
December 6, 2011. The complete transcript of the speech can be found online in Press Release 
Number: 2011/T57-13. 
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marriage per se; the ulterior problem is a violation of human rights based upon a 
legalized form of discrimination. Therefore, intimacy must be analyzed within the 
holistic perspective of human rights. Admitting a right to intimacy, regardless of the 
gender of the partners, means accepting and respecting human rights. An inclusive 
legalization of intimacy contributes to the development of a more solid human rights 
system. 
 
IV.4. The Constitutional Battle for Intimacy 
 
Chapter III.3. introduced some of the cases regarding the legalization of intimacy in 
Mexico City. These cases showed the constitutional conflict generated by the 
legalization of same-sex matrimony with the amendment of the Civil Code in Mexico 
City. Now that intimacy has been analyzed from a constitutional and a human rights 
perspective, the constitutional battle for intimacy can be revisited. This battle has two 
parties, the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City (with a left-wing majority) and 
Mexico’s Attorney General (representing the Federal Government by the ruling 
conservative party.) Exactly one month after the Legislative Assembly (LAFD) 
passed the bill that allowed same-sex couples to get married; the Attorney General 
filed a Motion of Unconstitutionality.93 With this measure, the Mexican Supreme 
Court had the jurisdiction to solve the dispute and to determine whether that bill was 
valid or not.  This triggered a national debate around the rights of same-sex couples 
for intimacy and adoption. Supreme Court Justice Sergio Valls was nominated to 
manage the case, and unofficially, the Motion of Unconstitutionality 2/2010 was 
called the “Valls Project.” 
 
Attorney General v. Legislative Assembly of the Federal District and Mayor 
 
The Attorney General (AG), Mr. Arturo Chavez, justified the motion of 
unconstitutionality according to five premises: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 According to Art.105.II.C MexCon. 
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a. The Legislative Assembly did not justify the need to pass the bill. The AG 
argued that the LAFD was obliged to justify and motivate its legislative acts as 
described in Art. 16 of the Constitution.    
b. This legislation damages the ideal [heterosexual] family model. The AG 
claimed that Art. 4 protects a heterosexual type of family formed by a husband, 
a wife, and children. Therefore, matrimony between same-sex partners 
violated this constitutional guarantee. 
c. Adoption by same-sex couples damages and discriminates children. The AG 
declared that the rights of children were not protected if adoption was 
available for same-sex spouses. He mentioned that children adopted by same-
sex parents would not find an appropriate environment for their development, 
and would be disadvantaged in comparison to children raised by opposite-sex 
parents. 
d. It diverts the federal order, with the recognition of same-sex matrimony in the 
entire country. The AG was preoccupied, because civil acts recognized in one 
state must be recognized by all other states in the federation, as stipulated in 
Art. 121. IV. 
e. It violates the constitutional normative hierarchy. The AG considered that the 
LAFD had attempted to override the constitutional supremacy with a 
legislation that was beyond its powers. 
 
On February 23, 2010, in response to the motion submitted by the AG, the LAFD 
submitted a report before the SCJN.94 Maria Alejandra Barrales Magdaleno was the 
President of the Governmental Commission in charge of this defense. The fifty-five-
page report was very comprehensive and it was divided into three sections, each of 
them presenting counterarguments for the AG’s allegations. The report described the 
motivations of the LAFD to pass this bill, but also, it informed the SCJN of the 
situation around homosexuality and same-sex matrimony in general, including 
comparative law. 
 
Section I. The AG challenged Art. 391 CCFD in Motion 2/2010. Nonetheless, as 
pointed out by the LAFD, the article was not amended. The LAFD had originally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 LAFD V Legislature. Report 2/2010. Maria Alejandra Barrales Magdaleno. Mexico City: CIDE, 
February 23, 2010. 
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planned to change this article to limit adoption for same-sex couples. The legislators 
had thought that it would have been easier to pass a bill allowing same-sex marriage if 
the bill banned adoption for same-sex spouses. At the end of the debate rounds, the 
legislators decided to go ahead with the whole package, allowing same-sex partners 
not only to get married, but to adopt children as well. Therefore, the AG’s arguments 
against Art. 391 could not be assessed by the SCJN because they lacked a foundation; 
there was no amendment to judge. 
 
Section II. This part of the report is by far the largest; it provides the SCJN with an 
extensive analysis on the issue of homosexuality. The study included the criminal 
repression of homosexuals in the nineteenth and twentieth century in Europe and in 
Mexico, using examples such as the trials of Oscar Wilde and theories of Michel 
Foucault; the pathologization and stigmatization of homosexuality; and the persistent 
stigmatization of homoparental adoptions. The report cited the official opinion of the 
American Association of Psychiatry in 2002:  
 
“Numerous studies over the last three decades consistently demonstrate that children raised by 
gay or lesbian parents exhibit the same level of emotional, cognitive, social, and sexual 
functioning as children raised by heterosexual parents. This research indicates that optimal 
development for children is based not on the sexual orientation of the parents, but on stable 
attachments to committed and nurturing adults. The research also shows that children who 
have two parents, regardless of the parents’ sexual orientations, do better than children with 
only one parent.”95  
 
Furthermore, the LAFD argued that after the years of repression, homophobia is now 
on a second phase trying to disguise homosexuality, with actions like those of the 
Attorney General. The arguments in the report directly accused the AG of 
homophobic behavior, with his attempt to position homosexual individuals as second-
class citizens using authoritarian techniques whose purpose is to keep the balance in 
favor of heterosexuality.  
 
 Moreover, the LAFD affirmed the constitutional rights to equality and to 
freedom of speech. Quoting the South African Constitutional Court, the LAFD stated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Ibidem, p. 10. 
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that the evolution of science and constitutional transformations now lead to the 
recognition of homosexuals as subjects of rights, not as objects of injuries, 
persecution and stigmatization. Consequently, matrimony between same-sex partners 
is a part of the right to equality and non-discrimination. It adds, excluding same-sex 
partners from the institution of matrimony deprives them of their constitutional 
protection for the organization and development of the family as detailed in Art. 4. 
This hypothesis was supported with jurisprudence in comparative law.96 The LAFD 
perceives matrimony as an expressive conduct as well. Thus, protected by the 
constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech in Art. 6 as a spiritual liberty. The 
symbolic dimension of matrimony falls within the scope of freedom of speech 
because individuals can express their love and commitment publicly.97 This very 
liberty contributes to the free development of an individual’s personality, also 
defended by the SCJN in the Constitutional Injunction 6/2008.98 The LAFD considers 
that recognizing this freedom of speech for persons who have sexual preferences 
different to those of heterosexuals regarding matrimony must be interpreted as a 
constitutional imperative due to its importance in the democratic debate in a 
pluralistic and diverse society. The report criticized the declarations of Catholic 
Cardinal Norberto Rivera, who openly expressed his dissent and constantly used a 
rather aggressive and offensive language to condemn the legislation passed by the 
LAFD. 
 
Section III. This final section responded directly to every allegation in the strict order 
of the AG’s submission. 
 
a. The LAFD reiterated there was no violation of Art. 16, legislators must not 
justify their acts in this matter, because this legislation grants individuals more 
rights. They would have justified a legislation that would deprive citizens of 
their rights, but considering they were recognizing and legalizing a right to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie et al (Doctors for Life International and Others, 
Amicus Curiae) (CCT 60/04); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others (CCT 10/05),  South Africa, December 1, 2005.; Stan Barker et al. v. State of 
Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), United States. 
97 The report made a reference to!Halpern et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al., Ontario Appeals 
Court, Canada, June 10, 2003.!
98 Constitutional Injunction 6/2008. Regarding the amendment of a birth certificate for a transsexual 
individual. Lead Justice: Sergio Valls. January 6, 2009. 
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marry one’s partner without gender discrimination, the justification is not 
necessary, but rather evident. 
b. Although the AG claimed that the constitution protected a heterosexual 
concept of family, the LAFD sustained that Art. 4 protects all types of family, 
there is no explicit definition of the term and therefore, its broadest protection 
for individuals is applicable, not limiting the interpretation of that concept to 
opposite-sex constellations. 
c. Regarding adoption in connection with matrimony, the LAFD pointed out that 
the AG had not demonstrated how children adopted by a homoparental 
matrimony would prejudice a child’s welfare. This allegation was unfounded 
and did not rely on any empirical research unlike the argument the LAFD used 
with the survey of the American Association of Psychiatry. Also, the LAFD 
was not obliged to justify the effects on children of homoparental matrimonies, 
because the legislation did not change any provision regarding adoption. The 
LAFD detailed Arts. 20 and 21 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights.99 
d. The LAFD demonstrated that according to the jurisprudence of the SCJN, 
civil acts celebrated in one state must be recognized in all states even if they 
contradict an internal regulation of that state. There is no conflict of laws in 
this case, because the civil act is celebrated within the jurisdiction of the 
Federal District and it is only the recognition of that act that must be 
acknowledged by other states, but they are not involved in the process of the 
civil act. 
e.  According to the line of arguments submitted in the report, there is no 
violation of Art. 133 and the constitutional supremacy is recognized and 
respected by the LAFD. The AG, with the premise that the legislation was in 
conflict with Art. 4, argued the supposed violation of that article in its 
definition of a family. However, as explained in (b), there is no contradiction 
because that article does not constrain the definition of the concept of family 
in the constitution. Therefore, the LAFD admits the constitutional supremacy 
at all times. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 E.B. v. France (Application 43546/02), January 22, 2008, and Karner v. Austria (Application 
40016/98), October 24, 2003. 
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The Valls Project concluded that matrimony by same-sex spouses in Mexico City was 
constitutional. The decision by the court ratified that the legislation had been enacted 
by the LAFD within the scope of its faculties. This decision supported the bill and 
recognized the validity of same-sex matrimony in the entire country. In addition to 
solving the Motion of Unconstitutionality 2/2010 submitted by the Attorney General, 
Justice Sergio Valls asked the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 
to prepare an amicus curia report regarding the matters challenged by the AG. That 
ad hoc report concluded that legalizing same-sex marriage could have a positive 
effect in the Mexican society, contributing to fight intolerance, segregation, violence, 
discrimination and homophobia. Also, the UNAM found out that biological or 
adopted children with homoparental households had little or none psychological or 
social impact in comparison to children raised by heterosexual parents. Justice Valls 
decided to expand the project and, although Art. 391 CCFD had not been amended; 
he submitted a proposal before all Justices to pronounce the opinion of the court 
regarding adoption by same-sex spouses. Subsequently, a couple of days after the 
defense of the legalization of same-sex marriage, the SCJN declared that adoption by 
same-sex matrimonies was also constitutional. 
 
IV.5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has presented the fundamental rights around intimacy, including the 
constitutional analysis, the human rights issues and the international and comparative 
perspective on this matter. Privacy is protected by the individual guarantees in the 
Mexican Constitution; as explained before, the jurisprudence has determined that this 
constitutional protection of privacy includes the protection of intimacy as well. 
Specifically, this can be found in Articles 6, 7, 10 and 16. The difference between 
privacy and intimacy was established with the analysis of the SCJN jurisprudence. 
These 96 cases handling the issue of intimacy have reaffirmed the contemporary 
relevance of intimacy and the different connotations of these concepts. The definition 
introduced by Justice Olga Sanchez serves as a reference in the decision-making 
process for the court, although it has not been consolidated as a doctrine. The rank of 
privacy and intimacy with regard to other constitutional rights has been determined in 
the domains of the due process cause, visitation rights, alimony and warrants. In order 
to understand the difference between privacy and intimacy, it was important to 
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include this research’s approach with the three layers of privacy. The interpretation of 
intimacy in its dyadic form can be best identified while taking into account that there 
is an intrinsic privacy of individuals, that there is a shelter and an atmosphere of 
privacy where intimacy exists as a bridge that links the intrinsic privacies of two 
persons. Understanding this difference and the connection between these two 
concepts is fundamental in the analysis of intimacy. Moreover, the human rights 
survey of intimacy lead this research to the particular study of recent constitutional 
amendments, to international treaties ratified by Mexico and to case-law in the United 
States that is relevant for the deeper comprehension of intimacy. The most important 
change with the constitutional amendments of June 2011 is that it gives international 
treaties and jurisprudence the same rank as direct constitutional law. This 
development now allows individuals to submit constitutional injunctions based on a 
broader spectrum of rights at a national and international level. Also, the changes 
include a more gender-neutral language and wording that reflects the intention of the 
legislators to evolve towards a more impartial legal system in terms of gender equality. 
All the international treaties that were reviewed in this chapter talk about a right to 
privacy and a right to form a family. However, they lack a specific right to intimacy. 
Even though it is clear in the jurisprudence that intimacy lies within privacy, the right 
to intimacy per se as a separate right still remains to be developed.  
 
The U.S. case-law detailed here has provided a comparative example of the 
debate around intimacy, from the marital protection of intimacy in Grisworld, to the 
right to abortion in Roe and the liberty of sexual practices in Lawrence. These cases 
confirm and support an individual’s right to privacy and intimacy. However, the ideas 
discussed in this chapter were best characterized by the constitutional battle for 
intimacy in the case of the Attorney General of Mexico v. the Legislative Assembly of 
Mexico City. The SCJN has now endorsed same-sex marriage in Mexico City and, 
voluntarily, adoption by same-sex couples. The first phase of this process, ratifying 
the current Mexico City law, has enabled the possibility of a second phase in the 
evolution of the legalization of intimacy in Mexico: the acknowledgement that same-
sex matrimony is constitutional can lead the SCJN to the conclusion that banning 
same-sex matrimony in the rest of the country is, thus, unconstitutional. Just the mere 
fact the same-sex matrimony has ben legalized in Mexico City confirms that the 
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Mexican legal system has the capacity to legislate in intimacy-related issues in 
general, and specifically, to modify the current status of intimacy.  
 
The contemporary legal reality of intimacy can and will eventually have to be 
changed, because the current trend within Mexico and at an international level is now 
demanding it. These changes are necessary not only for political purposes, but rather 
as an improvement in human rights conditions. Again, quoting the words of former 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gay rights are human rights and human rights 
are gay rights. The urgent recognition and legalization of same-sex intimacy is a 
human rights issue that cannot be ignored anymore by any democracy in the twenty-
first century.  
 
In addition to the legal approach to this matter, there are different perspectives 
in the debate about intimacy and marriage. So far, this research has made an emphasis 
on the law of the Civil Code in Chapter III, and the Constitution, International 
Treaties and Jurisprudence in Chapter IV. With this solid legal basis, it is also 
important to evaluate the debate from other, rather social points of view, such as: 
political parties, political actors, interest groups, activists, gender and religion. They 
cannot be disregarded in this research, because they are the catalysts of the eventual 
legal changes that can be produced. These stances require an extensive and inclusive 
review; therefore, they will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming pages.  
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V.1. Introduction 
 
A deeper reflection on legislative processes will lead us to the conclusion that the 
legal is political and the political is legal. At some point, it becomes rather difficult to 
draw a line between a legal and a political or sociological phenomenon taking place, 
because both of them are the same. 
 
In this context, it is crucial to analyze different perspectives on the issue of 
intimacy. In Chapter II, the question of intimacy was introduced. It included the 
conceptual framework, the analysis of discourse, the spheres of intimacy and the 
structures of intimacy. The following chapter reviewed the evolution of legal intimacy 
in Mexico, going through the different spheres and structures as they are identified in 
Mexican Law. Chapter IV provided a constitutional examination of intimacy in its 
relationship with human rights, at a national and international level. Now, it is quite 
relevant to discuss the diversity of perspectives and approaches to intimacy that end 
up influencing lawmakers and lawmaking in general. These perspectives are 
developed with different ideas regarding sex, gender, laicism, religion, justice, human 
rights and state intervention. In this chapter, these components will be explored in 
connection with the legalization of intimacy.  
 
First of all, it is important to study the relevance of conservatism and religion 
in Mexico, including the Catholic Church, the Prolife Movement and the 
Conservative party in Mexico that has controlled the federal government for over a 
decade. Their ideas have an impact on the legalization of intimacy in Mexico. Second, 
a review of the issue of gender will go over feminism, masculinities (in plural), gay 
and queer. In this section, it will be important to understand the concept of 
heteronormativity, the idealization of heterosexual paradigms, and how it permeates 
the legalization of intimacy. The notion of heteronormativity will also help us 
understand what will be described as the fallacy and algebra of gay marriage, and the 
paradox of privacy. This formulation of gay marriage would ask gay activists the 
following question: Do you really want gay marriage? The net effect of gay marriage 
is not necessarily equality. The claim for equal rights can be misleading in this sense. 
 V. A RAINBOW OF PERSPECTIVES: RECONSIDERATIONS ON LAW AND GENDER 
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Third, after the discussion on gender, the obstacles of legalized gender will be 
identified easily. This comprises the requirements for birth certificates and marriage 
licenses and provisions for transsexuals. Furthermore, this subsection will relate the 
case of Quintana Roo in the legalization of intimacy; a rather unexpected case of a 
legal void that opened the doors for same-sex couples to join in matrimony in 
southeast Mexico because of the absence of gender obstacles. No one would have 
thought that gay marriage has been there all this time. Fourth, the nuances of undoing, 
unlearning and destroying gender will be contrasted. This demands a thorough 
analysis of the connection between gender, intimacy and queer theory. At the end of 
this chapter, it should be clear how sex as a category and gender are differentiated. In 
order to accomplish that, this chapter embraces key literature in gender studies, such 
as the works of Judith Butler, Eve Sedgwick, Judith Halberstam, Jean Cohen and 
Susan Moller Okin. Their gender theories are fundamental for the abstraction of 
intimacy and its subsequent legalization. This includes a feminist and queer critique 
of marriage and a different approach to the issue of gender and its connection with 
intimacy.  
 
So far in this research, the structures of intimacy that have been analyzed 
underline the presence of sex as a category. The classification of marriage, for 
instance, as opposite-sex or same-sex marriage proves at least one thing: that sex is a 
factor. The factorization of sex causes unnecessary segregation and discrimination. 
How can a fair legal system avoid this? One of the answers would be to grant the 
same rights to every category. Nonetheless, the simplest and most efficient solution is 
to get rid of the very discerning factor that creates and fosters this segregation, the 
dilemma of difference also known as the feminist dilemma. The last pages of this 
chapter discuss the issue of hermaphrodites. Neither traditional marriage nor gay 
marriage is an answer to hermaphrodites or intersexuality, because the factorization of 
sex works against them. They are forced to fit into either choice. These discussions 
will provide an insight into the relationship between gender and intimacy as a means 
to evaluate the different options that can optimize the legalization of intimacy. 
Especially, there will be an emphasis on the problem that the binarism of sex and 
gender creates. Up until now, the duality of male and female persists. The goal for an 
appropriate legalization of intimacy would be to grow beyond this dichotomization, 
because an “either/or” proposition can only limit the alternatives in any circumstance. 
 163!
V.2. Conservatism and Religion 
 
In the battle for equality in intimacy, conservatives have been outspoken opponents of 
marriage equality and of the respect for self-determination in intimacy. Mexico has 
had three main strong influences: the Catholic Church, the Prolife movement and the 
ruling conservative party, the National Action Party (PAN). These entities have a 
powerful impact on the Mexican society and legislative processes. Beyond the legal 
considerations and the vindication of human rights, the conservative movement 
defends old interpretations and constructions of intimacy that they are not willing to 
change. The conservative movement has direct and indirect stakeholders. In the past 
years, they have blocked and slowed down the evolution of the legislation regarding 
intimacy. Conservatives cling to their beliefs and attempt to limit the equal 
opportunities of access to a legalized form of intimacy for some individuals. The 
following paragraphs will summarize the basic position of these groups. 
 
a. The Catholic Church 
 
Catholicism plays an important role in Mexico. According to the 2010 Census, 
82.71% of the population is catholic.1 Therefore, the catholic creed is a powerful 
persuasion mechanism for the large majority of the population. The official position 
of the Catholic Church is transmitted to the Mexican churchgoers. Other religions are 
increasingly gaining more territory, but have little or no influence on national politics 
and lawmaking. The catholic views on gender and intimacy permeate the Mexican 
society, particularly in the older generations. The role of men and women is 
determined by religious confirmation. As Okin has pointed out, old stereotypes are 
used to justify separate spheres for men and women, and she uses Pope John Paul II’s 
Apostolic Letter “On the Dignity of Women” to exemplify it.2 This letter is actually 
quite symbolic;3 it depicts the catholic ideal of the role of women in society. In his 
letter, Karol Wojtyla revisits the duties of women as (a) virgins, (b) mothers and (c) 
wives. What he calls the mystery or trinity of women is this obligation to be all of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). Panorama of Religions in Mexico 2010. 
Mexico : INEGI, 2011. p.10. 
2 Okin, Susan Moller. Justice, Gender and the Family. USA: Basic Books Inc., 1989.  p.15.  
3 Apostolic Letter “Mulieris dignitatem.” Of the supreme Pontiff John Paul II, on the dignity and 
vocation of women on the occasion of the Marian Year. Rome, Saint Peter’s: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, August 15, 1988. 
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above at different stages of life. Although he advocated equality of men and women 
before God, his letter is full of contradictions and consistently uses the predestination 
of masculinity and femininity. The infamous value attributed to virginity is nothing 
but the objectification of women in preparation for a male-centered marriage, 
shockingly denominated the “gift of self”. According to this approach, the gifts 
(objects) are women who become property of the recipients (owners) of the present: 
Husbands. Motherhood is justified with the role of the Woman as the mother of God 
(Theotókos),4 with the emphasis on procreation according to the motto of "Be fruitful 
and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it".5 The duty of women as mother 
confirms their objectification, because they are seen as industrial machinery capable 
of childbearing. Pope John Paul II considered both motherhood and virginity as the 
two dimensions that fulfilled the “female personality”. Last, but certainly not least, 
women are wives whose obligation is to be subordinated to their husbands in the 
marriage trap. The Pope promoted this passive attitude claiming that "to serve means 
to reign". He reminded women that "your desire shall be for your husband, and he 
shall rule over you", supporting the idea that marriage represents the "sincere gift of 
the person", of course, of the bride to the groom. This Catholic creed and discourse 
has perpetuated the role of women in marriage, an institution that has fostered 
inequalities and injustices. As discussed in Chapter II, in the Biblical Analysis of 
Marriage, the five spheres of intimacy could be identified in the traditional Christian 
marriage. It is especially important to observe the allocation of roles and their impact 
on the social imaginary of masculinity and femininity.  This morality is rather evident 
in the letter “On the dignity of women”, which should be called “On the indignity of 
women” instead. The essence of this apostolic letter is that it links the role to women, 
its moral values, to their dignity, a human right. If analyzed from this reverse-
perspective, the letter is very effective. Thus, everybody can agree upon the fact that 
gender roles are linked to an individual’s dignity and that the limitation, 
stigmatization or restraint of such roles may attack or jeopardize a human being’s 
dignity as well.  
 
Joseph Ratzinger was the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
in the Vatican before he became Pope Benedict XVI. On June 3, 2003; he released a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In Greek, as used in the original.!
5 Genesis 1: 28!
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letter on the “Considerations regarding proposals to give legal recognition to unions 
between homosexual persons.”6 This letter is an open directive calling for action by 
Catholic politicians and Bishops to stop the legalization of any sort of recognized 
intimacy between same-sex individuals. Ratzinger reminded them that  
“Homosexuality is a troubling moral and social phenomenon”, the letter opposed not 
only the legalization of different forms of intimacy analogous to marriage, but also 
any path to adoption. He claims that according to Catholic teachings, homosexuals 
“must be accepted with respect, compassion and sensitivity. Every sign of unjust 
discrimination in their regard should be avoided”. This statement contradicts the 
foundation of his letter, because its ultimate objective is to attempt to justify the 
discrimination of same-sex couples with the alleged moral law of Christianity. 
Ratzinger adds, “Not even in a remote analogous sense do homosexual unions fulfill 
the purpose for which marriage and family deserve specific categorical recognition.” 
The arguments used in this letter reinforce the institutional perspective of marriage, 
with the generational function of procreation as a duty of marriage. Regardless of the 
arguments, the Catholic Church opposes marriage between individuals of the same 
sex and any other similar type of union. This open call to catholic politicians 
demonstrates that the Church is aware of the political influence it has, and it uses it. 
However, no alternative is offered to same-sex couples that claim legal recognition. 
This opinion is just a defensive strategy that aims to protect the current legal form of 
intimacy, not offering further options to respond to this social demand. 
 
 Mexico is constitutionally a secular state, however, the influence of religion 
on politics and lawmaking is still a major concern. Even with first-world legislative 
accomplishments, like legalizing same-sex marriage in Mexico City, the country as a 
whole is still fundamentally catholic. The deep religious convictions of Mexicans 
represent an obstacle in the legalization of intimacy, because these convictions are 
proportionally represented in the congress through the political parties. And 
conservative ideas, like the catholic creed, delay or stall a fair and adequate 
legalization of intimacy for all. The legislation of intimacy-related matters in Mexico 
is slow, although the Mexican society is evolving at a faster rhythm, for political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ratzinger, Joseph. “Considerations regarding proposals to give legal recognition to unions between 
homosexual persons.” Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Document number: 20030731. 
Rome: The Vatican Archives, 2003. !
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parties, it is not profitable to upset their constituents with the legalization of these 
issues. Therefore, the political trend is to put these sensitive issues on hold, because 
Mexico is, for better or worse, still a very catholic country; with the second largest 
population of Catholics around the world.    
 
b. Prolife 
 
The constructive sphere of intimacy is also very controversial. As analyzed in the 
letters above, the Catholic Church has very firm interests in the protection of 
procreation. Consequently, the Prolife movement has also influenced the legalization 
of intimacy. The Comité Nacional Provida started in 1978 in Mexico and it has 
delegations throughout the entire country, in 25 states. This civil organization is very 
active in abortion-related issues and also in opposing any equal rights for 
homosexuals. This organization still provides support to “cure” homosexuality. Mr. 
Jorge Serrano Limon, a religious fanatic and Director of this Committee has been 
charged with corruption and sentenced to four years in prison recently.7 This case 
showed how the organization used public funds for their operations and then failed to 
distribute the funds appropriately. It is striking, not only to learn about corruption 
cases like this one, but also to find out how public funds are channeled to an 
organization with religious activism in the detriment of the equality of rights for 
women in particular. This can only be understood in connection with the third 
influence group, the conservative party. !
c. The ruling conservative party in Mexico 
 
The National Action Party (PAN) won the federal elections in year 2000 and presided 
the federal government until December 1, 2012. The power of the Catholic Church, 
the Prolife movement and this party has been exponential with the support of federal 
resources that have been evident in corruption cases like the one of Mr. Serrano 
Limón. The twelve years of a conservative federal government in Mexico coincided 
with a decade of international evolution in terms of equality in intimacy. As detailed 
in Chapter II, since January 11, 2001 in the Netherlands, federal governments around !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Vera, Rodrigo. Proceso. “Condenan a Serrano Limón por peculado.” Mexico City: April 20, 2012. 
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the world have begun to recognize marriage for same-sex couples. In Mexico, this 
recognition has been only possible at a local, state-level. The reason behind it is that 
the PAN is a resistant opponent of the legalization of same-sex types of intimacy. The 
analysis of the battle for intimacy discussed in Chapter IV.4 also showed the use of 
the federal order to fight the local legalization of same-sex matrimony in Mexico City. 
Although it was unsuccessful, the PAN fought hard to negate the social demands for 
equality in intimacy rights. The attitude of the conservative party has been very 
protective of traditional Christian matrimony, and according to the imperative 
guidelines of Joseph Ratzinger’s letter. The PAN has constantly and consistently 
attempted to install and permeate the catholic morality in the federal legislations, with 
predetermined conceptions of gender and duties for men and women.  
 
Summary 
 
Mexico is trying to evolve towards a more developing economy and society. 
Nonetheless, the spirit of the old Mexico is still present. Two continuous presidential 
terms controlled by the conservative party in Mexico have slowed down necessary 
reforms in the legalization of intimacy. As the Mexican psychologist and scholar 
Marina Castañeda suggested, “…the debate about gay marriage in Mexico has been 
complicated. It can be simplified if we consider that adult homosexuals must have 
exactly the same rights and obligations as heterosexuals…Of course, a strict 
separation between State and Church is necessary, and only the State should regulate 
matrimony, or civil unions, and divorce.”8 The generation gap in the country can be 
seen, newer generations are more open to sexual liberty and pro same-sex intimacy 
legislation. Castañeda has also observed the positive progress in tolerance and 
acceptance in Mexico over fifteen years of practice as a psychotherapist. She recalls 
only two or three cases over hundreds of patients, whose families never accepted 
them as homosexuals.9 Furthermore, on December 1, 2012, the previous ruling 
political party (PRI) took over the federal government. This political party leans 
towards the center of the political spectrum and is less influenced by the Catholic 
Church and similar conservative groups. This new constellation at the congress could 
ease a better and more equal legalization of intimacy in the years to come. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Castañeda, Marina. La nueva homosexualidad. Mexico: Paidos, 2006.  p.103. 
9 Ibidem, p. 33. See also: Castañeda, Marina. La experiencia homosexual. Mexico: Paidos, 1999. 
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V.3. Gender: Feminism, Masculinities, Gay and Queer 
 
What individuals think about intimacy, their expectations around it and the way they 
define it depends on their ideas and prejudices regarding gender. Therefore, it is 
crucial to explore the question of gender in its relationship with intimacy. The 
following paragraphs will review key aspects, like feminism, masculinities, gay 
activism and queer within the framework of intimacy. These different perspectives 
enrich and make the debate on intimacy a more dynamic one. It is important to single 
out every group because a collective heterosexual or homosexual point of view does 
not exist. A heterosexual man interprets intimacy according to his perception of 
masculinity, whereas a heterosexual woman may define it in terms of her feminist 
ideas. In a similar manner, a homosexual man will consider his concept of masculinity 
and a homosexual woman may be motivated by her political activism. Consider, for 
instance, the following statement from Sigmund Freud regarding the concepts of 
masculine and feminine: 
 
“It is essential to understand clearly that the concepts of “masculine” and “feminine”, whose 
meaning seems so ambiguous to ordinary people, are amongst the most confused that occur in 
science. It is possible to distinguish at least three uses. “Masculine” and “feminine” are used 
sometimes in the sense of activity and passivity, sometimes in a biological, and sometimes, 
again, in a sociological sense…The third, or sociological, meaning receives its connotation 
from the observation of actually existing masculine and feminine individuals. Such 
observation shows that in human beings pure masculinity of feminity is not to be found either 
in a psychological or a biological sense. Every individual on the contrary displays a mixture of 
the character-traits belonging to his own and to the opposite sex; and he shows a combination 
of activity and passivity whether or not these last character-traits tally with his biological 
ones.”10 
 
Unequivocally, feminism and masculinities, and the interpretation of what masculine 
and feminine means, affect both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Be it in a positive, a 
neutral or a negative way, these ideologies are decisive factors in the construction of 
intimacy and in its legalization. In order to understand how feminism, masculinities 
and gay activism influence the perspectives of intimacy, the following sections will 
explore these issues separately in detail. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Translated by James Strachey. USA: 
Martino Publishing, 2011. p. 97. 
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V.3.1. Feminism and Intimacy 
 
In the feminist perspective of intimacy, there are four central arguments against 
marriage: (a) Predestination, (b) Injustice, (c) Economic disadvantaged, and (d) Abuse. 
Going back to John Stuart Mill, marriage was criticized for its consequences in 
prejudice of women at least since two centuries ago. Mill defined marriage as a 
Hobson’s choice,11 because women had no alternative to intimacy but marriage. 
Marriage has been a legal instrument that has fostered the oppression of women and 
subsidized the empowerment of men for centuries. Thus, marriage being the one and 
only form of intimacy consolidates the first argument of the feminist critique: 
Predestination. The social pressure, cultural values and family dynamics have pushed 
(and many times forced) women into marriage. The belief that women have the 
obligation to get married is still present in many contemporary societies. Another 
argument against marriage is the analysis of the internal injustices it creates. Men and 
women assume different roles within marriage and these roles usually create a 
disadvantage for women, making them more vulnerable and depriving them of many 
rights. Cohen has analyzed that since many years ago, “the power exercised by 
husbands and fathers (over femmes-couverts and children) should be understood as a 
set of legal immunities granted (delegated) to them in their capacity as ‘private office 
holders’ heading the household. Courts traditionally justified their refusal to intervene 
in intrafamily disputes by invoking the family as a private domain…”12 This quote 
points out at least two different issues, the existence of a “head of household” and the 
distribution of justice. Men have traditionally exercised the roles of heads of 
households, taking advantage of a patriarchal structure where they stand at the top of 
the pyramid. This vertical organization results in a distribution of labor where women 
usually end up taking a less-favored position as housewives. The nomination of men 
as heads of household or leaders of the family unit usually goes hand by hand with the 
appointment of men as judges in the family order. Consequently, men who financially 
support their households also get to be the judges who will make important decisions 
and who will eventually distribute justice within the family unit. Indirectly, men buy 
their position as family judges. Of course, their decisions will most likely be partial, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Mill, John Stuart. The subjection of women. London: Savill, Edwards and Co. Printers, 1869. p. 51. 
12 Cohen, Jean L. Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm. USA: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
p. 39.!
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because there will be a conflict of interests in most situations. The dual role of head of 
household-justice represents a lethal weapon for women during the course of their 
matrimony. They are usually trapped in an unjust mechanism, which prevents them 
from being heads of household and distributing justice. This trap brings about the 
third argument: the gender role distribution reduces opportunities for women.  
 
This phenomenon should be interpreted, not in a traditional Marxist account of 
power13 (as class exploitation), but rather in a more discursive manner, as analyzed by 
Foucault in his repressive hypothesis14 (as discussed in Chapter II); where gender and 
sexuality are factored in. In other words, where the class distinction merges with the 
power of sexuality and reproduction, as producers and products of these very 
inequalities. In family units where wives do not work, their full-time job immediately 
becomes housekeeping. Every day women invest in their houses, they will lose an 
opportunity to find a job and to pursue a professional career. Women who have 
temporarily stopped working during their maternity leave and plan to go back to work 
afterwards, will also find it much more difficult to reintegrate to their professional 
lives and to get the same treatment and advantaged their male counterparts have at 
work. Furthermore, their performance at work will probably be reduced, because they 
will have obligations at home that are also demanding and time-consuming. Even 
women who do work must make an additional effort to manage their professional and 
personal lives in parallel, because after a day of hard work during the day, they must 
come home to what has been called the “second shift.”15 The first shift may have a 
salary but the second shift most certainly will not. It will only represent a hindrance in 
the performance of mothers/wives in the workplace. The fourth argument against 
marriage is that it provides a space for abuse. In this case, both verbal/emotional and 
physical abuse should be taken into account. As described in Chapter III, many 
criminal codes have amended provisions in order to regulate family life and to protect 
women from their husbands (and vice versa). In the case of Mexico, the Federal 
Criminal Code literally describes specific penalties for crimes such as spousal rape.16 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For further insight see: Allen, Amy. "Feminist Perspectives on Power", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Section 3.3. 
14 Foucault, Michel. The history of sexuality. New York: Random House, Vintage Books Edition, 
March 1990. pp. 21 et seq. 
15 Brake, Elizabeth, "Marriage and Domestic Partnership", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Section 5.1.!
16 Art. 265 bis FCRC 
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For many women, marriage has become a life-sentence that has taken away their 
liberty as they become property of their husbands, just as in slavery. Considering 
these four feminist arguments against marriage, it is clear that marriage as an 
institution, provides an unjust structure of intimacy for women.  
 
V.3.2. Masculinities and Intimacy 
 
Almost in opposite direction of feminism, masculinities contribute to the limitation of 
intimacy in a very peculiar way. First of all, in order to protect a patriarchal structure 
of society, the dominance of the male hinders the legalization of same-sex intimacy as 
a defense mechanism for the perpetuation of gender-based relationships. Secondly, 
within the heterosexual intimacy, masculinity secures the supremacy of men as bread-
winners and heads of household, while maintaining a second-rank, submissive role for 
women. Consequently, the establishment and continuation of masculinity in society 
encourages inequality in two dimensions; (a) screening the access of individuals to 
intimacy based on gender, and (b) developing and exercising values of inequality 
within the heterosexual structure of intimacy. Societies around the world have 
different hues of masculinities; some are more fundamentalist, whereas some others 
are more liberal or flexible. Also, within a given society, different degrees of 
masculinity may coexist and may even be institutional. This is the case of a very 
particular tradition: Masculinity in the military. 
 
Masculinity in the Military: Don’t ask, don’t tell! 
 
U.S. President Bill Clinton was criticized for his federal policy concerning 
homosexuality in the armed forces, casually recognized as “don’t ask, don’t tell,”17 
which was eventually repealed by President Barack Obama. In this policy, gay, 
lesbians and bisexuals were forbidden to serve in the military if they disclosed their 
sexuality. In other words, it allowed serving for the military as long as individuals did 
not engage in homosexual activity or disclosed any personal information about it. One 
of the justifications of this policy is quite remarkable, “The worldwide deployment of 
United States military forces, the international responsibilities of the United States, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 10 United States Code § 654. Pub. L. 103-160.!
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and the potential for involvement of the armed forces in actual combat routinely make 
it necessary for members of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living conditions 
and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized by forced 
intimacy with little or no privacy.”18 The word “intimacy” in this context was used as 
closeness and cohabitation, and the word “privacy” was used – most likely – in the 
personal-spatial connotation. Implicitly, the premise of this policy is acknowledging 
an invasion of privacy that is justified by the protection of masculinity disguised in 
the wording of “armed forces’ high standards of morale, good order and discipline, 
and unit cohesion.”19 Masculinity in the military is always a unique element, because 
on top of other immunities, the military does not abide by civilian law, it abides by 
martial law instead.  
 
In a similar way, the Mexican armed forces attempt to shelter masculinity, 
excluding women and homosexuals from the military. Women are admitted in the 
armed forces as volunteers only and cannot join as full-time service members. 
Homosexuals are not officially excluded, but they can always be separated from the 
armed forces claiming “faults against the honor and reputation of the military” 
according to the Regulations on Duties for Soldiers. 20  In the Mexican army, 
homosexuality is still considered a “sexual identity disorder”. Although the issue is a 
sort of limbo, homosexuals are not wanted in the armed forces and they are usually 
intimidated and bullied while they fulfill the mandatory duty. There are three waivers 
of the obligation, individuals who do not want to serve during the mandatory year 
may be released if they meet one of the following conditions: (a) they have a disease 
that will not allow them to perform well in the army, (b) they must leave the country 
because of their jobs, or, (c) they declare they are homosexuals. Individuals who 
choose the third option must be subject to a medical examination that will determine 
whether they are actually homosexuals or not. What this test consists of is still unclear. 
What is evident, though, is that the mere fact that being homosexual is a waiver 
represents a confirmation of the dismissal of homosexuality as a means to protect 
masculinity within the Mexican armed forces. The military is a traditional masculine 
institution; it maintains the male values alive as the police of virility, particularly with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ibidem, par. 12.!
19 Ibidem, par. 14.!
20 General Regulation on Military Duties. Official Journal of the Federation. Mexico, March 26, 1937.!
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the use of discipline. In this case, the discipline of gender has a specific target, to keep 
gender roles apart guaranteeing the supremacy of men, and their expected values of 
manhood. 
 
Another example of masculinity in the military can be analyzed in the case of 
Marangos v Cyprus21 tried before the European Court of Human Rights. A Cypriot 
citizen refused to perform the military service with the Cypriot National Group, 
fearing that he would be subject to degrading treatment. The Court decided that there 
had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention, and did not consider the claim 
for the violation of Article 3, regarding the prohibition of degrading treatment or 
punishment. As pointed out by Paul Johnson, “this is unfortunate, for it provided an 
opportunity for the Court to judge whether the prevalence of the institutional and 
systematic homophobia complained of by the applicant would have reached the 
minimum standards of Article 3.”22 It would be a great development in case-law to 
acknowledge the degrading treatment embodied by homophobic conduct, especially 
in “masculine” environments like the military.  
 
Masculinity in Politics 
 
When it comes to legislating on intimacy, it cannot be forgotten that most legislators 
and judges around the world are mainly men. In Mexico, out of 500 seats in the 
congress only 187 are held by women, this represents only 37.4% of the total.23 For 
the most part, men are deciding on the regulation of intimacy for the population as a 
whole. Heterosexual standards are applied in the decision-making process, and these 
standards are rather bias. Not only because they are heterosexual, but also because 
they are male-centered. They attempt to secure the dominance of the male ideal. 
Therefore, the essence and inertia of masculinity is also a constant factor in politics 
that affects the legal body in general; during the legislation process at first and later 
during judicial proceedings. It is men who decide what type of intimacy men and 
women should have. It is heterosexual men who define the rules of intimacy between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 23 ECHR CD192, Application No. 12846/05. 
22  Johnson, Paul. ‘An essentially private Manifestation of Human Personality’: Constructions of 
Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review (Oxford 
University Press), 10:1 (2010), p. 85. 
23 Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies). Information published on the website of the Mexican 
Congress. (September 15, 2013)!
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two men or two women. As long as legislatures are predominantly run by men, 
masculinity will prevail and it will hinder the development of a more equal system of 
intimacy for individuals. This can only be fixed with the proportional inclusion of 
more gay men and women in politics. Masculinity in politics has a snowball effect in 
society, it represents social male ideals and it fosters a systemic male dominance with 
the legalization of masculinity. With masculine politics, the male, the masculine, the 
heterosexual becomes and remains legal, while the female, the feminine and the 
homosexual remains or turns illegal. Hence, the legalization of intimacy demands a 
gender balance in politics that can help distribute rights more equally. 
 
Female Masculinity 
 
Another category of masculinity that cannot be ignored is female masculinity. The 
lesbian movement in Mexico has been very active in the demand for equality in the 
legalization of intimacy. It was a woman who promoted the Cohabitation Partnership 
Law in Mexico City (Enoe Uganda). It was a woman (Lol Kin Castañeda) who 
challenged the Social Security System claiming the rights for her wife as a dependent 
and beneficiary of welfare. Women and their masculinity play an important role in 
Mexico.  Their masculinity is not necessarily a replica of the mainstream Mexican 
male masculinity; it is rather a new expression of self that challenges and threatens 
traditional masculinity. Judith Halberstam explains the binarism of gender with what 
she calls “The Bathroom Problem.”24 She argues that individuals who do not fit into 
given community standards for male or female are usually questioned or approached 
when they are in a public bathroom and tend to be confronted with the message “You 
are in the wrong bathroom!” People are always trying to classify individuals as either 
male or female, and gender policing is stricter in public places. As she points out, 
restrooms at airports are particularly intensified versions of the bathroom problem. 
Halberstam underscores the fact that: 
 
“If we use the paradigm of the bathroom as a limit of gender identification, we can measure 
the distance between the binary gender schema and lived multiple gendered experiences. The 
accusation ‘you’re in the wrong bathroom!’ really says two different things. First, it 
announces that your gender seems at odds with your sex (your apparent masculinity or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Halberstam, Judith. Female Masculinity. USA: Duke University Press, 1998. p. 20. 
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androgyny is at odds with your supposed femaleness); second, it suggests that single-gender 
bathrooms are only for those who fit clearly into one category (male) or the other (female). 
Either we need open-access bathrooms or multigendered bathrooms, or we need wider 
parameters for gender identification. The bathroom, as we know it, actually represents the 
crumbling edifice of gender in the twentieth century. The frequency with which gender-
deviant ‘women’ are mistaken for men in public bathrooms suggests that a large number of 
feminine women spend a large amount of time and energy policing masculine women. 
Something very different happens, of course, in the men’s public toilet, where the space is 
more likely to become a sexual cruising zone than a site for gender repression…The men’s 
room, in other words, constitutes both an architecture of surveillance and an incitement to 
desire, a space of homosocial interaction and of homoerotic interaction.”25 
 
In Mexico, the policing of gender and the paradigm of the bathroom problem 
are a constant. The predominant macho culture is fostered not only by men, but 
surprisingly promoted by women as well. Traditional values of masculinity are 
cultivated and encouraged; this includes expected behavior at school, at work, at 
church, and at home in the interaction with the family. The paradigm of the bathroom 
problem is embodied in different contexts and produces reactions like: You’re 
wearing the wrong clothes! You have the wrong haircut! You are drinking the wrong 
drink! You’re eating the wrong food! You’re listening to the wrong music! You’re 
watching the wrong show! You’re choosing the wrong color! Because men and 
women have expected choices for clothes, food, music, shows, colors, etc. Although 
the policing of gender is present in the whole country, rural areas are particularly 
affected by this. Bigger cities are less gender-policed and more liberal. Furthermore, 
other phenomena have changed and challenged the traditional male masculinity; for 
instance, single motherhood. Immigration of many Mexican men to the United States 
in the past decades has modified the circumstances of many households and the 
number of single mothers has increased. According to a study published by the 
Mexican Congress, there are approximately five million single mothers in Mexico. In 
only one quarter of a century, the percentage of households run by single mothers rose 
from 13.5% in 1976 to 20.6% in 2000.26 These changes in the population and in the 
behavior of many Mexican families discourage the ideal of the male “head of 
household” and contribute to the transformation of male and female roles. Female !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Ibidem, pp. 23-24. 
26 Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies). AAP/ASC/ALRG. Report Number 3766. May 10, 
2008. 
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masculinity is not only an expression of lesbian women, it can occur also when 
heterosexual women challenge traditional male roles, for example, taking over the 
role of head of household and becoming bread-winners. This is accompanied by more 
access of women in the work sphere and different patterns of authority within the 
family sphere. In sum, female masculinity also jeopardizes the supremacy of 
traditional male masculinity. 
     
V.3.3. Gay Activism and Intimacy 
 
Strongly influenced by the post-Stonewall gay liberation movement in the seventies, 
Mexico has lived an exponential emancipation of the LGBT population in the past 
two decades. Bigger cities in the country, like Monterrey, Guadalajara and Mexico 
City have a very active gay community. The number of LGBT people attending gay 
pride parades and demonstrations is increasing every year. Gay activists and 
associations demand tolerance, respect, protection and equality. Tolerance and respect 
are specially needed in a predominantly catholic society. Furthermore, activists 
demand an effective protection from the public administration of justice. Many crimes 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual citizens are not prosecuted. Authorities 
ignore claims of harassment reported by LGBT individuals, because they consider 
they are “normal” or “justified”. The current reality shows that there is little or no 
protection for this particularly vulnerable group. Gay activist do not expect additional 
attention by authorities, but rather, they demand protection and law-enforcement in 
the same terms and to the same extent as for heterosexuals. In other words, the 
fundamental idea of activism is to ask for and reach equality. In terms of intimacy, the 
goal of activists is to legalize gay marriage. Gay activism in Mexico does not have 
any radical ideas when it comes to marriage, their aspiration is to replicate the 
traditional heterosexual model of matrimony and family with a sole variation: same-
sex spouses. This is the equality trap that gay activism around the world has fallen 
into and that can be easily identified in Mexico. Gay activists demand a heterosexual 
form of intimacy called marriage. However, they fail to notice that the mere fact of 
asking for this so-called equality validates the heterosexual role model and endorses 
the injustices and inequalities inherent to opposite-sex marriage. Therefore, what 
appears to be a demand for emancipation involuntarily supports and nurtures 
heteronormativity, the heterosexual social system. Reaching equality by having this 
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type of gay marriage will generate the inequalities that heterosexual marriage has 
maintained for centuries. Thus, when it comes to the issue of intimacy, gay activism 
has a bogus claim. Even if gay marriage were legalized in the whole country, the 
inequality would not be eradicated. On the contrary, there would be a larger 
population that would reproduce the same old-fashioned gender roles.  Average gay 
activists fail to identify the ulterior problem behind gay marriage; their blind spot is 
that they fail to see that gay marriage is also the same as the good old heterosexual 
marriage.  
 
V.3.4. Queer and Intimacy 
 
There is a small fraction of the gay population that is happy without gay marriage and 
whose point of view is actually to disown gay marriage. From this queer perspective, 
there is a harsh critique of marriage. And, it is from this queer approach that this 
section will analyze intimacy, considering the issues of heteronormativity, privacy 
and identity. 
 
The fallacy and algebra of gay marriage  
 
During a lecture at the University of Dresden in June 2007, Prof. Wyduckel explained 
that after the reunification of Germany in 1991, West Germany and East Germany 
(German Democratic Republic)27 had merged into a single state: Germany, the 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In a peculiar metaphor, he juxtaposed algebra to 
synthetize how the two legal systems had evolved. He explained that in algebra, all 
students learn in school that A + B = C; however, in the reunification of Germany, A 
(West Germany) plus B (East Germany) had equaled A. In other words, the 
unification of both legal systems did not create a new one. It merely replicated the 
first one. The same axiom is true for gay marriage. The trap that most gay activists 
fall into is that in the algebra of gay marriage there is a fallacy: 
 
A (Heterosexual Marriage) + B (Gay Marriage) = A (Heterosexual Marriage) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Deutsche Demokratische Republik. 
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Homosexual couples have failed to provide a new form of intimacy that will represent 
a new structure of intimacy for family life. There is no official gay alternative for 
intimacy yet. Instead, homosexuals want to use the “heterosexual recipe” for intimacy 
and family relationships. Consequently, gay marriage is per se heteronormative. 
Queer studies and theories use the term “heteronormativity” to describe the 
idealization of the heterosexual paradigm and lifestyle. The problem with gay 
marriage in this context is that it uses heterosexual norms as the benchmark. Gay 
marriage is sexist and heterosexist, pursuing a form of intimacy with a heterosexual 
imperative that replicates male dominance and unjust inequalities within the family 
structure. Cohen pointed out that “Neither strategy can transcend the dilemmas posed 
by difference: going public (assertion of difference) or choosing silence (pseudo-
assimilation) are two flawed alternatives constructed by a context in which a 
particular mode of intimate relationships and sexuality – heterosexual marriage – is 
(re-) centered as the norm and the standard to which one must either conform or be 
construed as deviant.”28 Heterosexual marriage is the norm, and by choosing the same 
heterosexual model as the structure of gay marriage, heterosexuality is being re-
centered as the norm. Using Mary O’Brien’s term, the social movement and call for 
gay marriage is part of the “malestream thought.”29 Gay mainstream is for the most 
part malestream as well.  Considering these reasons, the whole ideal of gay marriage 
becomes nothing but a fallacy. 
 
The paradox of privacy 
 
Another question to consider is the relationship between privacy and intimacy, not in 
the context analyzed in the previous chapter, but rather as a potential justification for 
censorship. Chapter IV analyzed the issue of privacy as a right in light of the 
constitutional individual guarantees, from a human rights perspective. This privacy, 
however, may be exercised or not. In claiming this right to privacy, individuals may 
be falling into a trap that would be counter-productive for the emancipation of LGBT 
individuals.  Social interactions constantly force people to disclose information about 
their lives, their sexuality and their status of intimacy. A simple introduction of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Cohen, p. 87. 
29 For more insights into her term, see O’Brien, Mary. The Politics of Reproduction. London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 
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person may reveal plenty of information; simply indicating the title Mr., Jr., Mrs., 
Miss. will imply information about gender and intimacy. If we introduce Miss Jones, 
interlocutors will know we are talking about a single woman. There is a constant peer 
pressure to disclose information about one’s intimacy status. For instance, married 
individuals are expected to show a ring on their left hands. The disclosure of intimacy 
often comes together with the ever-present disclosure of gender and sexuality. It is 
also the case with married women who change their last names to their husband’s. As 
Sedgwick has argued, “A woman’s use of a married name makes graphic at the same 
time her subordination as a woman and her privilege as a presumptive 
heterosexual.”30 Although this research could agree with the first premise, on the 
issue of subordination, it has also been explained in Chapter II that the right to change 
last names after marriage is also an agency element that belongs in the constructive 
sphere of intimacy; and it can only be considered heterosexist if the legal provision 
only allows women to take their husband’s name, but not the husband to take their 
wife’s. When it comes to revealing one’s intimacy status, many gay individuals –
married or not – choose to claim their right to privacy and not to disclose personal 
information about their private lives and intimate partners. In spite of the fact that 
individuals do have the right to keep their personal information private, exercising the 
right to privacy in this case is effectively a mechanism of self-censorship. 
Consequently, privacy is a double-edge sword. On one hand, the right to privacy 
allows individuals to choose their intimate partners and to have decisional autonomy. 
On the other, privacy (in the connotation of secrecy) may lead to a subtle self-
censorship that may nurture oppression and hinder the emancipation of LGBT 
minorities. The right to marry a same-sex partner is only reinforced and effective for 
social change if it is accompanied by the self-disclosure of intimacy status. In other 
words, if gay men and women really want to promote the development of 
contemporary societies, they must come out of the closet in the first place; and 
eventually, they must come out of the intimacy closet as well.  This paradox of 
privacy has been thoroughly analyzed by Eve Sedgwick in the Epistemology of the 
Closet, she has studied the constant actions of self-disclosure and self-censorship. She 
adds that “The closet is the defining structure for gay oppression in this century…The 
image of coming out regularly interfaces the image of the closet, and its seemingly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Sedgwick, Eve K. The epistemology of the closet. USA: University of California Press, 2008. p. 32. 
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unambivalent public sitting can be counterposed as a salvational epistemologic 
certainty against the very equivocal privacy afforded by the closet.”31 Hence, the 
public legal recognition of other forms of intimacy validates individual privacy. 
Coming out of the intimacy closet is an additional burden for homosexuals. This 
required disclosure is not expected of heterosexuals, because the heteronormative 
construction of society takes their masculine and feminine roles for granted. Cohen 
adds that “The logic of self-disclosure inherent in the first option has, perforce, the 
form of an open secret: an admission or public confession that “I am one of them,” a 
member of a despised social category”…The privacy afforded by remaining in the 
closet (the second option) is equivocal, to say the least.”32 
 
Gender Identity and Stigmatization 
 
A legalized form of intimacy is also linked to an individual’s gender and sexual 
identity. By marrying a same-sex partner, individuals (voluntarily or not) “join the 
homosexual club.” LGBT individuals who legalize their intimacy are simultaneously 
confirming their sexual identity and assuming gender and social expectations and 
stigmatization. Going back to Karen Prager, “Gender identity is a feeling of 
confidence in one’s femaleness or maleness, whereas gender constancy is an 
understanding that one always will be the gender one is now.”33 In a certain way, 
when individuals choose to marry their same-sex partners, they are aware of the 
gender constancy that the legalization of their intimacy will grant them. Nonetheless, 
this gender identity will still be either male or female.  
 
V.3.5. Conclusion 
 
When it comes to the legalization of intimacy, gay men and woman face a rather 
complicated dilemma: to get married or not. If you consider the issue of equality from 
a gay activist perspective, what you can get out of marriage is the opportunity to 
access a structure, an opportunity that is a given for heterosexuals. However, this 
equality brings you to marriage, an institution that creates and conserves inequalities. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibidem, p. 71. 
32 Cohen, p. 87.!
33 Prager, Karen J. The psychology of intimacy. New York: Guilford Press, 1995. p. 93. 
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So, the actual material effect of equality as a principle of justice disappears. Many gay 
couples reproduce the roles of male and female. Not only the behavioral mannerisms, 
but also the distribution of labor associated with marriage. Such couples are nothing 
but a carbon copy of a heterosexual husband and wife. Access to marriage for this 
type of gay couples will only lead to more injustices, because one of the partners will 
eventually be disadvantaged with fewer opportunities, losing professional autonomy 
and financial independence. In this context, what is the net effect of marriage 
equality? At the end of the day, is it just access to an institution of inequality. On the 
other hand, if you analyze a gay couple where both partners work, you will find fewer 
injustices and fewer inequalities. Even if they do not get married and without an 
allegation of marriage equality, the net reality in their unmarried lifestyle may show 
more equality, more justice and more consistency that in a married couple, be it a 
heterosexual or a homosexual one.  
 
Households where both partners work are informally called “DINKs”, an 
acronym for Double Income No Kids.34 Dinks are usually more successful couples 
with a higher income, a more active lifestyle and a more comfortable purchasing 
power. The financial independence and equality of income of both partners is the 
reality of many queer couples. For such combinations, what is the advantage of 
marriage? The truth is that in these cases, marriage does not have a lot to offer, except 
for the visual impact on society and its contribution to the emancipation of LGBT 
minorities. Thus, the real advantage of gay marriage is the effect of “going public.” It 
has been argued before in this research that the right to privacy is the essence of a 
right to intimacy. However, ironically, it is the publicity effect what may lead to 
equality. Oxymoronically, the privacy of marriage can only contribute to equality if it 
goes public. Using Sedwick’s metaphoric discourse, in an epistemology of the 
intimacy closet, the epistemological process of marriage equality occurs not while 
same-sex partners are allowed to enter into matrimony, but rather when their society 
learns that same-sex partners have had the equal opportunity to get married. It is, thus, 
with this objective that marriage is relevant for all men, women, straight, gay and 
queer, because same-sex marriage teaches our communities the democratic values of 
equality. The alleged equality of gay marriage is a delusion. In the critique of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 According to the Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, the term DINK had its first known use in the 
English Language in 1986.  
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marriage and gay marriage, equality must be analyzed from a material perspective 
with a real ulterior effect, and not merely considering who has access to marriage or 
not. 
 
V.4. The Obstacles of Legalized Gender 
 
As detailed in the previous section of this chapter, the different perspectives on 
gender are very relevant in their relationship with intimacy. When talking about the 
legalization of intimacy, what becomes extremely important is the legalization of 
gender. Some ideas or prejudices around gender lose their impact because they have 
no legal effect. It is now time to study particular elements of legalized gender and the 
obstacles they represent in the legalization of intimacy. 
 
V.4.1. Birth certificates and marriage licenses 
 
Regardless of the genitalia one is born with, a newborn becomes male or female at the 
time of registration. Birth certificates in Mexico must show the sex of the child, “The 
birth certificate will be registered with two witnesses. It will show the date, the time 
and the place of birth, the sex of the newborn, the corresponding last names; also, 
whether it has appeared dead or alive; and the fingerprints of the baby.”35 The civil 
code has clear indications for the legalization of gender. The options are rather limited, 
it must be either “male” or “female”; the option to determine “hermaphrodite” or 
“intersexual” does not exist. Neither is it possible to choose a “rather not disclose” 
alternative. What parents do not realize is that since that very moment onwards, the 
newborn is predestined to follow a path of gender profiling and gender learning for 
the rest of their lives. Of course, sometimes this fate begins even before birth, when 
parents start buying either blue or pink clothes for the baby according to the 
ultrasound gender forecast. But legally, it all starts with the registration of the birth 
certificate. Surprisingly, it is at that time as well, that the legalization of that child’s 
future intimacy is being predetermined. The sex shown on their birth certificate will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Art. 58 FCC. In Spanish: “El acta de nacimiento se levantará con asistencia de dos testigos. 
Contendrá el día, la hora y el lugar del nacimiento, el sexo del presentado, el nombre y apellidos que 
le correspondan; asimismo, la razón de si se ha presentado vivo o muerto; la impresión digital del 
presentado. Si éste se presenta como hijo de padres desconocidos, el Juez del Registro Civil le pondrá 
el nombre y apellidos, haciéndose constar esta circunstancia en el acta.” 
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consequently constrain the options for the legalization of their intimacy in the future. 
Most likely, they will only be able to choose partners of the sex their parents did not 
register. Hence, the declaration of the child’s sex made by parents at the time of 
registration becomes an obstacle for the eventual decisional privacy of that individual 
when they reach adulthood. In a similar manner, the binary gender system found in 
birth certificates is repeated in marriage licenses. The taxonomical dichotomization of 
spouses forces civil registries to identity a husband and a wife. These roles will arise 
from the sex indicated on their birth certificates. Thus, marriage licenses contribute to 
the perpetuity of the legalized gender specified on birth certificates. In order for a 
civil registry to issue a marriage license, it is necessary to submit “the birth 
certificates of the applicant, and if required, a medical certificate that determines their 
age, when it is unclear that the man is more than 16 years old and the woman more 
than 14 years old.”36 As outlined by the civil code, birth certificates and marriage 
licenses have an integral and sequential relationship.  
 
V.4.2. Transsexuals and the amendment of their legalized gender 
 
On August 29, 2008, Congresswoman Leticia Quezada, President of the Commission 
for Equality and Gender at the LAFD, backed up by the Human Rights Commission 
for the Federal District, submitted a bill to give transsexuals the opportunity to amend 
their personal civil records in accordance with their gender identity. The bill was 
approved and published on the Official Gazette on October 10, 2008, entering into 
force thirty days later.37 This reform changed the wording of three articles and 
included a new section in the Civil Code for Mexico City only, not at the federal level. 
The civil code now recognizes legal capacity in equal terms for men and women, with 
an anti-discrimination provision, banning unequal treatment based on age, pregnancy, 
legal status, race, language, religion, ideology, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
gender role expression, skin color, nationality, origin or social class, job or profession, 
economic status, physical appearance, disability or health status.38 What used to be a 
more overarching protection of sexuality is now a more nuanced acknowledgement of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Art. 98 par. 1 FCC. In Spanish: “El acta de nacimiento de los pretendientes y en su defecto un 
dictamen médico que compruebe su edad, cuando por su aspecto no sea notorio que el varón es mayor 
de dieciséis años y la mujer mayor de catorce.” 
37 OGFD Number 439. October 10, 2008.!
38 Art. 2 CCFD 
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minorities. Including different sexualities, different gender identities and different 
expressive mannerisms of gender roles. It is important that the legal capacity be 
recognized in all of the above-mentioned cases, so that civil rights claimed by all 
types of individuals be respected and not merely disregarded by alleged diagnoses of 
disorders. Transsexuals and transgender individuals could not even claim their equal 
rights in the past, because they were considered mentally-ill, diagnosed with a sexual 
identity disorder, and consequently losing their legal capacity. This amendment 
provides an anti-discrimination provision that allows judges to reissue birth 
certificates in accordance with the actual gender identity of citizens.39 Now, the 
judicial procedure for gender redetermination is clear. The process includes specific 
deadlines and protocols for the new registration of birth certificates, including the 
amendment of the previous one, the issuance of the new one and the protection of 
privacy.40 After the new birth certificate has been issued, the original birth certificate 
is locked and cannot be accessed by the public without a court order. This enhances 
the protection of individual privacy and the respect for their gender identity. 
Individuals who rectify their gender identity, always have the right to change it again 
if their gender identity changes in the future. 41  Transsexuals and transgender 
individuals can now change the gender shown on birth certificates and subsequently 
amend their identification documents; but, is this the solution to the problem with the 
legalization of gender? This research must answer in the negative form. The capacity 
to amend one’s gender identification exists, but the options are still the same: male or 
female. That is to say, the root of the problem, the binary systematization of gender 
persists even after this amendment. Individuals may redefine their gender identity as 
long as they remain within the dichotomization of gender taxonomies. After an 
amendment of the birth certificate, the options for the legalization of intimacy will 
still be the same, and they might be limited to choosing an opposite-sex partner. So, 
what seems to be a real answer to the question of gender identity is actually just a 
patch to the fundamental problem with gender: its categorical binary system.  
 
V.4.3. Quintana Roo and the absence of gender obstacles 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Art. 35 CCFD 
40 Art. 498 Bis 1-8 CCFD 
41 Art. 498 Bis 8 CCFD 
 185!
The Yucatan Peninsula recently became popular for legal analysts, and not precisely 
for tourism purposes; the State of Quintana Roo (where the Resort City of Cancun is 
located) faced an unexpected legal battle for the legalization of intimacy. On 
November 28, 2011, two same-sex couples submitted their applications for 
matrimony in the municipality of Lázaro Cardenas, Quintana Roo.42 These couples 
(Patricia Novelo & Areli Castro, Sergio Monje & Manuel Reyes) noticed that the 
Civil Code in the State of Quintana Roo had a legal void, the wording of the 
provisions for marriage were and had always been gender-neutral. Therefore, there 
was in fact no legal impediment for same-sex couples to submit their applications for 
matrimony. Art. 680 states: “Persons who pretend to engage in matrimony will 
submit a petition before the civil registry…” 43  None of the articles regarding 
matrimony (Art. 680-797 CCQR) defines it in terms of a man and a woman. In a 
certain way, heterosexual marriage had been customary law, but the text of the civil 
code was actually open to any sort of couples. After a detail review of the Civil Code, 
the local civil registry admitted their applications and the couples got married. 
However, on April 13, 2012, they received a notification issued by the Secretary of 
State, declaring the nullification of their marriage licenses. The argument of the State 
Government was that matrimony defined in terms of man and woman as spouses was 
implicit in the Civil Code. Both couples filed an appeal and along with the support of 
human rights and gay activists, the annulments were revoked. The decision of May 3, 
2012 finally ratified the lawfulness of same-sex matrimony in Quintana Roo, 
confirming the validity of the previously registered marriage licenses and endorsing 
any future same-sex matrimonies in all municipalities in the state.  
 
This unique case of gay marriage by accident in Mexico did not happen 
because the local legislators in Quintana Roo were open-minded and wanted to allow 
same-sex couples to get married in the state. But rather, it happened because nobody 
paid attention to the wording and they did not use the words man and woman literally 
to restrict access to this structure of intimacy. As discussed, the existence of legalized 
gender is an obstacle for the legalization of intimacy. In this case, however, the use of 
gender-neutral language removes the obstacle of the gender barrier. Chapter IV.3. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Santana, Rosa. Proceso. “Rectifica gobierno de Quintana Roo: valida bodas gay” (Rectification by 
the government of Quintana Roo: validates gay marriage.) May 3, 2012. Mexico City, Mexico. 
43 Art. 680 CCQR. In Spanish: “Las personas que pretendan contraer matrimonio presentarán un 
escrito al oficial del Registro Civil…” 
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detailed the recent amendments to the constitution in 2011, which incorporated a 
more gender-neutral language that would ease the protection of minorities and the 
legalization of their intimacy. Quintana Roo had this unbiased language before, but it 
had not been exercised or even questioned before these two couples submitted their 
applications for matrimony. In sum, the gender obstacle was absent in this civil code, 
and in order to legalize same-sex intimacy nothing had to be modified, citizens 
merely needed to claim their equal access rights.  
 
V.5. Undoing, Unlearning and Destroying Gender 
 
Up until now, the question of gender in this research has been linked to intimacy 
primarily in the context of restricting access to intimacy based on the binary male or 
female. This limitation, however, is merely an external and visual obstacle of the 
more complicated, complex and inner problem of gender. In the previous section, it 
was shown how gender creates obstacles in the legalization of intimacy. It must be 
acknowledged first of all, that gender is already socialized and legalized. Second, that 
the current legal forms of intimacy are permeated by gender. And third, that a more 
just legalization of intimacy requires changes in the legalized gender elements, such 
as gender-based access to marriage. The contemporary trend since 2001 has been to 
undo gender,44 undoing it in such a way that the removal of a gender restriction 
results in a more encompassing and more equal formulation of intimacy. Amending 
the wording of legislations to “fix” the gender-bias access restriction is merely a 
mechanism to undo gender. Switching from “marriage is the union between a man 
and a woman” to “marriage is the union between two persons” is a dismantlement of 
gender.  
 
In other words, undoing gender means starting the engine in reverse mode, but 
that backward movement is still linear and it walks along the axis of gender.  
Gendered intimacy orbits around the binary and imaginary of a heterosexist axis, 
where same-sex intimacy is the satellite deviation of an opposite-sex intimacy where 
women are the reflection of the male mirror. Undoing gender can only be the first step 
in the legalization of intimacy; nonetheless, it is not the ultimate goal or a real answer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 With the legalization of same-sex marriage in The Netherlands, see Chapter II. 
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to the problem of gender. Individuals are taught and learn gender even before they are 
born. The cognitive and constant existence of gender in human beings requires a 
deeper and more difficult process: Unlearning gender. Unlearning gender suggests 
changing or reshaping the gendered paradigms from intimacy. To be more precise, the 
tendency to shift from “marriage is the union between a man and a woman” to 
“marriage is the union between two persons” is not unlearning gender. If you read the 
words in bold and compare them with the same sentence above, you will see that 
undoing gender was the transition from the man/woman binary to a more gender-
neutral wording. Nevertheless, this second sentence where gender has been undone 
still talks about two persons. So, even though gender neutrality has been 
accomplished, the binary morphology of intimacy still remains intact. Therefore, 
unlearning gender would mean forgetting the paradigm of a binary code for intimacy 
that necessarily implies two individuals for its constitution. Of course, it is difficult 
enough to legalize intimacy in a constellation of two individuals, let alone a structure 
of intimacy where more members are contemplated. However, understanding that the 
current shape of intimacy with two members is a result of a gendered intimacy is 
crucial for the process of unlearning. Once it has been established that gender should 
not only be undone but also unlearned, the following question arises: Can individuals 
unlearn gender? The answer is yes. If the body (and the reproductive organs of an 
individual) and its given gender were to be separated, gender lies only in the 
imaginary. This construct is nurtured by cultures, societies, families, and is subject to 
change. Therefore, what is learned can also be unlearned, in spite of the fact that 
unlearning is a more difficult epistemological process that requires deconstruction. 
Consequently, in the legalization of intimacy the ultimate goal should be to destroy 
gender. Undoing gender is a prerequisite for unlearning gender; in the same 
correlation, unlearning gender is imperative for the destruction of gender. Hence, 
destroying gender in intimacy means to identify and to fix a specific problem (like 
male-female wording), then to identify the paradigm (binarism) in order to finally 
destroy it: legalizing a form of intimacy where that very binarism is not present or 
mandatory.  
 
V.5.1. Deconstructing Gender in the Spheres of Intimacy 
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Chapter II introduced the Spheres of Intimacy, which were identified in the structures 
of intimacy in Mexico in Chapter III. Now, it is time to analyze the spheres of 
intimacy in their relationship with gender. First, the emotional sphere in marriage 
links all the feelings directly to women, the emotional side of intimacy is considered 
the “feminine” side. The problem with this direct association is that it creates a 
distribution that reserves the rational side for men. For example, after a divorce, 
children under seven years of age are to remain in the care of their mothers by default, 
unless they are in danger.45 The legislator added this provision with a gendered and 
heterosexist mentality where women are supposed to take care of their children. The 
imaginary that binds feelings with the feminine is a threat to a gender-free or gender-
neutral intimacy. This emotional side attributed to women is also materialized in a 
spatial context: The House, especially with the myth of the ideal housewife who turns 
a house into a home with her warmth. This domesticity of women is part of the 
gendered paradigm that must be changed. Marriage has been a heterosexual weapon 
for the continuation of male repression for centuries, and the home has been the 
architecture of the disciplinary discourse where women are – in a certain way – tamed. 
Second, the moral sphere has the binary of right and wrong, which is strongly 
influenced by religions. On top of that, there is a gendered expectation of male and 
female that comes with religions and it creates a matrix where rights and obligations 
are determined and predestined by gender roles. Till death do us part is the preface 
that has enslaved many women who have no way out of marriage because of the 
moral, i.e. religious, doctrine of predestination in a supposed lifelong intimacy. The 
social inertia promotes a constitution of intimacy in compliance with a compulsory 
heterosexuality. The gender roles in the structure of marriage are determined in such a 
way that they serve men and hinder the personal and professional development of 
women. Third, the sexual sphere of intimacy has an idealized exclusivity of spouses 
that is consolidated and secured through monogamy. The impediment to engage in 
multiple and concurrent intimacies protects the ownership of men over women. When 
individuals think of polygamy, they are usually thinking about a man having more 
than one wife, which is technically polygyny; but rarely do they consider polyandry, a 
polygamous condition when a woman has multiple husbands. This is the result of the 
preconceived gender structure where men own women through marriage, but women !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Art. 282. VI par. 2 FCC 
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do not own men. The female body, thus, becomes property of the male. The current 
tendency to criminalize spousal rape46 is a means to undo the sexual ownership of 
men who have abused their wives for generations. Consequently, monogamy has 
historically served men in heterosexual marriage. Fourth, the economic sphere is tied 
to the power structure in intimacy, one where men hold the decision-making role and 
control women. The traditional heterosexual distribution of labor with the figure of 
men as breadwinners traps women in a domestic function that perpetuates the 
economic and power disadvantage of women. This unbalanced relationship stimulates 
the ownership of heterosexual men, who buy women in a sale transaction where they 
are both the seller and the buyer in a market they have created themselves. This 
economic power is a purchasing power for men, a power that generates injustices 
within the intimacy but also in society in general. The subjection of women in their 
families perpetuates the subjection of women in the social environment in general, 
because the same structure of male power is replicated and amplified. Last, but not 
least, the constructive sphere of intimacy comes with a very clear obligation 
according to gender roles: Reproduction. Women have a compulsory duty to give 
birth to children. The ideal construction of a heterosexual intimacy is a vertical one. 
Reproduction serves men in a transcendental deployment of power that will remain 
across generations. The production of children secures the reproduction of the same 
structure of power where men remain at the top. Through the establishment of kinship, 
gender is bridged in such a way that it becomes a legal path for the transfer and traffic 
of power in a structure that guarantees the dominance of men. Furthermore, women 
are objectified even more through pregnancy and childbirth. They become the 
machinery used by a male subject. A horizontal intimacy (like a marriage with no 
children) jeopardizes heterosexual men, because it does not secure the reproduction of 
the power structure ad infinitum. 
 
V.5.2. Gender, Intimacy and Judith Butler 
 
As has been established in the previous chapter, that the human right to intimacy is 
linked to an individual’s right to privacy. This decisional autonomy to choose a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 As it is typified in Art. 265 bis FCRC. !
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partner (or multiple partners for that matter) for intimacy must remain at the 
discretion of every individual as a fundamental and protected right. Analyzing the 
legalization of intimacy, it has been proved that this legalization is an 
acknowledgment of that privacy. And at the same time, this is a legitimization of 
volition and desire. In most countries, this desire can only be a heterosexual one. 
Judith Butler argues that, “The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the 
production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between ‘feminine’ and 
‘masculine,’ where these are understood as expressive attributes of ‘male’ and 
‘female’.”47  
 
In the case of marriage, that desire is gender-dependent, because it requires 
opposite-sex desire with a male-female binary when one individual desires the 
contrast just as in a black and white polarity. In this social picture, women represent 
the negative reflection that validates the exposed attributes of men. In order to undo, 
to unlearn and to destroy gender in intimacy, it is necessary to identify it in the 
performative function proposed by Butler. Separating the sexual-anatomical from 
gender, she states, “If the body is not a ‘being,’ but a variable boundary, a surface 
whose permeability is politically regulated, a signifying practice within a cultural 
field of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality then what language is left 
for understanding this corporeal enactment, gender, that constitutes its ‘interior’ 
signification on its surface?”48 According to this proposition, the body is merely a 
vehicle, a given one, for the expression of gender. She adds, “Consider gender, for 
instance, as a corporeal style, an ‘act,’ as it were, which is both intentional and 
performative, where ‘performative’ suggests a dramatic and contingent construction 
of meaning.” 49  Interpreted from this perspective, compulsory heterosexuality 
demands the limitation of desire to a specific category of vehicle (opposite-sex 
bodies) and the constraint of expression to a specific expression where the 
performance can only convey a specific meaning, either male or female. Butler has 
also affirmed that even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism'and'the'Subversion'of'Identity. USA: Routledge Classics, 
1990. p. 24. 
48 Ibidem, p. 189. 
49 Ibidem , p. 190. 
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morphology and constitution, there is no reason to assume that genders must remain 
as two.50  
 
Understanding gender in its performative purpose, gender becomes a practice 
of expression. And if individuals have the right to freedom of expression, then gender 
must be acknowledged as a fundamental human right. A dichotomization of gender 
can only foster a system that serves and perpetuates the power of male heterosexuality. 
 
Intimacy and Objectification 
 
For the study of the legalization of intimacy so far, the main characters or pillars of 
intimacy have been the individuals, the subjects. These individuals, however, are and 
become objects of intimacy as well. The interchangeability of positions as subjects 
and objects functions in a dialectical manner, where both subject and object are 
necessary for intimacy. Nonetheless, objectification does not always guarantee 
equality and justice. Objectification can be defined as seeing and/or treating another 
individual as an object.51 Marta Nussbaum and Rae Langton have identified ten 
elements of objectification: 
 
1. “Instrumentality: the treatment of a person as a tool for the objectifier's 
purposes. 
2. Denial of autonomy: the treatment of a person as lacking in autonomy and 
self-determination. 
3. Inertness: the treatment of a person as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in 
activity. 
4. Fungibility: the treatment of a person as interchangeable with other objects. 
5. Violability: the treatment of a person as lacking in boundary-integrity. 
6. Ownership: the treatment of a person as something that is owned by another 
(can be bought or sold). 
7. Denial of subjectivity: the treatment of a person as something whose 
experiences and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Ibidem, p. 9. 
51 Papadaki, Evangelia (Lina), "Feminist Perspectives on Objectification", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
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8. Reduction to body: the treatment of a person as identified with their body, or 
body parts. 
9. Reduction to appearance: the treatment of a person primarily in terms of how 
they look, or how they appear to the senses. 
10. Silencing: the treatment of a person as if they are silent, lacking the capacity to 
speak.” 52 
 
Immanuel Kant affirmed that the only structure of intimacy in which two individuals 
can practice their sexuality without reducing themselves to objects is monogamous 
marriage (because both spouses surrender exclusively and reciprocally), in 
comparison to prostitution and concubinage, where the prostitute and the concubine 
are objects that satisfy a sexual desire.53 He described it with the following sentences: 
“… if I yield myself completely to another and obtain the person of the other in return, 
I win myself back; I have given myself up as the property of another, but in turn I take 
that other as my property, and so win myself back again in winning the person whose 
property I have become. In this way, the two persons become a unity of will.”54 
 
Nevertheless, even if spouses have surrendered to one another it should not 
mean that the other will have arbitrary immunity for any act. In other words, even if 
this objectification is recognized and approved by law, it does not negate the fact that 
the objectification has taken place. It must be acknowledged that intimacy – legalized 
or not – involves an objectification process of the intimate partner. Under this premise, 
the discussion would rather focus on the evaluation of a voluntary vs. an involuntary 
objectification and of a positive vs. a negative one, and it would create a matrix of 
objectification with these two axes. Individuals who voluntarily join in a structure of 
intimacy are simultaneously endorsing the objectification process. This legally 
recognized form of intimacy, though, should not grant an individual a carte blanche 
over their partner. That is to say, voluntary objectification also has its own limits. 
These boundaries, for instance, draw the line between spousal sex (voluntary) and 
spousal rape (involuntary). Regarding the positive-negative axis, it could be said that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Ibidem. For further reference see: Nussbaum, Martha, 1995, “Objectification”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 24(4): 249–291, and Langton, Rae.  Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on 
Pornography and Objectification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. !
53 Ibidem 
54 Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. Louis Infield (Translator). New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1963. 
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with the instrumentality element, during sexual intercourse both spouses practice a 
positive and voluntary objectification where the sexual exchange is for reciprocal 
benefit. As opposed to rape, where the objectifier is causing a negative effect with the 
involuntary use of the other person. Acknowledging one of the elements of 
objectification should not mean that the individual is subject to all sorts of 
vulnerabilities in general. For example, if an individual accepts the instrumentality of 
a situation, it should not allow the other to deny their subjectivity, or autonomy, or to 
assume their violability. In the case of procreation (i.e. biological reproduction in an 
opposite-sex intimacy), women are the instruments, the objects that will carry the 
fetus until birth. But also, men are objectified for the production of semen. This type 
of consensual and reciprocal objectification is not negative. The problem would be to 
assume that after women have agreed to procreate once, they can be reduced to their 
bodies and be forced to procreate even against their will. Therefore, objectification is 
not necessarily a negative or harmful concept and it is not absolute either. The limits 
of objectification are to be determined and are relative to the circumstances of the 
objectification process and the subject to be objectified. Approving a single element 
out of the ten mentioned above does not imply the consent for objectification in all of 
them.  
 
Butler has analyzed the critical exchange in structuralist discourse, especially 
reviewing the regulation of exchange in the systems of kinship. She reminds us of 
Lévi-Strauss’s point of view in The Elementary Structures of Kinship:  
 
“the object of exchange that both consolidates and differentiates kinship relations is women, 
given as gifts from one patrilineal clan to another through the institution of marriage. The 
bride, the gift, the object of exchange constitutes ‘a sign and value’ that opens a channel of 
exchange that not only serves the functional purpose of facilitating trade but performs the 
symbolic or ritualistic purpose of consolidating the internal bonds, the collective identity, of 
each clan differentiated through the act. In other words, the bride functions as a relational term 
between groups of men; she does not have an identity, and neither does she exchange one 
identity for another. She reflects masculine identity precisely through being the site of its 
absence. Clan members, invariably male, invoke the prerogative of identity through marriage, 
a repeated act of symbolic differentiation.  Exogamy distinguishes and binds patronymically 
specific kinds of men, Patrilineality is secured through the realistic expulsion of women and, 
reciprocally, the ritualistic importation of women. As wives, women not only secure the 
reproduction of the name (the functional purpose), but effect a symbolic intercourse between 
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clans of men. As the site of a patronymic exchange, women are and are not the patronymic 
sign excluded from the signifier, the very patronym they bear. The woman in marriage 
qualifies not as an identity, but only as a relational term that both distinguishes and binds the 
various clans to a common but internally differentiated patrilineal identity.”55  
 
In this context, the economization of women highlights their objectification as 
a precondition for intimacy, marriage. The expulsion and importation of women as if 
they were products creates an exogamic imperative. And this very imperative will 
determine the rules of kinship, thus, delimiting the options for intimacy and desire. 
Simultaneously, this system secures the hegemonic position of men and it forbids any 
non-heterosexual behavior that would jeopardize this position, i.e. other forms of 
intimacy. This exogamic trade requires the objectification of women, but necessarily 
where men are the objectifiers, preserving the subjection of women and the power of 
heterosexual men. Therefore, exogamy as a principle in kinship represents a 
heterosexist element in intimacy that perpetuates the heterosexual social structure. 
Exogamy, along with its objectification premise, validates a legalized morality on the 
structures of kinship, one that endorses the trade of women in a heterosexual economy. 
 
The legalization of desire 
 
In the discussion of the legalization of intimacy, it is necessary to highlight the 
legalization of desire. Desire in this context, is to be analyzed both as a noun and as a 
verb: What may you desire? And, may you desire at all? Starting with the second 
question, the action of desiring can be linked to an individual’s will and liberty, both 
physical and spiritual as reviewed in the constitutional guarantees in IV.2. The first 
question, however, turns out to be more complicated. Desire (the thought) and the 
object of desire must be legalized and legitimated by the state. Butler argues: “To be 
legitimated by the state is to enter into the terms of legalization offered there, and to 
find one’s public and recognizable sense of personhood is fundamentally dependent 
on the lexicon of that legitimation.”56 This legitimation creates a binary of (a) the 
permitted – the legal – and (b) the forbidden – the illegal. Those desires usually 
authorized by the state are the heterosexual and heterosexist ones, demonizing and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Butler (1990), pp. 52-53. 
56 Butler, Judith. Undoing Gender. USA: Routledge Classics, 2004. p. 105. 
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punishing the forbidden impulses. The legalization of these desires creates taboos for 
prohibited events like pedophilia and incest. There is a clear condemnation for 
pedophilia in the legalization of intimacy; this is consolidated with the minimum age 
requirement for any structure of intimacy. In the case of the Federal Civil Code in 
Mexico this is established in Art. 148, the minimum age for marriage is 16 for men 
and 14 for women.57 The moral message in this provision is delivered clearly: You 
must not desire intimacy with men under sixteen or women under fourteen years of 
age! In other words, the state legalizes intimacy after a certain age and simultaneously 
penalizes intimacy before then.58 Both for heterosexual and homosexual scenarios, as 
Butler has argued, “For both sides of the debate, the question is not only which 
relations of desire ought to be legitimated by the state but also who may desire the 
state, who may desire the state’s desire.”59 In a similar manner, the disapproval of 
incest is also expressed literally. One of the impediments for matrimony is kinship, 
both legal and biological vertical and collateral up until the third degree of 
separation.60 Judith Butler has also studied the incest taboo from a heterosexist 
perspective, revisiting the Lacanian psychoanalysis, “The symbolic is the realm of the 
Law which regulates desire in the Oedipus complex.”61 This symbolic representation 
is distinctly censured in the legalization of intimacy with an explicit ban on incest, 
whose moral context is: You must not have intimacy with your relatives! As 
expressed by Butler, the prohibition against incest is one “that makes sense only in 
terms of kinship relations in which various ‘positions’ are established within the 
family according to an exogamic mandate. In other words, a mother is someone with 
whom a son and daughter do not have sexual relations, and a father is someone with 
whom a son and daughter do not have sexual relations, a mother is someone who only 
has sexual relations with the father, and so forth.”62 In the The Elementary Structures 
of Kinship, Lévi-Strauss has claimed that biology does not require the incest taboo 
and that it is merely a cultural phenomenon.63 Biologically justified or not, incestuous 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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desire is discouraged and castigated.64 “In the Lévi-Straussian model, the position of 
man and woman is what makes possible certain forms of sexual exchange. In this 
sense, gender operates to secure certain forms of reproductive sexual ties and to 
prohibit other forms. One’s gender in this view is an index of the proscribed and 
prescribed sexual relations by which a subject is socially regulated and produced.”65 
The prescribed sexual activity is the one where procreation is possible, meaning that 
other forms of sexuality (as it is the case with incest) that would stop or may 
jeopardize reproduction are forbidden. As expressed by Butler, the law forbidding 
incest is the locus of an economy of kinship that prohibits endogamy.66 Going back to 
the heterosexist instruction of procreation, the incest taboo takes for granted a 
biological hazard not only for the potentially pregnant woman, but for heterosexuality 
in general. As clarified with incest and pedophilia, some desires are unwanted and 
forbidden by the state. In jurisdictions where same-sex intimacy has not been 
legalized, the tacit moral meaning of that omission is: Same-sex desire is forbidden. 
This is sometimes accompanied by the criminalization of sodomy. Supporters of gay 
marriage are not only advocating for a structure of intimacy, they are concurrently 
demanding the legalization of their very desires. Because, “…the sexual field is 
circumscribed in such a way that sexuality is already thought of in terms of marriage 
and marriage is already thought of as the purchase of legitimacy.”67 Consequently, the 
legalization of intimacy implies a legalization of desire that endorses an individual’s 
sexuality and free will. 
 
Another Sex for Gender? 
 
One of the problems with gender is the establishment of the binary system, male and 
female. This binarism does not allow any points in between, in the current universal 
culture only two sexes are intelligible and the existence of anything else is ignored or 
refuted. In her commentary on the politics of sexual discontinuity, Butler revisited the 
history of the French hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin. 68  Foucault wrote the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 In the Federal Criminal Code, Art. 272, incest is punished with up to six years in prison. 
65 Butler (2004), p. 47-48. 
66 Butler (1990), p. 56. 
67 Butler (2004), p. 106. 
68 Butler (1990), p. 127 et sqq. For reference see also: Foucault, Michel, ed. Herculine Barbin, Being 
the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Ninetenth Century Hermaphrodite, trans. Richard McDongall. 
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introduction to the publication of the journals of Herculine. Butler revisits this 
narrative and questions Foucault’s perspective. Herculine, this nineteenth-century 
hermaphrodite also known as Alexina, falls in love with Sara and becomes her lover. 
Eventually, Herculine discloses his/her genital secret to a doctor and a priest. In return, 
his/her revelation leads to his/her separation from Sara and a legal transformation of 
Alexina into a male form or citizenship. S/he is forced to dress as a man and to act as 
a man in public. His/Her love and desire for a woman motivated these men to 
determine Herculine must have been a man; because one may only desire a woman if 
one is a man. This determination implies a prohibition of a woman desiring another 
woman and it confirms that the legalization of desire is only possible as a mirror in 
the binary of gender. Before committing suicide, Herculine was almost in isolation 
and s/he claimed to soar above both sexes.69 S/he was for the most part angry at men 
“whose ‘title’ s/he sought to usurp in h/er intimacy with Sara and whom s/he now 
indicts without restraint as those who somehow forbid h/er the possibility of love.”70  
 
Hermaphroditism reminds us of the categorization of sex and its relationship 
with gender. First of all, the genitals present in hermaphrodites are both male and 
female organs. This represents a complication for science, especially considering that 
contemporary cultures only conceive two sexes. Is creating a new sex, a third sex the 
solution to this problem? The answer to this question can only be negative. The real 
problem is not only the dichotomization of sex, but also that the whole legal discourse 
is based upon this dualism. Constituting and instituting a new category of sex would 
only reinforce that idea and praxis that gender and sex must be intelligible for the 
application of law. The truth is, when it comes to human rights (especially equality), 
if justice is really blind, it does not have to comprehend an individual’s sex or gender 
to be fair. The goal is to remove all the imperatives that require segregation, such as 
the category of sex. Second, the social understanding of sex and gender dictates the 
nomination of a legal sex. This legal sexuality, independently of an identity, requires 
a male or female performance accordingly. When Herculine was transformed into a 
man, s/he did not change her body, his/her appearance was expected to be different, 
and his/her social rights and obligations as a man were amended consequently. In 
other words, her new social identity repositioned his/her worth before the eyes of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Butler (1990), p. 141. 
70 Ibidem 
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justice. And last but not least, Herculine’s intimacy with Sara ironically solved the 
equation of his/her sexuality. Before the eyes of priests and doctors using the formula 
of heterosexuality: 
 
Intimacy (Z) = Man (X) + Woman (Y). 
 
They believed that taking into account that Herculine/Alexina (X) had intimacy (Z) 
with Sara (Y), a woman, ergo X could only be a man (!) This limited perspective on 
intimacy negates any other combinations of love and desire. Thus, the categorization 
of sex is also a categorization of desire. And it is this classification what determines 
what is permitted and what is forbidden for a particular individual of a given sex. 
Hermaphrodites are clear victims of objectification. The social, clinical and legal 
discourses violate their integrity, reduce them to their bodies and deny their autonomy. 
Treating them as objects, they are sorted into the groups of male or female with a 
phallic classifier. Nonetheless, they also learn the principle of objectification and 
become objectifiers when it comes to intimacy. The words of Herculine confirm this 
fact when s/he implies having sexual relations with Sara she relates: “From that 
moment on, Sara belonged to me…!!!”71  With this eloquent choice of words, 
Herculine described her intimacy. Perhaps it is in intimacy where they find their only 
opportunity for agency. Going back to the original question, another sex for gender? 
Does the legal system need a sexual category for someone like Herculine so that s/he 
can legalize his/her intimacy? The problem is not the existence of a hermaphrodite, 
but rather the promotion and perpetuation of a legal system that demands a sexual 
index. Adding a third sex to the universe of gender would not be the most appropriate 
solution because the paradigm of classification would still be present. Another sex 
would not negate this discrimination; it would just validate it instead. Unlearning and 
undoing the category of sex would actually generate a more positive impact on the 
application of justice, with a legal system that discouraged the objectification and 
separation of individuals based on the phallism of their body parts. 
 
V.6. Conclusion 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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When it comes to sexuality, there is a subconscious and almost compulsive imperative 
to categorize individuals based on their preferences. Accordingly, those sorted out as 
heterosexuals qualify for the legalization of their intimacy automatically. Those left 
out are trying to fit in, via a heteronormative approach they try to buy an entry ticket 
to “the heterosexual club.” The gay activist fight for equal rights is embodied or 
reduced to the demand for same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, this is not the solution, 
or at least not the only one. Butler explores this issue with a question: “One critical 
question thus becomes, how does one oppose the homophobia without embracing the 
marriage norm as the exclusive and most highly valued social arrangement for queer 
sexual lives?”72  
 
Certainly, claiming marriage as an option for homosexuals is one way to fight 
homophobia. But, why is marriage the most valuable contract for intimacy? And, does 
this type of deal work for queer lifestyles? In the manufacturing of intimacy, the 
heterosexual recipe for intimacy should be considered as a sample, but not as the 
benchmark or role model. As argued in Chapter II, contemporary societies are 
evolving from a discourse of sex towards a discourse of intimacy. However, the 
current discourse of intimacy is still contaminated by the discourse of heterosexuality, 
and it is alarming that homosexuals are playing a game with cards that have been 
dealt by heterosexuals. The more the legislation moves towards a genderless intimacy, 
the more just it will be for all individuals, both heterosexuals and homosexuals, man, 
woman, transsexual or intersexual. Discovering one’s sexuality and gender identity is 
an epistemological process where gender is learned, performed and taught 
simultaneously by an individual. And whatever the discovery may be, individuals 
should not be deprived of the opportunity to legalize their intimacy with whomever 
they choose. An egalitarian legal system should provide a platform for the 
development of the citizen, regardless of their personal choices. Legal systems with a 
heterosexist tendency must not prescribe a formula for social arrangement that will 
not be applicable for different types of relationships and intimacies. As Butler points 
out, “what is most important is to cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for 
some, and similarly, to refrain from proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for 
some. The differences in position and desire set the limits to universality as an ethical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Butler (2004), p. 5. 
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reflex. The critique of gender norms must be situated within the context of lives as 
they are lived and must be guided by the question of what maximizes the possibilities 
for a livable life, what minimizes the possibility of unbearable life, or indeed, social 
or literal death.”73 She frames her argument in this utilitarian perspective where more 
possibilities should be promoted. It has been mentioned before that gay marriage is 
nothing but traditional marriage. Hence, the options are not really being maximized, 
they are being replicated or duplicated. New technologies in our times have opened 
the path for alternatives that other generations did not have, e.g. reproductive 
technologies. Laws regarding intimacy, however, have not been as diligent adapting 
these opportunities accordingly. Clinical developments have exponentially embraced 
Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), and yet, legislations constrain the opportunities 
that these technologies offer. Contemporary legislations on marriage are basically a 
heterosexual template for intimacy. The current challenge is to evolve beyond these 
templates and to come up with a new one, an enhanced version of an intimacy pact 
that would serve a larger and more equal population. How can this be accomplished in 
such a way that it provides the necessary protection for individuals while securing 
their autonomy and equality? This is not a simple question; it requires an exhaustive 
analysis of all the factors involved.  Since the beginning of this research, intimacy and 
its legislation has been defragmented with the use of the spheres and the structures of 
intimacy. The fundamental human rights around intimacy have been highlighted, as 
well as their protection by the Mexican Constitution. Considering that the core 
elements of intimacy have been reviewed, they shall now be consolidated in the next 
and final chapter in the form of a proposal for a functional structure of intimacy that 
takes into account all of the findings that have been discussed throughout this research. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Since the beginning of this research, the meaning of intimacy was questioned. Love, 
trust, closeness, self-disclosure, bonding, attachment, sexuality, support and 
commitment are ideas or interpretations of the concept of intimacy. The working 
definition provided in Chapter II synthesized intimacy as a close reciprocal 
relationship of future-oriented companionship with attachment in different private 
domains. After that definition was established, the outstanding question was: How is 
intimacy legalized? With the case study of Mexican Law, it has been clarified how 
close reciprocal relationships can be legalized. In different forms, and through a 
variety of legal mechanisms, intimacy can be regulated indeed. Nonetheless, are these 
forms of regulation appropriate? Are they flexible enough so that individuals can 
legalize their chosen standards of intimacy? And, most importantly, are these forms of 
legalization fair? Through the introduction and analysis of the spheres of intimacy, 
separate elements of intimacy could be identified. The sum of the emotional, the 
moral, the sexual, the economic and the constructive sphere constitute the 
conglomerate of intimacy. As discussed before, intimacy comes in different forms 
that have been called Structures of Intimacy in this research. Simple relationships, 
marriage, common-law marriage, putative marriage, same-sex marriage, civil unions 
and domestic or registered partnerships are different formations or structures of 
intimacy that have individual types of legalization. In the case study of Mexico, 
Chapter III analyzed matrimony, concubinage, cohabitation partnerships and civil 
pacts of solidarity; and their contrasting advantages and disadvantages. Considering 
the entire discovery in these legalized structures of intimacy, can it be said that there 
is a perfect formula for the legalization of intimacy? This research can only answer 
this question in a negative way. Hence, this last chapter will provide a proposal to 
legalize intimacy differently, in the form of a Family Contract. The ideas that will 
follow in the next sections of this chapter shall serve as a recommendation that may or 
may not be followed up by legislators, courts, stakeholders and individuals, in Mexico 
and in other countries. After all, as discussed in Chapter IV, human rights and 
intimacy are closely interrelated. Intimacy is a relatively universal topic for human 
beings, regardless of their culture and citizenship. Therefore, any advise for a new 
form of legalization of intimacy in Mexico can be considered in other parts of the 
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world as well. The proposal for a new type of legalization of intimacy comes after the 
analysis of the problems observed in the current forms of legalization. Moreover, it 
takes into account the fundamental rights of individuals and their right to intimacy. 
This concluding proposal does not attempt to negate the status quo on the legalization 
of intimacy. It merely suggests a new recipe for a more inclusive structure of intimacy 
that can embrace contemporary realities of intimacies in our societies.    
 
VI.1. Unlearning Marriage 
 
In order to conceive a new form of legalization of intimacy, the first step must be to 
“unlearn” what we know about the most popular form of intimacy: Marriage. As 
discussed before, traditional opposite-sex marriage is the expected form of intimacy 
for individuals in many countries around the world. Therefore, one must unlearn 
marriage and the expectations around it, and be prepared for new types of intimacy 
that do not follow the traditional paradigms of marriage. As pointed out by Elizabeth 
Brake, 1  there are two main approaches to the arrangement of marriage: the 
contractual and the institutional view. 
 
The contractual view of marriage denotes a scheme of rights and obligations 
outlined in the form of clauses as any other commercial agreement. The clauses on the 
marital contract represent promises or pledges to specific duties or prohibitions that 
spouses are willing to comply with in their intimacy. These clauses are preset 
provisions, and in some cases, spouses have the right to choose between two options. 
For instance, choosing between community or separate property. All stipulations 
regarding the marriage contract are usually determined by Civil Codes, or by separate 
legislations that shape the marital contract. Unlike other types of contracts, the 
marriage contract is drafted by legislators and is only executed by individuals. Thus, 
individuals are left with a socialized and legalized understanding of intimacy that they 
must adopt as theirs. 
 
The institutional view of marriage seems to be a social and morally dictated 
view of marriage that citizens must abide by and that limits their liberty when it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Brake, Elizabeth, "Marriage and Domestic Partnership", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Section 3. 
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comes to making personal decisions. Blake adds that “much like the professional 
moral obligations of a doctor; to become a doctor, one must voluntarily accept the 
role and its obligations, but one cannot negotiate the content of these obligations.”2 
Hence, marriage construed as an institution bestows social obligations that even 
spouses cannot modify. In other words, individuals are free and have the right to 
marry, but they lose their freedom and leverage as soon as they get married. While 
considering marriage as an institution, philosophers like John Stuart Mill have pointed 
out the inequalities that the institution promoted: “The relation between husband and 
wife is very like that between lord and vassal, except that the wife is held to more 
unlimited obedience than the vassal was.”3 Under this premise, it can be said that not 
all institutions are good. And, that the fact that marriage might be considered an 
institution, it does not make it a perfect one, or one that must be perpetuated ad 
infinitum. Furthermore, it is still debatable whether marriage per se is the institution.4 
Marriage can be considered an institution only in the inseparable connection with the 
construct of “Family.” That is to say, marriage is rather an instrument of the 
institution of the family. Therefore, the institutional component of marriage is rather 
an extension of the institution of The Family. Undoubtedly, the family is a social 
institution. As mentioned in Chapter IV.3.2., the UDHR already acknowledges the 
family group unit of society that is entitled to the protection by society and the State. 
Nonetheless, having a family is also possible without marriage. Consequently, the 
institution or instrument of marriage is not as necessary or as fundamental as the more 
robust institution of the family. 
 
Considering both approaches, which one of them is more appropriate for the 
legalization of intimacy? This research supports the idea that intimacy should be 
regulated as a contract. One of the problems with the institutional perspective of 
intimacy is that it is laden with a social (including religious) morality that imposes 
behavior on individuals. This imposition diminishes the liberty of individuals and 
overrides the “freedom of contract” principle. In their intimacy, individuals should 
keep their ability to choose the conditions of their contractual terms – written or not – 
in their emotional, sexual, social, economic and constructive spheres. In other words, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Ibidem, Section 3.2.!
3 Mill, John Stuart. The subjection of women. London: Savill, Edwards and Co. Printers, 1869. p. 150. 
4 See: Dorsen, Norman, et al. Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials. Second Edition. 
USA: West, 2010.  pp. 632-651. 
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the laissez-faire state policy should apply not only to economics, but also to the 
individual’s entitlement to intimacy. The current paradigms of marriage as the norm 
for intimacy have to evolve in a different way that allows societies to structure their 
intimacies differently. This process of unlearning marriage should begin with 
adequate legislation to divorce intimacy from marriage. That is to say, the legalization 
of intimacy should not be made according to the standards of marriage anymore. 
 
The process of unlearning marriage must be accompanied by a proper 
educational program. That means, that a new legalization of intimacy must include 
regulation on the education system so that it can accommodate a new education 
curriculum that will include other types of intimacy. If individuals have the right to 
intimacy, they must also have the right to be informed about it. Just as set out by Art. 
3 par. 2 in the Mexican Constitution, the education system must foster respect for 
human rights and justice, public schools curricula should then embrace a wider scope 
of intimacy that will inform citizens and future citizens of their legal options for 
intimacy, in the all-encompassing human rights protection. Because one can only 
grasp the idea of new forms of intimacy when there is more than one option available. 
The current education system is only promoting heterosexual values, and it would be 
fair to include different forms of intimacy in public education materials, so as to 
inform students and people in general about other forms of intimacy while teaching 
the values of equality. 
 
VI.2. A proposal for the Legalization of Intimacy in the 21st Century 
 
This research has advised the reader to unlearn marriage in order to legalize intimacy 
differently. Now, the following paragraphs will propose an approach to legalize 
intimacy more efficiently and more fairly. First, consider why should intimacy be 
legalized at all? Intimacy between individuals creates a pact, an agreement, a 
covenant, a deal, a contract. Be it in written form or consuetudinary, individuals 
create a free and private treaty that should be acknowledged by the state. Not 
necessarily determined by the state, but undoubtedly recognized and enforced 
officially; primarily for the protection of the individuals who form that intimacy and 
for the individuals that might arise from that family unit, but also for the security of 
third parties that might be affected by this intimacy. Therefore, the approach for the 
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legalization of intimacy proposed here is also one of contractual nature. Second, the 
twentieth century was marked by a flexibility of intimacy, including no-fault divorce, 
interracial marriages, the typification of spousal rape as a crime, and the trend to 
secularize marriage in general. Nevertheless, all these ideas and movements orbited 
around the axis of marriage, in a heterosexist manner. The reality in the twenty-first 
century is a different one, with phenomena that include globalization, different 
population growth patterns, changing economic factors, new forms of reproduction, 
etc. A new form of legalization of intimacy must take into account all these changes 
and embrace them accordingly. Third, the analysis of the Spheres of Intimacy 
introduced in Chapter II has identified the most fundamental elements of intimacy, 
both in abstract and in pragmatic terms. Consequently, the proposal for a new form of 
legalization of intimacy must and will obviously include the domains of the spheres of 
intimacy as well. What this new suggestion for legalization creates is rather a new 
structure of intimacy, a flexible one that would be structured and determined by 
individuals more freely.  This structure is basically a foundation where individuals 
will be able to structure their own structure of intimacy.  
 
 The character of a new legalization of intimacy should be a more flexible and 
adjustable one. All individuals are different, and the acknowledgement of particular 
differences in tastes, preferences and lifestyles can only lead to a more understanding 
legalization where the terms of behavior and commitment between partners are 
customized by them, not by the state. Going back to Cohen’s ideas, “The previously 
hegemonic form of intimate association –monogamous, heterosexual, permanent, 
patriarchal marriage – with its rigid gender norms, moralistic attitude towards sex, 
and explicit homophobia, was widely acknowledged to constitute a public status 
regime directly regulated and enforced by the state.”5 This should evolve towards a 
more individual form of association that is self-regulated, as she suggests, the 
legislative goals in the domain of intimacy should be to “regulate self-regulation.”6 
She concludes that, “The only way to secure freedom, equality, and the chance of 
happiness for everyone in this domain is to let go of unhelpful approaches, embrace 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Cohen, Jean L. Regulating Intimacy: A new legal paradigm.  USA: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
p. 182. 
6 Ibidem, p. 178. 
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the paradigm shift, and reflect together on the choices it opens up for us.”7 In the 
same line of logic, this research now proposes a form of intimacy that can be self-
regulated by individuals. The state should enable a platform where citizens can 
regulate their cohabitation and harmony by themselves; and of course, regardless of 
their gender, guarantee equal access to both men and women. 
 
VI.2.1. You name it! 
 
What should be the appropriate name of a new form of legalized intimacy? Having 
analyzed the different structures of intimacy, and having asked the reader to unlearn 
marriage, how should this new form of intimacy be called? Although the name might 
seem irrelevant, the debate around gay marriage has shown that many people have 
problems with the use of the term “Marriage”. Conservatives, for the most part, cling 
to the defense of the word marriage based on religious reasons or whatever. The 
Defense of Marriage Act,8 known as “DOMA” in the United States is a clear example 
of the fight for the wording of spouses and marriage. The act provided a clear 
definition to be inserted in the United States Code: 
 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.''9 
 
This part of the act ended up being declared as unconstitutional in a landmark 
Supreme Court decision on June 26, 2013.10 However, it does show that opting for the 
word marriage has been controversial in the debate of same-sex marriage, in the 
United States and abroad. At the end of the day, the chosen word is a euphemism and 
what really counts is the protection of human rights granted by any given form of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Ibidem, p. 203.!
8  DOMA. Pub.L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, enacted September 21, 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C 
9 Ibidem. Section 3.!
10 United States v. Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer, et al. No. 12-307. Argued March 27, 
2013. Decided on June 26, 2013, 570 U.S. ___2013. 
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intimacy. Therefore, the more people fight for the use of the word marriage, the more 
they drift apart from the argument of equality and liberty. 
 
The word marriage is nowadays too contaminated. And so are the concepts of 
gay and same-sex marriage, because they have been exposed to heteronormative 
discourses. The best thing to do is to move forward with a different name. New is 
better. Choosing a new name should secure that all individuals are included and that a 
new form of intimacy does not discriminate access unfairly. As discussed earlier, 
marriage is also just the instrument, but the actual institution observed is the family. 
An intimacy builds a family unit, even with two partners without children; their 
intimacy has a binding effect that pushes them to act as a family unit. Considering the 
institution of the family and the contractual personality of intimacy, one of the 
appropriate names would be: Family Contract. For the purposes of this argument, this 
research will consolidate the proposal for a twenty-first century legalization of 
intimacy in the nominated name, Family Contract. 
  
VI.2.2. The elements of a Family Contract 
 
After the establishment of the name for this suggested form of legalized intimacy, the 
core elements of this type of contract must be highlighted. These items should be seen 
as a checklist for the legalization of an intimacy. These elements are factors or 
variables that must be established in the structure of the contract, however, 
individuals must have the liberty to determine the conditions and specific resolutions 
on each one of them. This includes the possibility of adding ad hoc clauses to dictate 
the behavior and governance of their intimacy. 
 
A. Parties 
 
While discussing gender in Chapter V, the binary morphology of intimacy was 
identified as a gender-permeated element. Shifting from male-female relationships to 
male-male or female-female relationships does not change the fact that these 
intimacies still rely on the premise that intimacy can only happen between two 
individuals. A new form of legalized intimacy should be more inclusive and allow 
multiple members of an intimacy, enabling partners to decide how many members 
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they want to include in the family unit. Consequently, a family contract should be 
open to relationships that engage more than two adults and without limitation 
acknowledging their freedom of contract as adults. There should be no limitation or 
discrimination (as long as they are of legal age) to engage in a family contract; the sex, 
gender, sexuality, intersexuality or transsexuality should not hinder their eligibility for 
a given family contract. 
 
B. Duration 
 
Nothing lasts forever, especially in contemporary societies with multiple factors that 
change in an environment that individuals alone can no longer control. As a result, the 
myth of “Till death do us part” has become ever so outdated. What is then the ideal 
duration of a family contract? Only the signatories can define the answer. The 
suggestion here is to determine an initial term, subject to renewal, renegotiation or 
reaffirmation of the clauses in the family contract. In other words, the contract should 
be designed for an initial duration with renewal intervals instead of trying to believe 
in the myth of eternity in intimacy, which may of course happen, but the approach 
should be to see the contract as a renewable commitment. 
 
C. The Spheres of Intimacy in the Family Contract 
 
After the introduction of the spheres of intimacy, the third chapter of this dissertation 
identified all the legal elements of these spheres in the different types of structures of 
intimacy in Mexico. In the Family Contract, as a new suggested structure, the legal 
components of intimacy in every sphere will now be detailed. 
 
a) The emotional sphere of the Family Contract 
 
Individuals who decide to sign a family contract should be able to modify their legal 
status, from “single” to “committed” or a similar word that denotes their new 
obligations and rights. The objective would be to grant them a specific and publicly 
recognized status that will enable them to claim any public rights, but also any 
entitlements in the private domain. For instance, having their employers acknowledge 
 209 
their family partners for private events and benefits, or hospitals recognizing a 
partner’s right to visit a patient they are committed to. 
 
Closely linked to an individual’s right to change their status comes the right to 
legal guardianship. Partners who choose to sign a family contract do so because they 
trust the partner they are committing to. In the event that one of the partners becomes 
ill or loses their legal capacity to make decisions, their partner should have the 
automatic legal guardianship to care for that person. However, individuals should 
keep the right to appoint a third party for the duty of legal guardianship if they decide 
to have another relative or individual they trust. Ideally, the default legal guardianship 
should be granted to the family partner, unless otherwise advised by the signatories 
when they formalize or amend their family contracts.  
 
It has been pointed out before, that for many individuals it is very important to 
formalize their intimacy in a particular ceremony. The means of formalization is also 
an emotional element that should be considered for a Family Contract and individuals 
should have the right to make their intimacy official at a civil registry or an analogous 
public office where they feel comfortable and fairly acknowledged for the celebration 
of their intimacy in a public environment. 
 
b) The moral sphere of the Family Contract 
 
In the best-case scenario, a family contract should remain as objective and as fair as 
possible. This should also include, avoiding pre-conceived moralities on spousal 
duties, and opting for a more balanced distribution of duties. As mentioned before, 
gender usually plays a big role in the moral sphere. In the family contract, nonetheless, 
there should be gender equality for access to this structure of intimacy; but also, for 
the labor division in the family unit. Cornelia Fine points out that, “Both the 
breadwinner and the caregiver roles are, of course, necessary. Without the 
breadwinner there is no money for food. But without the caregiver, the food is not 
cooked; there is no clean plate on which to place it; and the children are living naked, 
filthy and wild in the garden, communicating by way of a primitive system of grunts. 
The ‘separate spheres’ of men and women – his public, her private – were seen as 
complimentary and equally, but in an Animal Farm-ish some-spheres-are-more-equal-
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than-others sort of way.”11 She adds, “Not until 1974 did US legislation require that 
married women be able to apply for credit in their own names. And it was only in 
1994 that it became possible in the eyes of the law for a British husband to rape his 
wife. I mention these points not to lower the mood, but simply to highlight the 
asymmetry of power and status in the traditional marriage contract.”12 Undoubtedly, 
one of the challenges of the family contract is to manage and to cope with the 
allocation of roles in the family in order to reach a type of contract where power is not 
asymmetric. 
 
In general, people do not like to plan for negative scenarios, like death or 
illness. Nonetheless, it is very important that the family contract foresee a scenario of 
termination, a “way-out.” No contract should enslave a signatory forever. With this 
premise, the family contract should provide a clause where individuals are able to 
resign freely. One of the problems with intimacies is that sometimes they also have a 
short shelf life. A family contract should certainly stipulate the conditions for 
termination/separation and the course of action to take afterwards, including due 
notification to the affected party (or parties). Ideally, it should establish a minimum 
notification period of three months or so before further action is initiated. Regardless 
of the mechanisms, no moral justification should prevent an individual from 
separating. The approach for termination should be one where damages are reduced or 
avoided, for the members of the family unit and also for third parties. 
 
c) The sexual sphere of the Family Contract 
 
For most intimacies, the sexual sphere plays a big role, undoubtedly, a more relevant 
one during the initial phase of the relationship. How important should this be in the 
Family Contract? First, it should be considered whether there is a sexual obligation at 
all. And second, the exclusivity of sexual relations should be determined by the 
parties. As pointed out when analyzing the four structures of intimacy in Mexican 
Law, there is no sexual obligation in any of them. Although it is implicit that spouses, 
concubines, or civil partners have sexual intercourse; they are not obliged to do so by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Fine, Cordelia. Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism Create Difference. 
USA: W.W. Norton, 2011. p. 79. 
12 Ibidem 
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the mere fact that they are in a legally recognized structure of intimacy. In the Family 
Contract, this non-obligation should be respected as well, because an individual’s 
physical integrity or intrinsic privacy should not be ignored after signing into any 
structure of intimacy. 
 
 Moreover, the very same personal liberty that allows an individual to choose 
their partner for intimacy should allow them to a sexual liberty after they engage in an 
intimacy as long as the other party or parties are informed and accept that. Therefore, 
the Family Contract should include a provision where partners declare whether they 
want to have sexual exclusivity or not. This exclusivity could be waived as long as all 
parties agree to modify the conditions of their contract. For the protection of 
signatories individually, and their health, it is important to protect them with due 
notification and conditional acceptance of any new terms regarding their sexual 
practices. It is unfair when only one partner takes advantage of an open sexuality, 
while the other is limited to an exclusive sexual arrangement. Being informed of the 
sexual rules for the intimacy is a right that partners should have and that should be 
included as a provision since the creation of the Family Contract. Nonetheless, all 
parties should have the right to enjoy their sexual liberties with the proper amendment 
or termination of the contract. 
 
The issue of sexual exclusivity leads to the question of the multiplicity of 
Family Contracts. On one hand, it should be possible to include more than one partner 
in the Family Contract. On the other, should individuals be free to sign more than one 
Family Contract? In other words, should Family Contracts encourage monogamy?  
This issue should be resolved by partners. Although it is already complicated enough 
to have one structure of intimacy with one partner, individuals should still have the 
liberty to engage in another intimacy as long as it is accepted by their partners. That is 
to say, during the creation of the Family Contract, all parties should determine 
whether they will keep the right to engage in other concurrent intimacies. These are 
the types of personal decisions that individuals must be able to determine freely 
according to their own morals and standards, and not to those dictated by society and 
the state. Partners should decide whether they will be able to sign additional Family 
Contracts o not. 
 
212 
d) The economic sphere of the Family Contract 
 
How can an intimacy survive in the twenty-first century without the appropriate 
economic arrangements? It is very difficult, if not impossible, to think of a structure 
of intimacy where the economy does not affect the behavior of partners and their 
interactions. Thus, the Family Contract should include all the economic provisions 
that will regulate the management of income and assets, alimony and any applicable 
compensation of damages. 
 
 In order to maintain an even-handed system of justice within an intimacy, it 
should be clear since the creation of the Family Contract how the income will be 
generated, managed, and distributed among members of the family unit. A fair 
generation and allocation of resources will provide a platform within the family where 
injustices will be minimized. In contemporary societies where both partners in 
intimacy work, the power structure within the family changes. Domestic governance 
is also determined by the ability of partners to bring home additional funds. Hence, 
the Family Contract should allow clauses where partners can decide on the 
administration of their income and their estate in general. This includes 
straightforward rules for the new status of the properties and possessions that partners 
had before the creation of the family contract, the patrimony during the maturity of 
the intimacy, and unambiguous terms for the redistribution of assets after a potential 
termination or separation. What some jurisdictions allow as a pre-nuptial agreement 
(informally known as a pre-nup) should be incorporated directly in the Family 
Contract as a fundamental part of the family pact. Beyond the simple community or 
separate property binarism, these clauses should be more specific and include 
different scenarios, both positive and negative. These scenarios should foresee death 
of partners, and how assets will be transferred accordingly; as well as voluntary and 
involuntary separation and termination. 
 
Furthermore, the economic sphere may include the potential obligation to 
provide financial support for children or former partners. Among the terms for the 
distribution of assets after termination or separation, the Family Contract should 
include the obligation of partners to provide financial support even after the intimacy 
has come to an end. This should be regulated by partners and consider the length and 
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dimension of the obligation. For instance, temporary support during the notification of 
termination period, or alimony for children until they reach legal age. Lastly, partners 
should foresee and outline a scenario for a compensation of damages. Many 
commercial contracts end up in unexpected situations that create damages. In 
intimacy, considering the economic sphere of the structure, individuals might incur in 
the generation of damages to their partners. The affected party should be able to claim 
the corresponding economic compensation for the damages caused due to the 
violation of any of the clauses in the Family Contract. The time invested in intimacy 
also may represent an opportunity cost for an individual. If the terms of the family 
contract are ignored or contravened, the affected individual should be entitled to some 
compensation as initially provided in the contract. If all of these obligations are 
defined since the formulation of the Family Contract, individuals will be able to 
assess the limits and the magnitude of their liability before they make the decision to 
commit to any obligations.  
 
e) The constructive sphere of the Family Contract 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are issues in a relationship that represent the 
foundation, the constructive sphere of intimacy. They include, among others, 
parenthood, reproduction, adoption and inheritance. Considering the two types of 
construction described, an intimacy may have a horizontal or a vertical structure. In a 
horizontal one, the founders of the intimacy, the partners have reciprocal obligations 
and rights. The right to inherit one’s patrimony to a partner in the Family Contract 
should be established by default. Choosing a different person as a heir should be an 
option. But, in cases where no heir has been determined, the partner in the Family 
Contract should be considered as the primary heir along with descendants, if any.  
 
Descendant(s) is the keyword that brings the focus to the second type of 
construction, a vertical form of intimacy. Some partners in intimacy may decide to 
include children to expand or perpetuate their family unit. Individuals who sign a 
Family Contract should be able to have their own children via traditional biological 
reproduction, to adopt children or to use new means of technology in fertility to assist 
them in the biological reproduction, such as surrogacy. A Family Contract should 
represent the legal nest for the incubation of a newborn, regardless of the methods of 
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reproduction. Also, there are many individuals who decide to create an intimacy after 
a divorce or single parenthood, a Family Contract should allow them to include a 
mechanism to acknowledge the new relationship or kinship between the children of 
previous intimacies and the new partners of a parent. It is quite common to have 
stepsiblings and stepparents, but they are almost never legally linked. It is rather 
complicated to get the legal guardianship of a stepchild, even if the stepparent has 
spent more time and effort than the biological parent raising that child. Sometimes 
this void of acknowledgement represents an obstacle when travelling or visiting 
relatives at a hospital, let alone claiming any inheritance rights. A Family Contract 
should establish provisions that create a new form of legal kinship in the stepparent-
stepchild-stepsibling triangle. And the state should recognize these family ties with 
equal rights and obligations, considering that if parents have decided to include these 
individuals in their family units, the state cannot restrict the legally recognized 
kinship based upon an old abstraction of family structures where divorce was not 
possible and individuals did not move on with their lives to construct a subsequent 
structure of intimacy. In this century, these new forms of kinship should be legalized 
and embraced by a new form of legalized intimacy. This would enable individuals to 
have equal rights and obligations despite their family history. 
 
Moreover, choosing a common last name should be an option for partners in a 
Family Contract, be it the last name of one of the partners, a composite one, a 
hyphenated one, an anagram, an acronym or a completely new one for the new family 
they will construct. The chosen last name should be transferable to children as well. 
As argued before, cross-cultural relationships are not isolated events anymore, and 
immigration laws are crucial for many families. In order to guarantee the cohesion of 
a family unit, signing a Family Contract should allow individuals to have their 
partners in their country of residency, no matter what citizenship they have, and they 
should not be subject to discriminatory restrictions. The state should recognize an 
individual’s entitlement to have a foreign partner as a legal resident in the country 
where the intimacy will be established, and eventually, wherever they decide to move. 
In view of the relevance of international or cross-border intimacies it is also important 
to develop the role of the jurisdiction in the Family Contract. 
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D. Jurisdiction 
 
As is the case with most contracts, it will be particularly important to determine a 
jurisdiction in order to avoid the phenomenon of forum shopping. The current 
globalized world demands a mobility of individuals and their families. This 
international mobility of intimacies creates problems of conflict of laws. Hence, 
intimacies become mobile or nomadic – voluntarily or involuntarily – and the 
enforcement of the commitment of these intimacies becomes more complicated. It 
would be absurd to think that a couple would engage in a new form of intimacy in a 
different legal system every time they move to a new country. For this reason, the 
“portability” of the family contract is pivotal. It is necessary to contemplate a new 
international order of civil status and international registration and recognition of 
intimacies. 
 
For the establishment of the jurisdiction, it is important to consider at least three 
principles that will affect the intimacy: 
 
a) Primary jurisdiction. In most cases, the primary jurisdiction is that of the 
place where the contract or ceremony is celebrated, under the principle of lex 
loci celebrationis. Therefore, it is important to choose carefully the place 
where the intimacy will be legalized. 
 
b) Country of citizenship. Regardless of the country where the intimacy was 
legalized or celebrated, the country of citizenship or nationality of the 
individuals who engage in that intimacy is also relevant. Following the 
doctrine of lex patriae, an intimacy may be affected by the laws of the country 
of citizenship of the individuals who ultimately form it. 
 
c) Place of residency. Independently of the country of citizenship and the place 
where an intimacy was legalized, the obligations of individuals because of that 
intimacy may vary if they change residency to a different country, according 
to the lex domicilii approach, the local laws of the country of residency of 
individuals could be applicable to their intimacy. 
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Therefore, it should be strongly advised to determine the jurisdiction of a family 
contract; and to decide up to what degree, these principles of private international law 
will affect the rights and obligations of an intimacy; not only at the beginning, but 
also throughout the maturity of that intimacy. 
 
E. Registration 
 
As part of the process of legalization, the registration of the family contract is 
important so that the document can become a public record. Civil, cohabitation and 
domestic partnerships, as well as matrimonies are usually registered at the local or 
corresponding civil registry. A similar process should work for the family contract. In 
addition to that, the economic sphere of the intimacy is also important before third 
parties. Therefore, and ideally, a type of contract like this one should have the option 
for registration at the local commercial registry as well. Not exclusively, but as a 
subsequent and optional registration of the commitments outlined in the family 
contract. Especially, considering the impact that intimacy may have on an individual’s 
patrimony. 
 
VI.2.3. Scope of Application 
 
The content and rationale of this proposal is mainly to inform of a new possibility for 
the legalization of intimacy. These ideas may motivate legislators to submit 
amendments to the civil code in Mexico or elsewhere. But also, to advise constituents 
and stakeholders on how to approach intimacy in the fight for equal rights for same-
sex relationships. Needless to say, this proposal to legalize intimacy differently is not 
a proposal to legislate gay marriage. This proposal sets the common ground for 
partners and intimacies of any sex and gender roles. 
 
a. Legislation of the Family Contract 
 
If a new form of intimacy will be legally recognized, it must go though the legislative 
process first. The implicit suggestion in this research is that the issue of intimacy begs 
for a reform. Particularly in the case of Mexico, some states have already made 
progress allowing same-sex partners to engage in matrimony. Nonetheless, the 
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arguments presented throughout this dissertation have detailed the inefficiencies of 
marriage as it is now. The civil code must be compatible with contemporary families 
and lifestyles. Therefore, it is urgent to legislate reforms that will embrace and 
accommodate these changes. The message to legislators is clear: Please include 
equality, liberty and privacy in the current federal and local provisions regarding 
intimacy. It is necessary, these obsolete legislations must be amended; these must 
change as soon as possible to stop further human rights violations. 
 
b. Social Activism and Advocacy 
 
The recommendation for social advocates is to reconsider what they are fighting for. 
It has been underlined before in the fallacy and algebra of gay marriage that gay 
marriage is intrinsically heteronormative. In spite of the fact that the activism for gay 
rights attempts to get the acknowledgement of equality, liberty and privacy for same-
sex couples; it should be considered that the same means of activism reinstate and 
consolidate heterosexuality as the norm. Therefore, this research also invites activist 
to rethink and to double-check the paradox behind the logic of the arguments they are 
defending. 
 
c. Individuals 
 
And last, but not least, individuals who read this piece of research are also encouraged 
to sit down and assess their current structure of intimacy. Is it legalized? Have all the 
spheres of intimacy been considered in the most adequate manner to protect the 
interests of the family unit legally? Many individuals, gay and straight, never consider 
the legal aspects of their intimacy until they face a real problem. The issues that have 
been underscored in this research are clear indicators of the potential problems that a 
family unit could have or could avoid. Therefore, the invitation for individuals is to 
examine the legal aspects of their intimacies and to find a way to address them 
promptly. 
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VI.3. The Future of Intimacy 
 
As long as societies continue to evolve, what is understood by the word “intimacy” 
will keep changing constantly. Traditional marriage is becoming an obsolete form of 
intimacy, while assisted reproduction, surrogacy, adoption and same-sex unions are 
being legalized in more jurisdictions. Hence, what is the future of intimacy? On one 
hand, there is a reality of intimacy that individuals shape and redefine everyday. This 
reality develops with the maturity of societies and their degree of tolerance, openness, 
fairness, and their respect for privacy. On the other hand, there is a future of legalized 
intimacy. The democratization of societies demands the inclusion, protection and 
enforcement of human rights. In this century, and hopefully in many to follow, 
individuals should be entitled to the legalization of their intimacy the way they want 
to live it and with whom they want to do it. This dissertation has pointed out the 
importance of equality, privacy, dignity and liberty in their connection with intimacy. 
The discrimination of same-sex intimacies is a clear violation of fundamental human 
rights. The upcoming decades should bring about many positive changes in the 
acknowledgement of an individual’s right to intimacy. Both the legislative and 
judicial bodies will play a key role. Legislators must realize that societies need to 
embrace new forms of intimacy, and enact appropriate legislation. Nevertheless, they 
should keep in mind that the best approach is to regulate for self-regulation, 
recognizing the rights of individuals to draft the rules of their own intimacy, not 
necessarily following the moral rules dictated by the state. The judiciary is also 
competent for legal transformation; Courts should be able to defend the basic human 
rights of individuals, granting them equal rights to intimacy regardless of their sex, 
gender or any other preferences. Justices have the power to make changes that will 
protect individual liberties, in many cases, just by applying current laws that prevent 
discrimination. In Mexico, some states have already enabled new structures of 
intimacy at the state level. In the years to come, the Mexican Supreme Court of 
Justice must resolve that restricting marriage to opposite-sex spouses is a 
discriminatory practice that violates the fundamental human rights granted by the 
Mexican Constitution.  Likewise, the Congress can enact adequate legislation that 
prevents this discrimination. Whether either body will act promptly, still remains to 
be seen. However, the judicial, legislative and executive branches, they all have the 
obligation to respect fundamental legal rights. This research has analyzed the 
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legalization of intimacy thoroughly. Yet, there is a related issue that should be taken 
into account: the right to be single. Because the right to privacy leads us to the right to 
intimacy in the same axiom that it leads us to the right to solitude. The inertia to 
engage in intimacy and to negate solitude can also be construed as a heterosexist 
obligation coming from the social pressure to get married. The right to bachelorhood, 
the right to that utmost privacy, the right to solitude should also be acknowledged. 
And considering equally all those individuals who do not want to engage in intimacy, 
although they have the right to, their right to solitude should also be respected. It 
should be observed that legal provisions that reward intimacy with social benefits are 
sometimes also penalizing single individuals. Taxation in many jurisdictions, for 
example in Mexico, is unfair to single people; it rewards married people with benefits 
while it punishes single people for their decision to remain single or their inability to 
change that condition. Therefore, legal bachelorhood as a mirror of legal intimacy, is 
a phenomenon that could also be analyzed in a separate research. The true 
development of intimacy and bachelorhood will grow exponentially as societies drift 
apart from marriage and traditional paradigms of relationships and intimacy. New 
forms of legalization of intimacy will have an impact on people, not only in 
contemporary societies, but also in the future. Hopefully, there will be a time when 
history books will narrate the period of time when only heteronormative intimacy was 
possible and how it changed for a more inclusive legal recognition of intimacy. The 
legalization of new forms of intimacy will bring positive social changes that will be 
easily identified by future generations. Among others, by legally embracing other 
forms of intimacy, the state sends a clear message of social justice to its citizens: 
Basic human rights are protected. And, this very protection of human rights is a 
pivotal element of any State of Law. If there is a real state of justice in Mexico, the 
legalization of intimacy shall encompass liberty, dignity, equality and privacy. At a 
federal level, this is not yet the case. The optimistic expectation is that there will be 
positive legal changes in the following years that will enable a better legalization of 
intimacy, only time will tell. 
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ADDITIONAL NOTES 
 
1 All bible passages were cited from: The Holy Bible. New International Version.  
USA: The Zondervan Corporation, 1995-2010. They are available online and 
updated as of September 24, 2013. URL = <http://www.biblegateway.com/> 
 
2 Mexican Laws and their amendments can be found online on the website of the 
Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados).  
URL = <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/> 
 
3 Unless otherwise specified, all translations into English have been made by the 
author of this dissertation. 
 
